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Business performance management and measurement (PMM) systems are often 
viewed as relatively recent phenomena, responding to the failure of historical 
practices which prioritised financial measures. Emerging at the start of the 1990's, 
the topic has proven popular among both academics and practitioners alike; 
Kaplan and Norton's article on the "Balanced Scorecard - Measures that Drive 
Performance" is the third most cited Harvard Business Review article since the 
1950's.  However, despite the subsequent research, PMM systems have not lived 1
up to their early promise and there have been recent calls for a complete re-think 
of the discipline. Contributing to the debate on its future direction, this thesis 
explores how firms have measured and managed their performance in the past. It 
describes the cases of three British multiple retailers and analyses the 
organisation structures, processes and measures that they used to manage 
performance between 1920 and 1970. The findings raise questions about some of 
the core principles and assumptions that have underpinned PMM research over 
the last 25 years. They show that before 1950, far from being imposed through 
command and control processes, performance was managed collaboratively 
where the objective was not control but learning. They highlight the importance of 
socio-cultural factors and support the view that PMM systems should be 
considered social systems. They challenge whether measures deserve the central 
role that they are assumed to take in a modern PMM system. Finally, the findings 
show the importance of informal practices used by managers and directors and 
question whether these, rather than formal structures and processes, offer the 
best opportunity to understand performance holistically.
 "Decades of Influence", Harvard Business Review, November 2012.1
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The aim of the thesis is to take a current business issue and then, through the 
examination of historical sources, identify insights which improve our 
understanding of the issue. It is based on Gaddis' conviction that the purpose of 
history is "to interpret the past for the purposes of the present with a view to 
managing the future" and reflects the concerns raised by Scranton:
"I believe that unless business history reframes its question sets and 
restocks its conceptual imaginary through sustained critique, the field may 
well become self-extinguishing, a consequence of holding fast to visions of 
a past that rest mute in relation to present circumstances and looming 
dilemmas in business and society."2
The current business issue relates to business performance management and 
measurement. Performance management and measurement (PMM) is a broad 
term which includes all of the structures, processes and performance measures 
that a business uses to achieve its objectives. It is a topic which emerged in 
academic literature in the early 1990's although its roots stretch back much further. 
It still raises issues because despite the thousands of academic papers written on 
the topic, we still don't fully understand how businesses should manage their 
performance.  Some of the most published researchers in the field argue that the 3
discipline is at a "cross-roads", that "our understanding of this field is far from 
complete" and requires "a complete re-think".  4
In order to improve our understanding of PMM systems, the thesis will examine 
how three British firms, all multiple retailers, managed and measured their 
performance between 1920 and 1970. It will do this by using a modern framework 
 Gaddis, Landscape, 11; Scranton, Beyond Chandler, 429.2
 Bititci et al., “Challenges”, identified more than 200,000 articles published between 1980 3
and 2010.
 Bourne et al., “Emerging Issues”, 117; Bititci et al., “Challenges”, 318.4
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to document the constituent elements of a PMM system in each of the firms.  5
Based on the analysis of the results, the thesis will present those findings as, 
firstly, challenges to our current views on PMM systems and, secondly, potential 
areas where academics may look for answers.
The thesis is set out as follows.
Chapter One is the introduction and compromises three sections. The first sets out 
the aims and objectives of the thesis. It does this by exploring the literature on 
PMM systems to identify the issues that firms currently have in managing 
performance. These issues are presented as research questions. The second 
section explores the definition of a PMM system. The third section explains the 
methodology that has been used to answer the research questions. It explains 
why a historical approach is particularly useful to understand a topic as broad but 
interconnected as PMM. It then justifies the choice of industry (multiple retailing), 
the three firms used in the analysis (Marks & Spencer, Boots the Chemist, WH 
Smith and Sons) and the period of the review (1920 to 1970). The section 
concludes by introducing a framework and justifies why it is a useful tool to 
analyse the cases.
Chapters Two to Four comprise the case studies. Each is based on archival 
research supported by existing literature. Each chapter will start with contextual 
background information about the specific retail sector in which the firm operated 
and a summary of the firms development from its founding to 1970. The bulk of 
each chapter will then document the structures, processes and measures they 
used to manage performance using the framework introduced in Chapter 1. 
Analysis is included within each section and the principal findings are drawn 
together in the conclusion.
The final chapter returns to the research questions and uses the findings from the 
case studies to identify those insights which may be relevant to modern 
practitioners. Insights are drawn not from the differences but rather the similarities 
 Ferreira and Otley, Extended Framework.5
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between each other and over time. However, given the relative narrow range of 
the industry sector (multiple retailing) and the small number of case studies, the 
insights will be expressed as challenges to current thinking rather than new theory.
The findings are significant and challenge some of the central principles that have 
underpinned research over the last 25 years. They show that far from being 
imposed through command and control processes, performance was managed 
collaboratively where the objective was not control but learning. They show that 
performance measures, rather than being at the heart of the system, were at best 
just one of several contributors and at worst considered misleading and a 
distraction to learning. The case studies also show the importance of socio-cultural 
factors in managing performance, often overlooked in PMM literature. Finally, the 
case studies provide insights into the informal practices used by managers and 
directors to understand the performance and suggest that they were at least as 
important as the formal structures in managing performance 
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Chapter One: Introduction
The aim of the thesis is to take a current business topic, in this case, performance 
management and measurement systems, and through the examination of 
historical sources, identify insights which could lead to improvements in our 
current understanding of the topic. 
This first chapter will explain the current issues associated with PMM systems, 
identify specific research questions prompted by these issues and explain the 
methodology used to answer these questions. It is set out as follows.
The first section introduces the specific aims and objectives of the thesis. It starts 
by explaining the origins of PMM systems and how the thinking about the systems 
has evolved over the last 25 years. It will explain that despite the volume of 
research, several fundamental areas remain contentious. The section finishes by 
exploring three of these areas and raises three questions which the thesis will 
attempt to answer.
The second section explores the definition of performance management and 
measurement. It follows rather than precedes the section on the evolution of PMM 
systems as the definition has evolved as the thinking has evolved. Indeed, the 
definition is still contested.  Part of the problem lies in the distinction in the 6
literature between performance measurement and performance management. 
Articles switch between the two, sometimes with no regard to the title of the 
article.  Confusion is not helped by the number of terms and associated acronyms 7
used during the last 25 years to describe similar things: Contemporary 
Performance Measurement, Collaborative Performance Management, Business 
Performance Measurement, Performance Measurement Systems, Performance 
Management Systems, Integrated Performance Management, Integrated 
 Demartini, System.6
 Bititci et al., Challenges; Bourne et al., Emerging.7
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Performance Measurement.  While the focus of the thesis is on the broader 8
concept of performance management which includes performance measurement 
as one variable, the review of literature will consider both terms recognising the 
cross-overs in the literature and the belief held by some that the two are 
inseparable anyway.  The term performance management and measurement 9
(PMM) will therefore be used to include literature which covers either or both of the 
terms.10
The final section in the chapter explains the methodology that has been used to 
answer the questions raised. It explains why a historical approach is particularly 
useful despite recognised limitations. It goes on to justify the choice of industry 
sector (multiple retailing), the specific case studies (Marks & Spencer, Boots the 
Chemist, WH Smith and Sons) and the period of the study (1920 to 1970). The 
section and chapter concludes with an explanation of a framework that has been 
used as a heuristic tool to help collate, analyse and present the findings.
Aims and Objectives
Origins of PMM
The literature on the historical development of PMM situates its origins in the 
evolution of management accounting and the gradual convergence with strategic 
and operational management.  By the late 1980's, the convergence led to 11
academics starting to refer to a 'system' of performance measurement and the so-
called 'revolution' began.12
 Franco-Santos et al., Contemporary; Busi and Bititci, Collaborative; Franco-Santos and 8
Bourne, Examination; Choong, BPM; Jazayeri and Scapens, Business Values; Demartini, 
System; Ferreira and Otley, Framework; Brudan, Rediscovering Performance; Bititci et al., 
Integrated.
 Lebas, Performance.9
 Melnyk et al. Fit for the future.10
 Bititci et al., Performance Measurement; Brudan, Rediscovering Performance; Neely, 11
Evolution of performance measurement; Bourne, Handbook.
 Eccles, Manifesto; Neely, Revolution.12
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The PMM literature adopts a traditional perspective on the development of 
management accounting. It is based on the work of Johnson, Chandler and in 
particular, Johnson and Kaplan's 'Relevance Lost' which is described as the 
"cornerstone in virtually all scholarly papers on performance measurement."  This 13
literature reflects a contingent, rational approach to management accounting 
development which continues to influence the direction of research today.
In the 19th century, the growth in the size of businesses, increasing manufacturing 
complexity and geographical spread (e.g. railways) required more sophisticated 
ways to capture information about the costs of the business. It was more than just 
recording. Data on transactions and the development of associated ratios (cost per 
ton/ mile, operating margin) provided information on how those costs, the 
processes that generated those costs and the individuals who ran those processes 
could be controlled and improved.  This data was central to the successful 14
running of the business. As Chandler notes in relation to daily cost reports in one 
of his case studies "these cost sheets were Carnegie's primary instrument of 
control.  Costs were Carnegie's obsession." The principle that activities could be 15
measured, controlled and improved continued to develop through the scientific 
management movement and improvements in cost allocation methodologies.
Budgetary control emerged at the start of the 20th century as new operating 
models were developed to reflect the increasing complexity of organisational 
structures. Delegation of power and control required new ways to manage these 
units and led to the development of divisional forecasts, targets, budgets and their 
associated processes. These not only provided control over the divisions' activities 
but helped allocate resources and align management compensation using 
standardised methodologies.16
 Johnson, Du Pont; General Motors; Nineteenth century cost accounting; Chandler, 13
Strategy and Structure; The Visible Hand; Johnson and Kaplan, Relevance Lost; Bititci et 
al., Performance Measurement, 310.
 Kaplan, Evolution.14
 Chandler, Visible Hand, 267.15
 Johnson and Kaplan, Relevance Lost; Kaplan, Evolution; Chandler, The Visible Hand.16
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Johnson and Kaplan famously argued that development in management 
accounting slowed/ stopped after the 1920's.  Post war, however, there was 17
increasing convergence with other management streams. Operationally, in the 
1950's, and influenced by Japanese quality management principles, there was 
greater emphasis on measuring the quality of manufacturing processes and the 
consequent reduction in product variability. The work drew on statistical 
techniques developed by a number of Americans, particularly Shewart and 
Deming.  The convergence of operational and accounting thinking continued to 18
develop over the following 40 years as the practices were more widely 
disseminated in the West with the development of ideas such as Total Quality 
Management and Activity Based Costing.19
At a similar time, measurement literature also started to converge with the 
strategic control literature. For some time, it had been recognised that firms used 
non-financial measures to help understand performance. In France, a tableau de 
bord with a wide selection of measures had been used since the 1930's and 
General Electric experimented with using key corporate performance measures 
from the 1950's.  Although these widened the range of measures, the linkages, 20
particularly with strategy, were not always explicit. Early strategic thinking, 
meanwhile, identified weaknesses in traditional financial measures in supporting 
the strategy.  A number of articles in the Harvard Business Review, among other 21
journals in the 1970's and 1980's, developed the theme highlighting the impact of 
measures on creating short-term thinking, loss of competitiveness and lack of 
strategic focus.  In 1987, "Relevance Lost: the Rise and Fall of Management 22
Accounting" was published arguing that performance measurement had failed to 
 Johnson and Kaplan, Relevance Lost.17
 Bititci et al., Performance Measurement; Brudan, Rediscovering Performance; Johnson,  18
Lean; Busi et al., Collaborative.
 Johnson and Kaplan, Relevance Lost.19
 Bessire and Baker; Critical Perspectives; Eccles, Manifesto.20
 Drucker, The practice of Management.21
 Banks and Wheelwright, Operations v strategy; Hayes and Garvin, Tomorrow; Hayes 22
and Abernathy, Decline; Skinner, Manufacturing.
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keep up with changes in the business environment and growth in the PMM 
literature exploded soon afterwards.23
This interpretation of its origins in the PMM literature follows a contingent, rational, 
efficiency based interpretation of development - improvements are made in 
response to the environment. It is consistent with an economic perspective which 
classifies managers as rational, economic men who adopt and adapt process 
innovations to achieve their objectives. It is consistent with a Chandlerian view that 
management organisation and processes evolved as managers responded to 
opportunities presented by new technology and new markets. It is consistent with 
the traditional, modernist approach to accounting developments - the idea that 
accounting is changed in order to make it better. There may be periods of inertia, 
as described above, but innovations will emerge over time which continue the 
progress. PMM is part of this evolution. Bititci et al. summarised this prevailing 
viewpoint (at least in the PMM literature): "Informed by Ansoff's (1984) historical 
perspective on global industrial, business and social trends, it is clear that the 
performance measurement field has developed in parallel and indeed, in response 
to the global trends."  24
 
It is, however, a view not universally held by the sub-disciplines which comprise 
PMM. Management accounting literature, in particular, has more recently 
challenged the traditional perspective of change and reappraised the research of 
those who advocated it. In reviewing the literature on Chandler's "Visible Hand", 
John, for example, noted that "critics found troubling the extent to which 
Chandlerian business history was overly rationalistic, technology driven, and 
strongly detached from the booming, buzzing confusion of everyday life."  25
Similarly, Ezzamel et al. challenged the accounts of Johnson and Kaplan and 
Chandler by presenting an alternative to the development of cost accounting and 
the development of scientific management principles by situating it much earlier 
 Johnson and Kaplan, Relevance Lost.23
 Bititci et al., Performance Measurement, 311. 24
 Chandler, Visible Hand; John, Elaborations, 99.25
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(the 1830's) in the Springfield Armoury and arguing its principal objective was to 
assert disciplinary power. 26
Alternatives to the traditional interpretation of management accounting 
development emphasise the importance of organisational and social factors. 
Academics draw on social theories of Marx, Weber, Foucault and Giddens among 
others to help understand accounting's role in helping to constitute organisational 
reality.  The academics inevitably do not agree but represent a considerable body 27
of research which contrasts with the traditional perspective of accounting 
development. Studies have emphasised accountings role in control and creating 
organisational coherence and systems of accountability, learning and 
communication. Accounting data is described as not an end but part of a feedback 
loop that shapes the organisation and the behaviours of those within it.28
This above summary is not intended to describe the full range of social, 
institutional and organisational perspectives on management accounting nor to 
offer a defence of any one theoretical perspective over the others. Instead, it is 
meant to highlight how a traditional view of management accounting has been 
challenged by introducing a social perspective on its development. In doing so, it 
highlights a gap in our understanding of how PMM evolved. A number of 
academics now recognise PMM systems as social systems which shape the 
behaviours of the individual and the organisation.  However, there has not been 29
any reappraisal of PMM's origins. Reappraising how firms managed their 
performance in the past may provide some insight into the role of socio-cultural 
aspects on the various systems, processes and measures they used to manage 
their performance and will form one of the subsidiary research questions raised 
below.
 Ezzamel et al., Numbers.26
 Fear, Thyssen.27
 In Fear, Thyssen, the appendix titled "Accounting as symbolic practice" provides a 28
comprehensive summary. Useful summaries of management accounting research are 
also provided by Napier, Accounts of Change and Boyne, Systems; Johnson, Former.
 Gray et al., Madness; Melnyk et al., Fit for the future; Bititci et al., Performance 29
Measurement; Broadbent and Laughlin, Conceptual model; Bititci et al., Collaborative.
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The traditional perspective on the origins of PMM, however, raises a second 
question. The case studies quoted by Chandler, Johnson and Kaplan are a 
relatively narrow selection of the very largest US firms and primarily focused on 
the industrial sector.  The conventional narrative therefore provides considerable 30
detail on cost accounting measures and processes in the supply sectors. Indeed, it 
is argued that demand based measures did not emerge until the 1950's.  31
However, this ignores the importance of marketing and sales in a number of US 
manufacturers including sales force oriented firms such as Singer.  Service 32
businesses were also growing rapidly. Already by 1914, FW Woolworth had 1,000 
stores and sales of almost $100 million.  Growth accelerated across the sector 33
after that; between 1910 and 1929, the number of US stores which were part of a 
chain grew from 13,500 to 216,295 with 167,095 of the growth occurring after 
1920.  By 1929, chain store sales represented 22% of all retail sales in the US.  34 35
While cost management remained important for retail stores, sales was the key 
measure of success.  If retail and other demand oriented sectors were not 36
influencing how firms measured and managed performance from the 1920's, the 
question is why not?37
 Although Chandler, Scale and Scope, does include a chapter on Sears, it could be 30
argued that the chapter does as much to refute the conclusions in the final chapter than 
support them given it took well over a decade to introduce the structural changes.
 Bititci et al., Challenges.31
 Friedman, Birth of a Salesman.32
 Raucher, Dime Store.33
 Federal Trade Commission, "Chain Stores, Growth and Development of Chain Stores," 34
Tables 34 and 36, Vol. I, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1932; Beckman 
and Nolen, Chain Store.
 Beckman and Nolen, Chain Store.35
 Raucher, Dime Store.36
 The importance of the service sector and multiple retail in particular is discussed further 37
in the methodology section.
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The Development of Performance Management and Measurement 
1990 to the present
When Eccles called for a 'revolution' in performance measurement, the research 
community responded.  Just over 25 years later, PMM remains a “hot topic” within 38
both academia and industry. Citation/ co-citation analysis supports this. Using the 
methodology adopted by Neely, Taticchi et al. identified 6,618 articles on 
performance measurement published between 1970 and 2010 with over 91% of 
those written since 1990.  Figure 1.1 uses a similar methodology but refines the 39
search to include ‘performance management’ and ‘balanced scorecard’ and 
narrows the number of categories to only those focused on management. This 
reduced the results to 5,473. These results generated 62,303 citations.40
 Eccles, Manifesto; The term 'revolution' is regularly used to describe the development in 38
PMM over the last 25 years (Bourne et al., Emerging issues; Busi and Bititci, 
Collaborative; Neely, Revolution)
 Neely, Evolution; Taticchi et al., New Contexts.39
 Web of Science accessed 26 January 2017 using the terms “performance 40
management,” “performance measurement” and “balanced scorecard” in the topic. Search 
limited to Web of Science categories management, operations research management 
science, business, business finance and public administration as a closer identification of 
articles in other categories highlighted a significant number which were not relevant to 
PMM. Results included published articles, proceedings papers, books, reviews and 
editorial material https://apps.webofknowledge.com
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The volume partly reflected the multi-disciplinary nature of the subject with 
researchers from several fields contributing to the PMM literature. Of the 10 most 
cited articles, 3 were in ‘The International Journal of Operations and Production 
Management’, 2 in the ‘Harvard Business Review’ and 1 each in ‘The Journal of 
Marketing’, ‘Management Science’, ‘Journal of Accounting and Economics’, 
‘Journal of Organisational Behaviour’ and ‘The International Journal of Production 
Economics.’
Over that period, the focus of the studies has evolved. More than 10 years ago, 
Neely identified a 5 stage loop in the development of PMM.  He believed that the 41
next stage would lead to a return to the first stage. It is not clear that this has 
happened. The first stage, as described above, preceded the 1990’s and reflected 
the growing convergence but also frustration with traditional methods for 
measuring and managing firm wide performance.
The second stage, from the early 1990’s, comprised the development of 
frameworks to address the perceived shortcomings in performance measurement. 
Kaplan and Norton’s "The Balanced Scorecard: Measures That Drive 
Performance" was published in the Harvard Business Review and, based upon 
citation history, remains highly influential not only in terms of PMM literature where 
it is the most cited article but also in the wider business community - it is the third 
most cited HBR article since the 1950's and one of HBR's 10 must reads.  It was, 42
however, not the first nor only framework. There have been 21 models or 
frameworks published between 1990 and 2007 of which 13 were published 
between 1992 and 2001.  43
The third stage emerged from the mid-1990’s onwards and focused on 
implementation as companies applied the frameworks.  Among the most cited, 44
 Neely, Evolution.41
 Kaplan and Norton, Balanced Scorecard; "Decades of Influence", Harvard Business 42
Review, November 2012. Harvard Business Reviews 10 Must Reads: The 
Essentials.” (2010) Harvard Business Review Press. 
 Taticchi et al., Measuring Business Excellence.43
 Bourne et al., Designing.44
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Kaplan and Norton proposed ways to translate strategic thinking into business 
plans using targets and rewards and included feedback and learning loops.  The 45
questions raised about implementation, however, raised further questions about 
how these frameworks linked into the other performance management processes 
within the business and indeed, for those frameworks which focused on 
performance measurement, whether it could be separated from performance 
management.  Increasingly, the leading academics in the field referred to 46
performance management as well as performance measurement.47
The fourth stage, from the late 1990’s, was based on the results of empirical 
testing. Studies showed a 30% to 60% adoption rate for the balanced scorecard, 
the most well known of the PMM frameworks and adoption across a number of 
countries.  The studies, however, also highlighted mixed results experienced by 48
companies and identified a number of problems experienced by them during 
implementation.   Not surprisingly, up to 70% of PMM projects fail.49 50
The final stage, a response to problems companies were experiencing, was a 
questioning of the theoretical validity of the frameworks. Neely anticipated this 
would result in a return to the first stage and a reanalysis of the core 
assumptions.  Despite the vast literature produced since then, however, it is not 51
clear that this has happened. Much of the literature has instead focused on 
revisiting stages 2 through 4. New frameworks have been developed and more 
empirical research has been done. PMM has also narrowed and deepened. Sub-
fields have emerged with dedicated literatures on SMEs, the non-profit sector and 
 Kaplan and Norton, Strategic management system.45
 Lebas, Performance measurement.46
 Busi and Bititci, Collaborative; Bourne et al., Designing; Otley, Framework; Bititci et al.,  47
Integrated.
 Neely, Evolution; Rigby, Management tools; Speckbacher et al., German speaking 48
countries, Arena and Azzone, Empirical Study.
 Neely, Evolution; Ittner and Larker, Coming up short; Bourne et al., Designing.49
 Franco-Santos and Bourne, Management of Operations.50
 Neely, Evolution.51
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networks and also on specific cross functional processes including sustainability, 
project management and risk management.  52
The narrowing and deepening has been criticised by some who argue that 
research has become too specialised, separately analysing the different 
components of PMM without sufficiently explaining the linkages and interactions.  53
Stringer found that less than 10% of the 120 empirical studies examined displayed 
an integrated approach to the study of performance management.  Despite these 54
concerns, research has identified a number of benefits generated by PMM over 
the last 30 years. Franco-Santos et al. conducted a review of the consequences of 
introducing measurement systems in organisations.  Based on 76 papers 55
published between 1992 and 2011, studies have shown its importance as a 
heuristic tool which helps integrate management processes, its strength in 
communicating the intentions of senior management, particularly in aligning 
strategy across the organisation and, in creating an on-going dialogue about the 
success of the strategy. These contribute to organisational learning at all levels 
within the organisation and have a positive impact on the behaviours of employees 
by improving employee engagement in the creation and execution of the strategy 
as well as engagement in the performance of the business as a whole. Success 
was, however, contingent on a number of factors, the most significant of which 
related to implementation of the system; the way it was designed, developed, used 
and updated with several studies highlighting how difficult this can be.
Although the literature identifies a number of areas where PMM has made a 
positive contribution, one fundamental question remains unanswered - it is not 
clear whether a PMM system improves the financial performance of the business. 
Empirical studies have shown a positive impact, no impact or mixed results and 
there are equally inconsistent results in terms of their perceived impact on 
 Franco-Santos et al., Contemporary; Bititci et al., Challenges for tomorrow; Yadav et al., 52
Research Trends; Taticchi et al., Measuring Business Excellence.
 Bourne, Learning; Franco-Santos and Bourne, Examination; Yadav et al., Research 53
Trends; Choong, PMS.
 Stringer, Empirical.54
 Franco-Santos et al., Contemporary.55
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performance.  The inconsistent results may reflect the difficulty isolating the 56
impact of PMM on an organisations results from other factors - an excellent PMM 
system cannot compensate, at least in the short term, for market disruption, poor 
strategy execution or a disruptive culture. However, the inconsistent results also 
question whether PMM is capable of delivering the benefits originally anticipated. 
Some of the most published authors of the last 25 years continue to highlight 
weaknesses in our understanding of PMM and the need for a complete rethink of 
how we measure and manage performance of organisations in the future.  A 57
reexamination of the core assumptions which underpinned the original research, 
as Neely had predicted more than 10 years ago, is now long overdue.58
As already explained, the thesis will contribute to the debate by updating our 
understanding of how firms in the past managed the performance of their business 
over the long term. The literature, however, highlights three areas which are 
particularly contentious. These three areas are reviewed in more detail below and 
specific objectives, through research questions, are raised at the end of each 
section.
PMM and change
Throughout the last 25 years, the literature has assumed that the PMM system 
needs to be dynamic and adjust to changes in the internal and external 
environment. It is consistent with the interpretation of PMM's origins which argues 
that ways of managing performance evolved in response to changes in the wider 
business environment and changes in general business trends.  It is broadly 59
consistent with the traditional view in the related field of management control 
where managers are classified as ‘rational economic men’ who adopt and adapt 
management accounting developments in order to deliver their desired outcomes, 
 Bourne et al., Emerging issues; Melnyk et al., Fit for the future; Franco-Santos et al., 56
Contemporary.
 Bourne et al., Emerging issues; Bititci et al., Challenges for tomorrow.57
 Neely, Evolution.58
 Bititci et al., Challenges; Brudan, Rediscovering.59
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such as profit maximisation.  The concern for PMM systems is that if they do not 60
change as the environment changes, they risk becoming irrelevant or incoherent; 
the whole system undermined as measures no longer reflect current priorities and 
users build alternative mechanisms for managing performance. 
When PMM frameworks were developed, they included feedback loops and the 
knowledge created from the system was intended to influence subsequent 
strategic and operational decisions. The knowledge, however, could also be used 
to change the design infrastructure of the system (PMM processes or measures) 
and also how it is used in the business.  It was described as a way of promoting 61
continuous improvement.  Even as frameworks have been abandoned, there is 62
still a widespread recognition that PMM systems need to be dynamic, adjusting to 
changes in the wider business environment and ensuring alignment between 
strategy and measures.  Several commentators have argued that it has become 63
more important as the rate of change has  increased.64
In practice, however, companies have struggled to keep measures up to date, to 
adapt them following organisational change and to reflect the dynamic business 
environments in which they operate.  Research suggests that businesses bear 65
some of the blame, Ittner and Larcker, for example, highlight the short-cuts firms 
take in adopting "boiler plate solutions partly out of laziness and 
thoughtlessness.”  However, criticism is also levelled at the academic community 66
who have struggled to offer solutions. Practitioners have complained that PMM 
 Described by Luft, Historical theorizing; Modell, Accounting Change; Napier,  Accounts 60
of Change.
 Ferreira and Otley, Framework; Kaplan and Norton, Mastering; Lebas, Performance 61
Measurement.
 Lebas, Performance measurement;  Ittner and Larcker, Coming up Short.62
 Melnyk et al., Fit for the future; Choong, Meeting the Measurement Needs; Ittner and 63
Larcker, Coming up short.
 Ferreira and Otley, Framework; Bititci et al., Challenges.64
 Bourne et al, Learning; Franco-Santos and Bourne, Examination; Bourne et al, 65
Dynamics; Neely, Evolution; Otley, Management Control
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literature contains too little guidance, that it is too simplistic, mechanistic and 
prescriptive.  The criticism may reflect the nature of much of the research. While 67
the academic community agree that performance management systems need to 
be dynamic, too often their research assumes a static environment and there are 
few longitudinal studies.  There has also been insufficient explanation of what 68
'dynamic' really means. Perhaps, not surprisingly, there continues to be calls for 
more field research to examine how PMM systems evolve in response to changes 
in the external environment.69
The requirement for a PMM system to be dynamic has more recently, however, 
been challenged. Research with a large practitioner panel offered a more nuanced 
view. While organisations recognised they were operating in more dynamic 
environments and this was reflected in their strategies, firms chose not to change 
their measures. For the researchers this presented a surprising paradox - why 
would companies choose not to change their measures when their strategy 
changed.  They concluded that the linkage between strategy and measures was 70
not binary and that other factors and issues needed to be considered. In particular, 
they found that firms choose a mix of specific and general measures and the 
choice was linked to the level of uncertainty about the outcome. They concluded 
that where there is a high degree of uncertainty about the future, broad, general 
measures allow more flexibility than specific measures and therefore do not need 
to be changed if the environment changes. The same argument could be applied 
to processes (particularly reward processes where firms could choose to reward 
for specific outcomes or more general outcomes).
Observing how measures and processes change over time allows further insights 
into PMM practices. Did firms prefer general measures and broadly defined 
 Melnyk et al., Fit for the future.67
 Neely in forward to Taticchi, New Contexts. Stringer, Empirical. PMM is not alone in this. 68
Research on the closely related management control systems has similarly been criticised 
for the failure to conduct longitudinal field studies (Berry et al. Emerging themes). They 
highlight, however, that such research involves considerable resources.
 Bititci et al., Challenges; Berry et al. Emerging themes.69
 Melnyk et al., Fit for the future.70
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processes which allowed flexibility or did they use specific, tightly defined 
measures and processes which were aimed at achieving a precise outcome? This 
leads to a specific objective of the research: 
"How did the PMM structures, processes and measures change as the 
strategy and external environment changed?"
In answering the question, the focus is not on the process of change itself. This 
already has an extensive literature. Rather, the focus will be on identifying the 
extent and type of change to processes and measures and how information was 
then used differently in the organisation.
Measurement in a PMM system
The answer to the paradox posed by Melnyk et al. may reflect another challenge 
to a core assumption - perhaps measures are not as important to managing the 
performance of the business as the PMM literature assumes.  71
When Eccles launched his ‘Performance Measurement Manifesto’, the focus was 
firmly on measurement.  Kaplan and Norton’s "Balanced Scorecard" similarly 72
placed measurement at the centre of their system.  Throughout the rest of the 73
1990’s the vast majority of published research continued to focus on performance 
measurement.  However, there has also been a regular and persistent call for a 74
greater focus on performance management.  Authors highlighted the difficulty 75
separating out measurement from management and Lebas went further: 
“performance management precedes and follows performance measurement, in a 
virtuous spiral and performance management creates the context for 
 Melnyk et al., Fit for the future.71
 Eccles, Manifesto.72
 Kaplan and Norton, Balanced Scorecard.73
 Neely in forward to Taticchi, New Contexts.74
 Bourne et al, Emerging; Ferreria and Otley, Framework; Broadbent and Laughlin, 75
Conceptual Model;  Neely, Evolution; Otley, Performance management;  Lebas, 
Performance measurement.
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measurement, so they are not separable.”  Kaplan and Norton’s own publication 76
history reflected the changing emphasis. Their early work continued to focus on 
measurement (1993: “Putting the balanced Scorecard to work”) but they soon 
linked measures to management (1996: “Using the Balanced Scorecard as a 
Strategic Management System”) and just over 10 years later had dropped any 
reference to measurement in the title altogether (2008: “Mastering the 
Management System.”).  Recent studies continue to emphasise the difficulty 77
separating the two but performance measurement still dominates the literature 
comprising 70% of the relevant articles published in the last seven years.  Twenty 78
years after Lebas highlighted the impossibility of separating out measurement from 
management and 10 years after Kaplan relegated references to measurement 
from his article titles, “how performance measurement is and should be used to 
manage the performance of the enterprise” is still considered an emerging field 
albeit the most important.79
The prioritisation of measurement over management creates a risk for those who 
seek to improve the performance of their business. It can lead to the assumption 
that measurement de facto leads to performance or, at least, is an/the essential 
part of a performance management system. Frameworks such as the 'Balanced 
Scorecard' which use measures to link the separate elements of the system 
reinforce these views. However, there is a small but influential minority who 
challenge the importance of measures in managing the performance of the 
business. Field studies have shown that at a local level, performance 
measurement is secondary to performance management, especially when the 
business is in crisis mode.  Johnson and Broms went further suggesting that 80
 Lebas, Performance measurement, 34.76
 Kaplan and Norton, Putting; Using; Mastering.They continued to refer to balanced 77
scorecards within the overall process but they were relegated to just one of the tools in a 
wider system.
 Web of science database for the 7 years to the end of 2016. 78
 Bourne et al, Emerging.79
 Lebas, Performance measurement; Euske et al., International.80
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measurement is not necessary to manage a high performing business or can even 
have a negative impact.81
Academics have challenged the role of performance measurement on both 
practical and epistemological grounds. Practically, broadening the range of 
measures, elevating their importance and linking them as part of a wider system 
has proven hard to do. Studies suggest companies have experienced difficulties 
linking the different elements of the PMM.  Ittner and Larcker found nearly 80% of 82
companies did not (or could not) link the improvement in non-financial measures 
with future results.  Taticchi similarly described a ‘knowing-doing’ gap where 83
companies struggle to translate variations in performance measures into 
appropriate actions.84
Problems are linked to the nature of what is being measured. Some drivers of 
performance, such as employee capability and behaviours do not lend themselves 
easily to measurement. Measuring culture is even harder. Proxies may help 
communicate intent but lack validity, reliability or both.  However, even 'accurate' 85
measures are prone to subjectivity - 'sales growth' may be sourced from the 
audited accounting records and regulated by accounting standards but companies 
often prefer 'underlying' sales or 'like for like' sales in reporting performance, both 
liable to subjective definition.  Actionable timeframes also differ. Strategic 86
investment to improve employee capability through training or recruitment may 
take months or years to produce a measurable improvement while the impact on 
sales of an investment in advertising may be measurable almost immediately. 
 Johnson and Broms, Beyond Measure.81
 Franco-Santos et al., Contemporary; Yadav et al., Research Trends; Choong, PMS; 82
Franco-Santos et al., Production, Planning and Control; Nørreklit, The balance.
 Ittner and Larcker, Coming up short.83
 Taticchi, New Contexts.84
 Melnyk et al., Emerging issues; Micheli and Mari, Theory and Practice;  Franco-Santos 85
et al., Production, Planning and Control.
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Reviewing both through the same mechanic is difficult if not impractical. Measures 
cannot therefore be blindly accepted as 'truth' but require interpretation.  87
Interpretation requires managerial capability.
Some of these problems could be resolved by replacing measures with other ways 
to evaluate performance or by accepting a lower standard of accuracy for some 
measures. However, literature suggests that there are epistemological issues 
which make this difficult. Measures are associated with ‘truth’ and measurement is 
considered necessary as performance is not an objective reality.  The sentiment 88
is reinforced by business clichés such as "the numbers never lie", "what gets 
measured gets done" and "if you can't measure it, you can't manage it."   Micheli 89
and Mari trace the association of 'measurement' and 'truth' back to the Galilean 
assumption that the World is written in mathematical terms and the role of the 
academic is to measure what is measurable and make measurable what is not.  90
Measurement therefore becomes a search for the truth. They argue that while the 
natural sciences have abandoned the idea, seeing measures as forms of insight, 
the social sciences still hold onto the outdated way of thinking. Measures can 
therefore become an end in themselves, demonstrating control. They are also 
considered a necessary pre-cursor to understanding and consequent action, as 
implied by the above clichés. More measures can become synonymous with more 
knowledge and more accuracy can become synonymous with better knowledge. 
Neither are necessarily valid assumptions and promote a perceived conflict 
between accuracy (having all of the data to make the right decision) and adequacy 
(having sufficient data to make a decision quickly).91
The findings are echoed in related fields. In strategy, Mintzberg has long been a 
vocal critic of the role of measures in management and provocatively challenged 
 Boland, Interpretive Act.87
 Wholey, Evaluation.88
 A google search of these terms highlights how wide spread they are across business 89
news sites and  consultants sites.
 Micheli and Mari, Theory and Practice.90
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advocates to "try to measure the performance of measurement, instead of 
assuming it is wonderful?"  In education, Todd Rose, has recently called for the 92
"End of Average" and argues that averages are 'useless' as they create the illusion 
of knowledge and reveal little about the performance of individuals.  While he 93
specifically refers to education, he raises questions which are applicable to PMM - 
it too is focused on learning about how individuals perform whether that is 
employees or separate operating units within an organisation.
There is some recognition of these problems in the PMM literature. Johnson 
argued that measures are not an absolute condition in their own right but an 
emergent property of systemic relationships.  Firms need to focus on the 94
relationship between measures as well as the measure itself. More recently, there 
are calls for a pragmatic view of performance measurement and a need to engage 
with the intent of KPI's and not view them exclusively as evidence of real 
performance.  The home page of the Performance Management Association even 95
refers to "the madness of performance measurement."  However, with so much of 96
the current literature exclusively focused on performance measurement rather 
than performance management, there needs to be a greater understanding of how 
organisations have used measures over time in their organisations. 
This leads to a second specific objective of the thesis:
"How did the firms use measures to understand performance?"
 '‘Some half truths of management" www.mintzberg.org/blog/half-truths-management (22 92
March 2017).
 Rose, End of Average.93
 Johnson, Former. Johnson has increasingly engaged with system thinking and, in 94
particular, features of natural systems.
 Micheli and Mari, Theory and Practice; Bourne et al., Emerging.95
 http://www.pmaconference.co.uk/index.html (3 March 2017). The page has 96
subsequently been changed.
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Answering the question allows us to challenge whether measures are the central 
element of a PMM system or just one of several tools available for a firm to 
manage its performance. 
PMM and culture
The third core assumption reflects how PMM literature describes its own origins 
and the ways it subsequently developed. The origins of PMM, as noted above, are 
portrayed as a rationalistic response to changes in the external environment. The 
focus on frameworks/ models as well as the insistence of placing objective 
measures at the heart of any system highlight how this assumption continued to 
influence the subsequent development of the discipline. The difficulty that firms 
have faced in implementing and using PMM systems challenged that assumption 
and criticism that scorecards and similar tools create a reductionist, mechanical 
approach to performance management which ignores the cultural influences.  97
Academics now increasingly recognise the complexity and view PMM systems as 
social systems which are both shaped by but also shape the behaviours of the 
individual and the organisation.  Despite this, and while the literature has 98
acknowledged the importance of social systems and culture, it remains an area 
which remains relatively under-researched.99
Of the literature that does exist, much is focused on how PMM affects the culture 
and behaviours of the organisation or how the dominant culture in the organisation 
has an impact on the PMM system.  These studies reflect a values based 100
approach to culture - "how we do things around here" - where the culture is a way 
for individuals to manage the unexplainable and uncontrollable.  A similar 101
 Bessire and Baker, Critical Perspectives.97
 Gray et al., Measurement Madness; Melnyk et al., Fit for the future; Bititci et al., 98
Challenges; Broadbent and Laughlin, Conceptual model;  Bititci et al., Collaborative.
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 Locke and Latham, Goal setting; Ordonez et al., Goals gone wild; Jazayeri and 100
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approach for this study would be problematic as these studies assume that a PMM 
system is already in place and it would be anachronistic to assume that in this 
research. In addition, latest thinking on culture challenges the values based 
approach. In what has been described as a ‘second wave’ of cultural analysis, 
culture is repositioned as a ‘toolkit’. Actors and organisations draw upon this toolkit 
on a mix and match basis to assemble cultures and influence behaviours in order 
to achieve desired outcomes.  Culture can therefore be considered as a 102
resource, a constitutive tool, used by organisations to meet current objectives. 
From a PMM perspective this is significant - it suggests that firms could use 
culture to manage performance. This is largely ignored in the PMM literature. 
Ferreira and Otley, for example, do not include 'culture' in their PMM framework 
as, they argue, it is largely beyond the control of management.103
In the context of PMM, the focus in this study is, therefore, on how (or if) the 
organisations use their cultures to influence how performance is delivered. 
Particular focus will be placed on how culture was used to unite the separate 
elements of the system. In modern PMM systems, the performance measures are 
used to link all of the separate elements of the overall system.  However, work 104
completed by Euske et al. showed that across international settings, organisational 
culture, rather than measures, was the only unifying force across the supply 
chains they studied.  They did not explore, however, the extent to which the 105
culture was managed by the organisation. 
This leads to the final objective of the thesis.
"What role did cultural factors play in how performance was managed within 
the firms?"
 Giorgi et al., Many Faces ; Weber and Dacin, Cultural construction.102
 Ferreira and Otley, Framework.103
 Franco-Santos, et al., Contemporary.104
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Having, identified the principle aims and objectives of the thesis, the following 
section explores the definition of PMM. The definition helps establish the scope of 
the review. However, it also illustrates that the discipline still struggles in 
determining what exactly it is about.
The definition of PMM
Definitions have always been contentious within the field and not helped by the on-
going debate about performance management versus performance measurement. 
This was not surprising 20 years ago when the topic was in its infancy and a 
leading scholar could argue that it is “often discussed but rarely defined”.  106
However, 20 years later, there is still no consensus on the definition, although this 
no longer reflects a lack of definition but rather a range of definitions.  Part of this 107
is caused by the multi-disciplinary nature of the subject: strategists refer to 
strategy in their definitions, psychologists to behaviours. It is useful, however, to 
explore definitions in some detail as they help define the boundaries of the 
discipline and also where those boundaries are contested. Ferreira and Otley's 
definition of performance management is broad and therefore open to criticism but 
deconstructing it provides the opportunity to understand the main areas of 
consensus and contention:
“the evolving formal and informal mechanisms, processes, systems, and networks 
used by organisations for conveying the key objectives and goals elicited by 
management for assisting the strategic and on-going management through 
analysis, planning, measurement, control, rewarding and broadly managing 
performance and for supporting and facilitating organisational learning and 
change”.108
 Neely et al. System design, 80.106
 Demartini, System; Franco-Santos et al.,Towards a definition, identified 17 definitions 107
across the 337 papers they reviewed.
 Ferreira and Otley, Design and use, 264.108
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The separate elements in their definition can be deconstructed as follows:
‘Evolving formal and informal’. 
The term recognises the fluidity of performance management in terms of time but 
also in the techniques both organisations and individuals use in managing 
performance. Some frameworks, including the balanced scorecard, have been 
criticised for excluding informal controls. And, although the importance of informal 
measures is recognised in the literature, there are still calls for more field based 
research which examines them in practice.  The combination of formal and 109
informal measures also highlights the importance of both the institutional factors 
which create formal performance management systems and the role of individuals 
who drive informal performance management.  110
Similarly, there is a broad consensus that evolution is a core requirement of a 
performance management system. As noted above, however, keeping systems 
dynamic has proven difficult in practice and needs further consideration as there is 
evidence that the failure to update systems may not reflect operational capability 
but be a rational choice contingent on the complex interdependencies.
The inclusion of concepts such as evolution and informality, however, poses a 
challenge to researchers. Processes evolving over time are difficult to study using 
contemporary cross sectional methods whilst informal records are less likely to be 
retained over time hindering longitudinal studies. Stringer found 28% of the 120 
field studies she examined were longitudinal but defined 'longitudinal' as more 
than two years.  Only one study could be described as long-term. The researcher 111
returned after 15 years to find that while the formal processes had changed little, 
there was considerable change in the informal processes - a significant finding 
 Berry et al., Emerging themes;  Stringer, Empirical; Frow et al., Strategic behaviours. 109
 Boland, Interpretive Act; Scapens and Macintosh, Structure and agency.110
 Stringer, Empirical.111
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given the importance of evolution in the literature and lack of informal processes 
built into frameworks.112
‘mechanisms, processes, systems and networks.’ 
The words are frequently used interchangeably but highlight the breadth of 
techniques organisations use to manage performance. It also highlights that a 
performance management system is an umbrella term which includes a number of 
existing sub-processes, many of which have a long history. Brudan identified 
‘operational management’, ‘individual management’ and ‘strategic management’ 
as the core sub-processes  with the first two tracing their history to the early 19th 
century and the latter to the mid 20th century.  Notably, Ferreira and Otley do not 113
use the term “integrated” when describing these mechanisms and processes. 
Bititci argues that integration is a key dimension within the umbrella process and 
integration is also implied in Kaplan and Norton’s closed loop system.  Franco-114
Santos and Bourne also highlighted the importance of integration between 
strategy and operations and failure to integrate processes is highlighted as a key 
reason for PMM failure.115
‘key objectives and goals elicited by management for assisting the strategic and 
on-going management.’ 
Selectivity, a key dimension in terms of measures, also applies to the objectives 
and goals being measured. Much of the literature argues that PMM is primarily 
focused on managing strategy and traces origins to Drucker.  Kaplan and Norton 116
emphasised that performance management is about managing strategic objectives 
which originate as part of a closed loop management system, are operationalised 
 Stringer, Empirical.112
 Brudan, Rediscovering.113
 Bititci et al., Integrated; Kaplan and Norton, Strategic management system.114
 Franco-Santos and Bourne, Examination; Ittner and Larcker, Coming up short; Bourne 115
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and cascaded through the organisation (see also Bourne et al, Ittner and 
Larcker).  Ferreira and Otley argue that performance management systems need 117
to be broader than just strategic implementation and must provide for a spectrum 
of activities, a view also reflected in earlier accounting literature and the tableau de 
Bord which is considered by some as an early fore-runner of the balanced 
scorecard.  All agree, however, that the objectives and goals are not just 118
financial. 
The challenge remains, however, in identifying when an objective or goal becomes 
“key.” Limiting the number by focusing on just strategic objectives ignores the 
reality of where senior management focus lies and could lead to inflexibility - 
especially when new issues arise outside the strategy setting timetable, issues 
which need a quick response or which require local decision making.  However, 119
too wide a definition renders the overall process impractical and unmanageable - 
evidenced in one company with 300 measures on their ‘Executive’ dashboard.  120
Lebas argues that objectives are specific to the situation and that the identification 
of them is an essential function of management.  His conclusion was based on 121
case studies he performed with Euske et al. which showed that firms tend to focus 
on one particular measure at a time but that measure changed over time, was 
influenced by the wider context and case specific.122
‘analysis, planning, measurement, control, rewarding and broadly managing 
performance.’ 
Again, Ferreira and Otley have been deliberately broad, but the list highlights the 
range of techniques employed by organisations and individuals to manage 
 Kaplan and Norton, Strategic management system; Mastering; Bourne et al., 117
Designing;  Ittner and Larcker, Coming up short.
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performance. There are also omissions - motivating and communicating, for 
example could be added while ‘rewarding’ is contentious.  The term ‘control’, 123
while prevalent within accounting literature, is just one of several terms, as is 
‘measurement’.
Targets are also not explicitly referred to but Ferreira and Otley include them as 
part of planning, measuring and rewarding later in their article. The broader 
literature identifies targets as a critical part of a performance management 
system.  However there are on-going debates about how stretching those 124
targets should be and whether they should be linked to individual rewards. Targets 
for non-financial performance elements can be particularly controversial due to 
subjectivity and can undermine the whole system.  Johnson provides a 125
dissenting voice on targets controversially arguing that "the idea that business 
operations can be understood and controlled with quantitative targets, even target 
costs, rests on flawed logic and erroneous science.”  Targets, like measures, can 126
become an end in themselves and prevent a deeper understanding of the causes 
of the costs.
The breadth of the list highlights the challenge posed to performance management 
researchers - if they limit their research to just one or two elements such as 
measurement and rewards, or just one function’s activities, such as marketing, 
they ignore the interaction that these elements and functions have with other 
processes and the rest of the organisation. Criticism has been levelled at 
researchers who fail to recognise the multi-functional nature of performance 
management which requires the researcher to be multi-functional as well.  127
Stringer's review of 120 field studies identified only 9 studies which included all 
 Sobótka and Platts, Managing without measuring; Locke and Latham, Goal setting 123
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elements of a performance management system and not all of these examined the 
interconnections in any depth.128
‘organisational learning and change’. 
The idea that facilitating organisational learning and change is the purpose of a 
performance management system is not universally held. Bititci et al. claim that 
‘control’ is the principal purpose identified in the literature although they too argue 
that ‘learning’ is more important.  Learning and change is certainly the explicit 129
purpose in Kaplan and Norton’s closed loop process and it supports Lebas’ view 
that performance management is principally future driven - lessons generated by 
the process are fed back into the organisation to improve future performance.  A 130
future and learning focused management system is not new - Paul Mazur, 
describing the role of a ‘controller,’ may have noted that “it is only recently that 
such a history [of financial measures] has been either analysed to discover means 
of improvement or used as a basis for future planning” but he was writing in 
1927.  However, the difficulty in turning information into learning and then 131
actions, the “knowing-doing” gap, is well documented and strongly linked with 
organisational capability and culture.  132
The definition makes no mention of cultural and behavioural factors and this has 
drawn some criticism.  As noted above, culture will form part of the investigation 133
in this thesis.
 Stringer's Empirical analysis was based on Otley's, Performance management, 128
framework which identified 5 areas of a performance management system.
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The purpose of using the literature to deconstruct Ferreira and Otley’s definition is 
not to narrow down the researchers remit, something Bourne argues academics in 
the field have been guilty of but rather to highlight how broad PMM can be.  The 134
difficulty that academics have in defining the term therefore, is not because the 
topic is still new and emerging (Brudan) or because the field has not been 
professionalised (Neely) but because the term cannot be defined (Lebas).  His 135
argument is that the exact definition is case specific, defined by management and 
therefore dependent on context. For any given firm, therefore, performance 
management is not all of the characteristics described by Ferreira and Otley 
above, which may be unmanageable, but any combination that management 
choose to use. Although this increases the difficulty in conducting a case study, it 
may reveal unforeseen connections between systems and structures. And, while 
some features will be described which may prove irrelevant to the research 
questions, patterns will be uncovered which had not been identified before. 
Methodology
This section explains the methodology used to answer the research questions. 
Firstly, it will explore why a historical approach is particularly useful to provide 
insights on a topic as broad but interconnected as PMM. It will start with a 
discussion on what 'history' and a 'historical approach' are before discussing why 
they may be useful in this study. Secondly, it will demonstrate why multiple retail is 
a particularly fruitful area for research. In doing so, it will provide some context on 
the problems multiple retailers faced, the growth in multiple retail and the 
innovative environment in management practices this created, particularly in the 
1920's and 1930's. This will be followed by an explanation of why the three case 
studies, Marks & Spencer (M&S), Boots the Chemist (Boots) and WH Smith and 
Sons (WHS) were chosen. In doing so, it will also show which other retailers were 
initially investigated before being rejected. The chapter concludes by explaining 
the framework which was used as a heuristic tool to collate, analyse and report the 
findings.
 Bourne, Learning.134
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Why history?
Justifying the use of a historical approach as the basis for this thesis is 
complicated because both the terms 'history' and a 'historical approach' to 
research are difficult to define. Godfrey et al. argue that history is perhaps beyond 
definition and that historians have become sanguine about answering the question 
'what is history?'  Part of the problem lies in what Walsh described as the 136
ambiguity inherent in the term 'history': “It covers (a) the totality of past human 
actions and (b) the narrative or account we construct of them now."  The two are 137
not independent. We cannot know the 'totality' of past human actions. Only a 
fraction of past actions have been documented and even those may not be reliable 
- we often don't know the intentions (or competence) of those who documented 
them. Writing history requires interpretation but in doing so, we apply our own 
judgements influenced by our own biases and a knowledge of what happened 
next. This history we then write may not be recognisable to those that lived it.  138
Some have therefore challenged whether writing history is even possible? Schein 
described history as methodologically inaccessible, "fantastically complex, difficult 
to unravel."139
And yet, we cannot ignore it. Even Schein used history in his research. We still 
refer back to those sociologists and economists whose own work was informed by 
history. Histories still get written and read and there are repeated calls from other 
academic disciplines for more historical research as forthcoming special issues in 
the Strategic Management Journal and Organisation Studies testify.  One benefit 140
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of historical studies is that it offers a different methodological approach, a 
counterweight to the hypothesis testing, positivistic, data driven methodologies 
prevalent in the social sciences.  History, despite its own flaws, allows us to think 141
differently.  This is particularly relevant where prevailing social science 142
methodologies and frameworks have failed to provide the answers to questions 
consistently raised. In retail, which is the industry sector used in this study, 
Stephen Brown’s critique of the retail marketing literature concluded that all of the 
theories and models could be combined, were inter-dependent, while none, 
satisfactorily, could stand on their own. Indeed, he attacked the theories as failing 
to even meet the criteria for formal theory, suffering from poorly defined concepts 
and developed from a descriptive rather than explanatory basis. He concluded that 
there needs to be a new way of thinking which reverts back to a simpler fact base 
analysis of what is happening.  Brown did not call for more historical studies in 143
retailing but others have.  As one of them noted, the contribution that history can 144
make to our understanding of the present is not so much in providing a template 
for how retailers should operate now nor in identifying the origins of some path 
dependent route to the present. Rather, it is an investigation of practices within 
their own historical context which helps identify questions current researchers 
need to consider and points them in the direction that they may want to look for 
answers.145
The criticisms levelled at retail by Brown could be similarly levelled at the PMM 
literature. Yet unlike in retail and other social sciences, there have not been any 
recent calls for more historical studies on PMM. This is curious given PMM's 
 Decker et al. Business Histories.141
 Gaddis argues history liberates us from determinism and  presentism. Gaddis, 142
Landscape.
 Brown, Review and Synthesis.143
 Alexander, Past, Present and Future; Alexander, Objects; Hollander, Rearview Mirror.144
 Alexander, Prologue.145
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origins in the historical works of Johnson, Kaplan and Chandler.  Especially as 146
these works continue to be cited in PMM literature without engaging in the criticism 
they have subsequently received from historians.  Adopting a historical approach 147
therefore offers potential new perspectives on current issues.
However, what is a historical approach? It has been described in broad terms as 
empirical research that uses remote sensing and a contextualist approach to 
explanation.  Its distinguishing feature is a commitment to primary archival 148
research, in this case, the archives of M&S, Boots and WHS.  It is a broad 149
description but this allows different methodological frameworks depending upon 
the type of knowledge the historian is trying to produce.  Following Rowlinson et 150
al., the thesis adopts an analytically structured approach which bridges narrative 
and analytical schema.  In this approach, the sources are subordinate to the 151
concepts. This thesis uses a framework to capture these concepts and this is 
explained in more detail below. As an approach, it differs from many business 
histories which focus on the actions of the owners and directors.  Instead, it 152
places the organisation structures, processes and performance measures at the 
centre of the analysis recognising their importance in shaping the firm's 
competencies in managing their performance.153
 Johnson, Cost Accounting; Kaplan, Evolution; Johnson and Kaplan, Relevance Lost; Chandler, 146
Scale. There have been a small number of longitudinal studies based upon fieldwork but these do 
not constitute “historical studies.” Stringer, Empirical, noted that of the 120 case studies that she 
reviewed on performance management between 1990 and 2005, only 3 were longitudinal and 
covered all aspects of a PMS. Longitudinal, by her definition, was more than 3 years.
 Bititci, et al., Challenges, continues to cite them. Johnson himself now disagrees with 147
how management accounting is seen as a central element of effective performance 
management (Johnson, Lean Dilemma; Former). 
 Ingram et al., History; Gaddis, Landscape.148
 Godfrey et al., Organisational History.149
 Decker et al. Business Histories.150
 Rowlinson et al, Research Strategies. They quote Chandler's work as an example.151
 Including all of the secondary literature on the three case studies in this thesis.152
 Nelson and Winter, Evolutionary Theory, argue the importance of organisational 153
routines in shaping competencies. Fear's, Thyssen, follows a similar approach.
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There are two features which make a historical approach to PMM particularly 
appropriate. Firstly, a performance management system is complex. It 
encompasses a range of different processes and measures operating across 
structures within the business and managed by different functions.  These 154
operate both systematically and systemically to deliver the objectives of the 
business. The large number of variables creates a messy, complex system where 
it is difficult to separately identify dependent and independent variables. This 
complexity has hindered research with much of it too compartmentalised, focusing 
on only some elements of a performance management system and ignoring 
complementarity, an essential element of performance management systems.  155
Secondly, there is a strong temporal element. Firms have to manage both short 
and long term performance simultaneously. They also have to be future focused, 
measuring current activities to gauge whether future objectives will be met. The 
impact of investment in reward programmes or staff training on the performance of 
the business, for example, may not materialise for some time. Performance 
management systems are also not static (or not supposed to be according to the 
literature), they are reciprocal activities which evolve to reflect changes in the 
business and its environment. How PMM systems change over time provides 
insights into the nature of a PMM system. PMM field study research highlights the 
value of returning to a case many years afterwards and documenting the changes. 
However, further examples in the literature are rare.156
Historical research is suited to understanding both features. Historians consider 
themselves to be particularly interested in the interdependency of multiple, 
 Those who take a narrow functional view (e.g. study the management accounting of a 154
firm) focus on vertical structures and processes and can ignore interactions with structure 
and processes operating in other functions. This is a weakness of much of this literature. 
Adopting a broader perspective by looking at cross functional processes (e.g. PMM) 
shows that the role of processes can be wider than otherwise described in the literature 
(e.g. management accounting is not just about control but also about learning).
 Stringer, Empirical, found that only 9 of the 120 field studies on PMM systems covered 155
all aspects of a PMM system. Criticism of the narrowness of research has also been made 
by Bourne, Learning; Choong, Needs; Ittner and Larcker, Assessing Empirical Research; 
Merchant et al. Disciplinary Constraints.
 Stringer, Empirical, cites the 15 year gap between Otley's first and second reviews of 156
practices at the British Coal Board and the important differences found.
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complex, causal factors over time.  As Bloch argued: "History seeks for causal 157
wave-trains and is not afraid, since life shows them to be so, to find them 
multiple."  Based on the views expressed in recent literature, an historical 158
approach starts with the empirical evidence rather than a theory or assumption 
based on a single causal factor. Understanding of its significance emerges as it is 
compared temporally to antecedent and subsequent developments and situated 
within a contemporary external and internal context.  Change or persistence over 159
time allows for qualitative judgements on the structures. Judgements are 
expressed as ‘generalisations’ which historians embed in their narratives.  Care, 160
however, needs to be taken with these generalisations when applied to present 
issues. Historians are said to be particularly wary of using their findings to develop 
theory given the importance they place on context with both time and place 
influencing decisions.  What they can offer academics and practitioners facing 161
current problems is to show that "it need not be this way" and, by presenting how 
and why things were done in the past, can help current practitioners challenge 
their own assumptions.  162
The limitations of using historical analysis to explore current business issues are 
amplified in this case study because it is based on a relatively narrow industry 
sector (British multiple retail) and examines only three firms in that sector. The 
following section explains why both the sector and the three firms are particularly 
relevant. However, the thesis will not make definitive conclusions on modern PMM 
systems. Rather, it will provide examples, make arguments, construct 
generalisations and ask questions which will help current theorists and 
 Suddaby et al, Historical Institutionalism; Gaddis, Landscape.157
 Bloch, Historians Craft, 194.158
 Whadhwani and Bucheli, Future; Steinmo, Historical; Suddaby et al, Historical 159
Institutionalism.
 Steinmo, Historical.160
 Fear, Mining. A possible exception arises where history influences the theory such as 161
path dependency - 'history in theory' as Kipping and Üsdiken, Theory, describe it.
 Fear, Mining.162
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practitioners to become more historically sensitive and to challenge the 
assumptions they may hold about PMM systems.163
Why multiple retailing?
Multiple retailing has been chosen to investigate PMM practices because, as a 
service industry, it offers an alternative to the manufacturing bias prevalent in the 
PMM literature and, secondly, because of its rapid growth and the nature of the 
management problems it faced, it was highly innovative in developing 
management practices in the first half of the 20th century. 
The conventional PMM narrative describes the focus of pre-1960’s PMM on the 
supply side; costs needed to be minimised, work was primarily manual and 
management systems were based on prescriptive, standardised procedures and 
controls.  However, this understates the importance of the 'demand side' and the 164
service sector on PMM practices from the 1920's. A focus on sales and the 
customer requires companies to look externally and be more flexible to changes in 
local markets and over time. While even manufacturing businesses had well 
established sales teams and had developed sophisticated selling techniques 
before 1920, the PMM practices associated with their sales teams have been 
largely ignored in the PMM literature.  Furthermore, the evidence suggests that 165
the service sector was quicker to develop their management processes than 
manufacturers, especially in Britain. Chandler and Gospel both highlighted the lack 
of managerial development in British manufacturing firms before the 1950's.  It 166
was not until the Second World War, with the extension of mass production 
methods, the impact of tighter labour markets and the strengthening of trade 
unions that British firms developed their corporate structures and hierarchies. 
Even then, the development only started in the 1950's and only became significant 
 Kipping and Üsdiken, Theory; Whadhwani and Bucheli, Future; Rowlinson et al. 163
Research Strategies.
 Bititci et al., Challenges; Bourne, Handbook; Johnson and Kaplan, Relevance Lost; 164
Ansoff, Implanting.
 Friedman, Birth of a Salesman, 165
 Chandler, Scale and Scope; Gospel, Markets.166
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in the 1960's.  However, within service oriented firms and multiple retailers in 167
particular, structural changes took place much earlier. Commercial bankers, which 
like retailers had to manage high volumes of transactions and large numbers of 
distant branches, undertook widespread organisational change in the 1920's and 
were early adopters of new technologies.  Multiple retailers were also expanding 168
rapidly in the 1920's and needed to develop new organisation structures as 
discussed below. The focus on manufacturing businesses in the existing literature 
largely ignores these developments.
The second reason to use a service sector was that it was growing rapidly and 
generating innovative management practices strongly linked to performance 
management and measurement. Between 1870 and 1930, the service sector was 
growing much faster than manufacturing - for every 100 US workers involved in 
production/ distribution in 1870, that number had increased to 271/ 877 
respectively by 1930.  Multiple retail was growing particularly fast. Table 1.1 169
shows the growth of multiple retailing in Britain and the United States between 
1900 and 1950. The data are not comparable between Britain and the United 
States because of differences in what constitutes 'multiple' - the British data only 
includes those firms with 10 or more stores while the US data defined them as two 
or more, to 1930, and four or more thereafter. Co-operative chains and 
departments stores are excluded. However, despite the differences between the 
British and American definitions, the data illustrate the rapid growth in multiple 
retailing in both countries to 1930 and then some reversal in the United States in 
the number of stores if not the share of total sales.
 Gospel, Markets.167
 Bátiz-Lazo and Wardley, Banking on Change; Wardley, Commercial Banking.168
 Friedman, Birth of a Salesman169
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The growth and the particular problems multiple retailers faced contributed to a 
highly innovative period in management structures and practices. Multiple  retailing 
offered several scale advantages. Centralised and specialised head offices 
allowed buying efficiencies, driving down purchase cost while also providing 
buyers with direct access to manufacturers and knowledge of the latest products. 
Administrative functions could also be consolidated, creating synergies.  170
However, multiple firms' head office’s were distant from the customer and where 
the sales were made. They were distant from the store manager who was 
responsible for maintaining the relationship with the customer, controlling much of 
the costs (salaries) and safeguarding the most valuable assets (inventories and 
property). This put them at a disadvantage to local competitors. As one 
contemporary academic commented “the store manager is the personal 
representative of an impersonal organisation; the independent store owner is the 
Table 1.1: Growth in multiple/ chain stores in Britain and the US 1900 to 1950
Britain United States
Number of 
Stores part of 
a Chain (10 
stores or 
more)
Share of all 
retail sales (%)
Number of 
Stores part of 




Stores part of 
a Chain (4 
stores or 
more)a
Share of all 
retail sales (4 
stores or 
more)(%)
1900 20,901 3.0 - 4.5 4,500 n/a n/a
1910 36,314 6.0 - 7.5 13,500 n/a n/a
1920 45,315 7.0 - 10.0 49,200 n/a n/a
1930 66,488 12.0 - 14.0 216,295 159,638 22.2
1939 83,500 18.0 - 19.5 n/a 132,768 24.0
1950 84,658 18.0 - 20.5 n/a 105,109 22.8
Note that dates are not comparable. In the United States, data for 1930 relates to 1929 and 1950 
to 1948. 
a The decline between 1928 and 1948 largely reflected a decline in filling stations (24,593 fewer) 
and grocery stores (28,419 fewer).
Source: British data from Jefferys, Retail Trading, 20 and 61. US data for 2 store chains from 
Beckman and Nolen, Chain Store. Their source was Federal Trade Commission investigation into 
Chain Stores, 1932. 4 store chains and share from Lebhar, Chain Stores, Table 8. His source 
was the US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
 Beckman and Nolen, Chain store.170
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personal representative of a personal business.”  The problem of distance 171
compounded the problem of pace. Retail was a fast moving business where 
decisions had to be made quickly or independent competitors, often selling the 
same product, could take share through discounts or promotions well before 
information even got to Head Office. As another contemporary noted: 
“The business is in constant flux…. The retail business requires a motion-
picture method of recording which shows what has happened, is 
happening, and likely to happen; and corrective steps must be taken to-day 
to protect the future - tomorrow.”172
Both the rate of growth and the problems faced by the multiple retailers generated 
considerable innovation in management practices. In the US, The National 
Retailers Dry Goods Association was founded in 1911 and by 1935 represented 
5,480 stores employing 700,000 people.  Its role was to disseminate industry 173
best-practice. It established a ‘Bureau of Research and Investigation’ and ran a 
number of Conventions on an annual basis for Controllers (from 1919) and Store 
Managers (from 1923).  Academics were keen collaborators with the firms. From 174
1919, the Harvard Business School co-ordinated the collection of data on retail 
store performance through the Harvard Bureau of Business Research (HBBR). In 
an early form of benchmarking, the HBBR collected operating cost data from 
different retail sectors and soon expanded this to sales and gross margin 
information.  The Harvard Business Review included 43 articles on retailing in its 175
first 10 years of publication (1922 to 1932). Harvard also produced its first series of 
retail management case studies in 1922.  The pace of change meant that these 176
 Hayward and White, Chains Stores (1928), 377.171
 Mazur, Principles of organisation, 144.172
 Testimony of Samuel Reyburn of the NRDGA to the Members of Ways and Means 173
Committee 1935 http://www.ssa.gov/history/pdf/hr35reyburn.pdf
 McNair, retail distribution.174
 For example, although the 1919 report published on retail drug stores was entirely on 175
expenses, the 1920 version included both sales and gross margin statistics. (Harvard 
University Bureau of Business Research published reports 1919 and 1920).
 David, Problems176
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were revised and expanded in 1926, 1930, 1931, 1937 and 1957.  The preface 177
to the 1931 edition highlighted the innovations: “The last dozen years in retail trade 
in the United States have witnessed a remarkable growth of new policies and 
methods of management.” McNair then quoted a number of innovations - 
“standard classification of accounts, retail inventory method, unit control, stock-
sales ratio, open-to-buy, price lining, model stocks, mark-down control, machine 
tabulation, shopping news, radio broadcasting, stylist, quota bonus, blind check, 
unit packing” which, he argued, had not existed 15 years before.  The pace of 178
change led one academic to comment, almost despairingly, that "control 
mechanisms in large retail establishments are at present in such a state of 
continuous flux that it seems almost futile to attempt a consideration of the subject 
in a book."  179
While much of the academic literature emerged from the United States, many UK 
retailers were close observers of US developments. The arrival of Gordon 
Selfridge in 1909 is credited with introducing a number of retail management 
practices to the UK department store particularly relating to organisation and 
control.  The first Woolworths store also opened in 1909 exposing UK multiples 180
to US chain store practices. By 1920, they had 83 stores across Britain.  British 181
retailers visited the US to learn from US practices. Simon Marks of Marks & 
Spencer visited the US in 1924 and again in 1928, where he specifically looked at 
“problems of organisation.”  Harrods hosted a conference in 1926 where they 182
 McNair and David, Problems; McNair, retail distribution; McNair and Gragg, retail store 177
management; McNair et al. Problems in Retailing; McNair et al. Cases.
 McNair and Gragg, retail store management, preface v.178
 Hodge, Retail Accounting, preface x.179
 Lancaster, Department Store.180
 Walsh, When the shopping was good. Woolworths had 1,111 stores in the United 181
States at the time (Lebhar, Chain Stores).
 Sieff, Memoirs, 70.182
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shared practices with American department store owners.  Managers at Boots 183
regularly visited the United States to understand how they operated.184
While these innovations had started to emerge from 1900 onwards, by the early 
1920's, they were gaining traction across the United States and also in Britain. The 
rate of innovation declined in the 1940's.  However, observing how retail firms 185
managed and measure performance in the 1920's and how they subsequently 
developed, helps us understand which were important to firms in the past and over 
time.
Why Marks & Spencer, Boots and WH Smith?
The research questions will be answered using a comparative case study. The 
primary purpose of using a comparative case study was not to identify the 
differences in the PMM approaches of the firms but rather the similarities. In doing 
so, the intention was to establish certain principles used in managing and 
measuring performance which transcended the differences in each firm's historical 
development, competitive pressures, ownership structures and organisational 
cultures. 
Three cases were chosen. The number was limited to ensure that the PMM 
structures could be examined in sufficient depth to understand, where sources 
allowed, how all aspects of a PMM system operated over an extended period of 
time.  The topic is broad and the study covers a long period of time (50 years). 186
 In both Boots and M&S, managers regularly visited the US in the 1920's and 1930's 183
(details provided in relevant chapters below). In 1926, Harrods hosted a conference which 
included heads of American department stores (Retail Research Association: Store 
Owners Conference at Harrods May 22 - 29 1926).
 See section on Boots.184
 Harvard produced only one volume of retail case studies after 1940 but five 185
beforehand (see above). Furthermore, many of the innovations included in McNair and 
Gragg, retail store management, still operate today such as retail inventory method, model 
stocks, open-to-buy.
 In her review of 120 field studies examining PMM systems, Stringer found only nine 186
which covered all elements of a PMM system and only three of these were longitudinal (2 
years or more) Stringer, Empirical.
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Based on initial work in the WHS archive, it soon became clear that a wide range 
of sources would need to be consulted; few procedure manuals existed and even 
then, provided little insight into how performance was managed in practice. 
Restricting the number of case studies to only three, however, limits the 
conclusions that can be drawn. Sigglekow argued that generalising from only a 
small number of case studies is not convincing unless the results are truly 
exceptional or truly representative.  However, the small number still allows us to 187
raise questions about how PMM systems operate now and also to point 
academics and practitioners to where they may find answers.
The criteria for choosing the case studies had to be broad given that they all 
needed to be operating for an extended period of time and have similar scale and 
geographical spread to ensure that they faced similar managerial problems. 
Finding cases from the same retail sector was not practical given that they tended 
to be dominated by one or two firms.  However, evidence also suggests that the 188
largest multiple firms saw their competitors not necessarily as those which sold the 
same products but rather those who operated in similar locations and competed 
for a share of the same customer's expenditure. In Boots' first corporate plan 
published in 1978, they compared their performance not to other chemists but to 
M&S, WHS, Woolworths and Sainsbury's.  In 1957, a report by external 189
consultants commissioned by WHS compared their performance to M&S, Boots 
and Woolworths.  190
Based on secondary literature, a shortlist of potential multiple retailers was created 
and more detailed research, including visits to their archives, narrowed down the 
original list of six to three. All of the firms operated in different retail sectors but 
dominated the ones they were in. They faced different competition and were 
 Sigglekow, Persuasion.187
 In chemists goods, two firms had 88% of all branches of those firms who had more 188
than 25 branches in 1950 (Jefferys, Retail Trading, 387) and the biggest (Boots) acquired 
the second largest in 1968.
 BTC 2555/1 The Corporate Plan 1978.189
 WHS 802 - Analytical and Comparative Studies in Company Performance and 190
Finance: Economics Intelligence Unit 1957.
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subject to different regulatory frameworks. Reasons for the choices are provided 
below.
Marks & Spencer: Although the smallest of the three chosen firms at the 
start of the period, M&S was to become the second most profitable retailer 
in the World.  It was recognised in the period for its managerial 191
competence.  Simon Marks was a keen innovator in managerial practices 192
and looked to both the United States and continental Europe to learn about 
new organisational practices.  The firm reorganised several times during 193
the 1930's and 1940's and undertook a much publicised 'simplification' 
project in the late 1950's which touched its PMM practices.  It also 194
operated in a less directly regulated market than either Boots or WHS which 
were more directly affected by resale price maintenance. The archive has a 
large collection of sources relating to the organisation although significant 
parts of it are restricted (Board and Executive Meeting minutes, personnel 
files). There is also a wide range of secondary literature including the 
memoirs of both Israel and Michael Sieff as well as corporate histories.195
Boots: The market leader in the retailing of chemists goods, Boots was 
taken-over by an American firm in 1920 and introduced management 
structures and processes based on those of the parent company in the 
early 1920's. The firm therefore provides an insight into, what were 
considered at the time, the latest retail management techniques. The 
 "Sieff's despair at lack of 'probing' at M&S" Retail Week, 18 June 2004, 191
https://www.retail-week.com/sieffs-despair-at-lack-of-probing-at-ms/1714678.article.
 In 1962, Simon Marks was the first non-American to receive the Tobé Award for 192
contributions to retail ("Marks and Spencer Limited." Financial Times [London, England] 
14 June 1963: n.p. Financial Times. Web.); In 1974, M&S was the subject of a detailed 
Harvard University case study (A04/117 I Harvard Business School Case Study 1975 and 
1979).
 He visited the United States in 1924 and 1928 to learn about retail organisation (Sieff, 193
Memoirs). He reported in the 1933 AGM that he had visited retail companies in the United 
States, France and Germany "Marks and Spencer Ltd." Financial Times [London, 
England] 18 May 1933: 4. Financial Times. Web.
"Simplification for Efficiency" The Manager, June 1959.194
 Sieff, Memoirs; Sieff, Don't Ask; Rees, St Michael.195
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archive has a comprehensive range of sources although there are also 
restrictions on Board Minutes and salary information of named individuals. 
There are two books written about Boots but both have limitations which are 
discussed further in the introduction to the Chapter.196
WH Smith: Like Boots, it was the market leader in its retail sector 
(bookselling and newsagents). It was, however, older than the other firms. 
WH Smith still operated as a partnership in 1920 and its two most senior 
partners had joined in the early 1890's.  It managed its business largely in 197
the same way as it had in the previous century and therefore provides an 
insight into a more traditional form of performance management. The 
archive is extensive and has few access restrictions. It also contains a 
number of oral reminiscences which provide insights into how the business 
was managed from the early 1920's. The company history is 
comprehensive but its focus is on the activities of the firm rather than its 
structures and processes. It is also largely uncritical of the firm and the 
decisions it made.198
The following three were considered but rejected
Sainsbury's: As a grocer, they represented a retail sector which faced 
different challenges from the other firms. However, archive visits are limited 
to once a week, has limited cataloguing and it became clear after several 
visits that the sources were insufficient to construct a comprehensive 
picture of the PMM systems.
Woolworths: As an American retailer which had only arrived in Britain in 
1909, Woolworths would have provided potential valuable insights into 
 Greenwood, Cap: Chapman, Jesse Boot.196
 WFD Smith joined in 1891 and CH StJ Hornby, a close friend, in 1893. Hornby 197
remained a partner until 1946. Wilson, First.
 Wilson, First.198
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modern American PMM practices. However, the archives were not available 
for public review during the research phase of the thesis.199
The John Lewis Partnership: This firm constituted a potentially interesting 
business model as ownership of the firm was transferred over to its 
employees in 1928 by the owner, Spedan Lewis.  It was subsequently run 200
by the employees as a partnership. While the archives contain a 
comprehensive set of relevant sources, the firm was slow to expand and 
only acquired its third store in 1933 and therefore did not operate as a 
multiple retailer (more than 10 branches) for most of the period. 
Table 1.2 provides a summary of the three case study firms. The chapters on each 
of the firms provide more details about the origins of the firms and the sectors in 
which they operated.
The thesis covers the period 1920 to 1970. The start of the period was chosen as 
it coincided with the increased focus on retail management practices in both the 
United States and Britain as described above. Furthermore, it avoids analysing the 
impact of the war on the operations of the business which, while relevant for firms 
which employed so many, adds further complexity to the analysis and is less 
relevant to problems firms face today.  Finally, the date was also influenced by 201
the sources themselves. Boots was acquired by United Drug in 1920 and started 
to introduce new management practices soon after. Two important sources, their 
house journals The Beacon and The Bee, were only published from 1919 and 
1920 respectively. 1920 was also the year that WHS celebrated, incorrectly they 
soon found out, their centenary. The sources surrounding the associated events 
were a rich source not only in understanding the current practices but also how 
they had (or had not) changed over the last century. Although the M&S case study 
 The University of Reading only announced the acquisition of the Woolworths archives 199
9 March 2017.
 Cox, Spedan's partnership.200
 The impact of the post-war period is, however, covered. Changes in society brought 201
about by the war had a potential impact on how firms managed their businesses - 
particularly on  WHS which relied on cultural factors to influence performance 
management.
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also starts in 1920, it remained a small company until it started to expand at the 
end of the decade after it became a public limited company. There are also few 
archival sources before 1926.




Variety but principally 
clothes
Chemists Books, newspapers and 
stationery
Foundation 1884 1849 1792
Ownership Private company to 1926. 
Public company 
thereafter.
Public company to 1920. 
Subsidiary of an 
American multiple retailer 
1920 to 1933. Public 
company thereafter.
Partnership until 1929. 
Private limited company 






1917 - 1964: Simon 
Marks 
1964 - 1967: Israel Sieff
1967 - 1972: J. Edward 
Sieff
1884 - 1920: Jesse Boot
1920 - 1932: George 
Gales
1932 - 1954: John Boot
1954 - 1960: JP Savage
1960 - 1967: FA Cockfield
1967 - 1970: KD 
Williamson
1891 - 1928: WFD Smith
1928 - 1948: WH Smith






law of Simon marks) 
joined the company full 
time in 1926. The 
Executive board was 
almost entirely composed 
of Marks/ Sieff family 
throughout the period.
John Boot (son of Jesse 
Boot) was Deputy 
Chairman 1920 to 1933 
and effective head of UK 
executive board. 
Executive bodies 
primarily composed of 
directors who had been 
promoted from within the 
business.
Executive bodies entirely 
composed of family/ close 
family friends until 1948. 

























a Reflects complexity rather than size of business as M&S stores were larger than either Boots or 
WHS. WHS also had large numbers of bookstalls. In the 1960's all firms increased the average 
size of their stores but sales area data is not available. M&S did not regularly report their store 
numbers. 1930 data relates to 1934 and 1970 relates to 1968 as reported in the Financial Times. 
Sources: M&S: Rees, St Michael;  Financial Times. Boots: Chapman, Jesse Boot; BTC 461/ 462 
Statistical Books. WHS: Wilson, First; WHS X 15 Aggregate statistics.
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The end of the period was even more heavily influenced by the sources. Both 
Boots and WHS started to diversify in the early 1970's which took them both on a 
different trajectory strategically from how they had operated over the previous 50 
years.  While the strategic changes raise interesting questions, they add further 202
complexity to an already complex thesis. 1969 was also the year that David Smith 
resigned from executive responsibilities at WHS and the firm was run by someone 
from outside the firm for the first time since the business started in 1792.203
Although the period of analysis was 1920 to 1970, relevant sources have been 
examined outside those dates where they offered insights into the firm and the 
firm's operations. For example, Harvard University conducted a case study in 1975 
on M&S and Boots published their first strategic plan in 1978.204
Collation, organisation and analysis of data
In order to collate and organise the data, a framework has been used as a 
heuristic tool.  Using a framework in case studies presents a number of general 
risks, not least that it can imply a normative structure - a particular risk in a 
historical study where the concept of a PMM system did not exist. However, given 
the breadth of this particular study, the advantages are believed to outweigh the 
disadvantages; a framework will improve efficiency in collating and analysing 
information, ensure consistency when comparing the practices of different firms 
and aid completeness, ensuring that all aspects of PMM are reviewed for each 
firm studied.  Several PMM frameworks have been developed but, from the 205
perspective of this study, they share a number of weaknesses. Many of them, 
 Boots acquired the pharmaceutical company Crookes in 1971 ("Guiness sells Crookes 202
to Boots." Financial Times [London, England] 27 July 1971: [1]. Financial Times. Web; 
WHS went through a reorganisation in the early 1970's, selling a third of the bookstalls, 
conducting a joint venture in Holland and they tried to buy Thomas Cook. (Various 
Financial Times articles on 24 August 1973, 6 October 1973, 24 January 1972, Financial 
Times. Web.)
 Newsbasket, July 1969.203
 M&S A04/117 I Harvard Business School Case Study, 1975; BTC 2555/1 The 204
Corporate Plan 1978
 A failure of most PMM field studies (Stringer, Empirical)205
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including the Balanced Scorecard, describe a desired outcome rather than as-is 
processes.  They can ignore informal processes and focus too much on 206
requirements of directors rather than the actions of managers.  They can also 207
understate the importance of behavioural and cultural factors.  In 2009, Ferreira 208
and Otley published a 12 point “extended framework for analysis.”  It differed 209
from the other frameworks as it was developed explicitly to document the 
structures, processes and measures used to manage performance. 
Ferreira and Otley’s framework is based on 12 questions. The first 8 questions 
help describe the separate elements of a performance management system from 
the strategy of the business, through the key performance measures to the reward 
system. The final four questions apply to the system as a whole - linkages, 
strength, use and change. The framework is broad recognising the importance of 
formal and informal processes, of the different roles of managers across 
hierarchical levels and the relevance of both objective and subjective measures. 
The framework evolved from an earlier 5 question model which, together with 
earlier iterations of this model, was the basis for several studies.  The current 210
model has attracted some criticism for giving insufficient weight to social factors 
and doesn’t address conflicts between short term operational measures and 
longer term strategic measures.  These are discussed in more detail below.211
While the full 12 point model was used to organise the data for each of the case 
studies, in presenting them in this thesis, the framework has been modified. Table 
1.3 shows the original 12 areas and how they have been modified for the purposes 
of presentation. Reasons for modifying the table are included after the table.
 Kaplan and Norton, Mastering; Neely et al, Performance Prism.206
 Taticchi et al. Research Agenda; Ferreira and Otley, Framework; Stringer, Empirical.207
 Broadbent and Laughlin, Conceptual Model.208
 Ferreira and Otley, Framework.209
 Otley, Management Control Systems. It has been used in Stringer, Empirical, and she 210
quotes a further four studies.
 Broadbent and Laughlin, Conceptual Model.211
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Table 1.3: Framework







What were the key factors believed to be central to 
the organisation’s overall future success and how 
were they brought to the attention of managers 
and employees?Key Success Factors
Organisation Structure Organisation Structure
What was the organisation structure and what 
impact did it have on the design and use of 
performance management structures and 
systems? How did it influence and how was it 







What strategies and plans did the organisation 
adopt and what were the processes and activities 
that it decided were required for it to ensure 
success? How did it go about setting appropriate 





What processes (formal and informal) did the 
business use to evaluate individual, group, and 
organisational performance? Were performance 
evaluations primarily objective, subjective or 
mixed? Where the processes different for short 
term and long term performance issues.
Reward Systems Motivation
How did the firm motivate employees to deliver the 
performance of the business? What was the mix of 
financial and non-financial rewards?
Key Performance 
measures Measures
What were the key performance measures? How 
frequently did they change? How were they 
specified and communicated and what role do they 
play in performance evaluation? Did they use a 




How were the separate structures and systems 
linked (if at all)? How strong were those links? 
How did they change over time?Strength and 
coherence
PMS' use Included in the other questions
PMS' change Included in the other questions
a The order has been changed for presentation purposes.
Sources: Adapted from Ferreira and Otley, Framework.
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The reasons for the changes were as follows and partly reflect weaknesses or 
gaps in the 12 point framework which emerged during completion of the studies:
(1) To avoid anachronistic concepts and simplify presentation, 'vision and mission' 
and 'key success factors' have been merged and renamed 'Objectives.' The 
renaming is consistent with Otley's original 5 point framework which included 
'Objectives' and did not distinguish between vision, mission and key success 
factors.  In their later version, they wanted to differentiate between broader, 212
longer term objectives and shorter term more specific ones. For the purposes 
of presenting the findings, however, it was felt that they are so closely linked 
that to describe them in separate sections, several pages apart, was confusing. 
Therefore the broader term 'objectives' has been used. 
 
Strategies, plans and target setting were also merged for presentation 
purposes. Partly reflecting conventions at the time and borne out by the 
sources, formal processes relating to strategy and planning were relatively less 
developed than other processes. Therefore, rather than have two short 
sections, it was decided to merge the two.  
(2) To reflect more recent research. Ferreira and Otley acknowledge that reward 
systems include both financial and non-financial rewards and both formal and 
informal practices. However, they still link it with assessed aspects of 
performance. More recently, research has highlighted the importance of on-
going motivation and that this need not be linked to measures or targets.  213
The term "motivation" has been used therefore rather than "reward" to reflect 
the wider focus.
(3) To reflect gaps in the existing 12 point framework. An early draft of Ferreira and 
Otley's paper was criticised for excluding organisational culture from the 
 Otley, Framework.212
 Sobótka and Platts, Managing without measuring.213
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framework.  They acknowledge the criticism but argue that culture is largely 214
outside the control of the organisation and therefore does not form part of the 
description of the PMM system.  Preliminary research conducted on the WHS 215
archives, however, suggested that not only did a firm's cultures and identity 
influence performance management practices but that the firm actively 
cultivated the culture.  Culture has long been recognised as an important 216
element in a PMM system.  Literature on culture and identity has also 217
recognised that they are constitutive, capable of being used to influence 
behaviours to achieve desired outcomes.  To reflect this, 'culture' has been 218
considered explicitly within the framework. While it touches all aspects of a 
PMM system it has been included in the section 'Linking the System' as it was 
one element which helped bind the separate elements of the PMM system and 
created strength and coherence. 
(4) For narrative purposes. Ferreira and Otley's last four questions can apply to all 
of the eight preceding questions (separately or in total). When collating data, it 
became difficult to document how the PMM 'changed' and how it was 'used' 
outside the first eight sections. For example, in documenting how the 
organisation was structured, it is necessary to also describe how the structure 
changed over time and the drivers of that change. 'Change' and 'use' were 
therefore documented twice in the framework. To avoid this in the presentation 
of the findings, both have been subsumed into each of the previous sections. 
 
For describing the information 'flows' in the organisation and the 'strength' of 
the connections between the different elements of the PMM, a new section 
called 'Linking the system' was created. This allowed consideration of whether 
 Broadbent and Laughlin, Conceptual Model.214
 They also argue that context is outside the control of the organisation and therefore 215
have not included it either. In this thesis, the external context is provided in the 
background to each of the case studies. 
 See the Chapter on WHS. Particularly in the early 1920's, the sources show partners 216
using several cultural tools (rituals, traditions, artefacts).
 Euske et al, International setting. And, more generally, in management processes, 217
Fear, Thyssen, Jones, Unilever.
 Giorgi et al. Many faces; Weber and Dacin, Cultural construction.218
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all of the elements linked together to create a 'system' - whether the overall 
way they managed performance was stronger than the sum of the individual 
parts. Using a less specific title than Ferreira and Otley also allowed other 
factors which created linkages and conferred strength to be included - 
specifically organisational culture and identity as discussed above.
The following chapters use the framework to describe how each of the firm's 
measured and managed performance over the 50 years between 1920 and 1970. 
Each chapter has the same format. It starts with some context about the retail 
sector in which they operated and about each firm's own development before 
1920. It also provides some background information about how each firm then 
developed over the next 50 years. The main part of the chapter then examines 
each element of the framework as described above using the questions in the final 
column as a way of analysing the findings. A conclusion summarises the key 
findings about how the firm managed performance as a whole.
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Chapter 2: Marks and Spencer
Introduction
This chapter presents the case of Marks and Spencer. Like the other two firms in 
the thesis, Marks and Spencer was a successful multiple retailer that operated 
throughout the period and it continues to trade today. Like Boots and WHS, it 
traded in similar locations on the major shopping streets in towns and cities across 
Britain and, although not a direct competitor except for a small number of 
products, competed with the other two for a share of the consumer's 
expenditure.  Like the other two retailers, M&S also faced the same operational 219
problems caused by a large number of operating units located far from Head 
Office. While it had fewer branches, they were generally larger and similarly 
scattered across the country. There were, however, some important differences 
from Boots and WHS. Firstly, they sold few externally branded products and 
instead their products bore their own brand name 'St Michael'. They did not, 
however, manufacture themselves and instead sourced products from suppliers 
with whom they retained close links throughout the period. Their PMM practices 
therefore extended beyond their own firm. Secondly, with their origins in variety 
store trading, they were less tied to a specific retail sector than either of the other 
two retailers and they had a broader product range than either Boots or WHS. This 
potentially exposed them to more competition but also provided more freedom to 
change their product offering and helped them avoid the restrictions of resale price 
maintenance. Thirdly, although Simon Marks was not the founder of the firm, he 
was largely responsible for completely restructuring the business and driving its 
growth until his death in 1964. He therefore represented a powerful 
entrepreneurial force, quite different from in the other two firms. In 1920, WHS was 
being run by the fourth generation of the founding family and, by the end of the 
year, Boots had become a subsidiary of an American company.220
 All three of the case studies sold, for example, small gift items such as leather goods.219
 Wilson, First.220
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The principal sources were the company archives, the memoirs of both Israel and 
Michael Sieff and several company histories and journal articles.  The M&S 221
Company Archive was created in 1984 to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the 
firm and is managed by the University of Leeds. It holds more than 70,000 items 
from 1884 to the present day.  The archives are open to the public with prior 222
approval. There are more restrictions on the contents than in either Boots or WHS. 
All Board minutes are restricted, like Boots, but there are also restrictions on many 
of the private papers of the directors. In addition, there are relatively few sources 
relating to salary and other reward mechanisms in the archive.  Specific gaps 223
are identified in the individual sections below. Sources were chosen by using the 
on-line catalogue and discussions with the archivists.  The latter in particular 224
were helpful in identifying potential sources as using search words in the on-line 
catalogue was slow given the range of terminology used to describe documents 
and how this terminology changed over time.  By explaining the framework for 225
the analysis, the archivists suggested several sources which had not otherwise 
come to light including a Harvard Business School case study on M&S completed 
in 1975. 
The memoirs of Israel and Michael Sieff were important sources. They 
supplemented the primary sources and provided insights into the motivation 
behind decisions and described some of the informal management practices which 
are otherwise absent from the primary sources. However, both books can read as 
testimonials and other sources are used to verify their versions where available. 
The company history written in 1969 by Rees was also an important source, 
 Israel Sieff joined the firm full-time in 1926. He was Simon Mark's best friend and 221
brother-in-law and succeeded Marks as Chairman in 1964. Michael Sieff was his son and 
worked in the firm between 1950 and 1979 (Rees, St Michael).
 Marks in Time, https://marksintime.marksandspencer.com/the-collection. Based on 222
using the on-line catalogue, the majority of the sources in the archives relate to post-1980.
 This was confirmed in discussion with the archivists.223
 Searches are based on inputting key words. Given that terminology changes between 224
firms and over time, searching was a long process as different words were tried. There is 
also functionality which allows searching by theme but this was less useful given that the 
themes were broad.
 For example, using terms such as 'financial accounts', 'financial statements', 'financial 225
reports' produces different lists of sources.
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especially in relation to the development of the firm before 1920. The primary 
weaknesses of the book from the perspective of the thesis was its generally 
uncritical review of the activities of the firm and its focus on the key family 
members rather than the processes that operated within the business. He also 
relied on interviews with existing directors as the archive lacked sources at the 
time. It is not clear whether the book was influenced by the firm but Rees does 
acknowledge the support he received from the Marks and the Sieff families in 
writing the book.
The rest of the chapter follows the same format as the other case studies. It 
provides some context on the retail sector in which they operated (variety store 
trading). It is relatively brief as, compared to the Chemist or News trades, it 
remained a small sector before 1920 representing less than 3% of multiple store 
sales.  It is followed by a summary of the development of M&S over the period. 226
The section focuses in particular on how Michael Marks conducted business 
between 1884 and his death in 1907 as his principles foreshadowed how his son 
was to develop the business between 1917 and 1964. The rest of the chapter 
explores how M&S managed and measured performance following the framework 
described in Chapter 1.
Background and Context
The Variety Store Trade
The development of variety store retailing is relatively less documented in the 
literature than other forms or retailing. Jefferys, whose comprehensive history of 
retail trading in Britain between 1850 and 1950 provides much of the detailed 
analysis still used today, devotes relatively little attention to variety stores. He 
focuses instead on product sectors (food, footwear, chemists) and refers to variety 
stores briefly in those sectors. He does, however, offer a definition of a variety 
store as a multiple shop retailer with 10 or more stores selling a wide variety of 
 Jefferys, Retail trading, 69.226
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low-priced products under one roof. The products are usually displayed on open 
counters with little division between the sections.227
In Britain, the variety store emerged from the 'Penny Bazaars' and stalls that are 
first recorded in the 1860's.  These were primarily located in market halls rather 228
than on High Streets. Mass-produced goods were on open display and sold by 
poorly paid shop girls to working class customers.  In the 1890's they started to 229
grow in prominence as owners expanded the number of stalls they owned and 
opened shops on High Streets.  Prices remained cheap although not always at a 230
penny and while they continued to grow, they did not match the growth of the 
specialist multiples. In 1909, Woolworths opened their first British store in 
Liverpool.  Woolworths, founded in 1879, was already the largest variety (dime 231
store) chain in the US and still expanding rapidly.  There were fears that it would 232
drive British variety store chains out of business.  By 1920, Woolworths had 233
grown to 82 shops in Britain.  Woolworth's entry into Britain acted as a catalyst 234
for the variety chain sector, especially after the War. Not only did they expand 
rapidly but, at least in the case of M&S, spurred competitors to grow as well.  In 235
1920, there were 300 variety store branches in Britain representing under 3% of 
multiple store retailing sales.  By 1938, this share had increased to nearly 20% 236
 Jefferys, Retail Trading, 466.227
 Morrison, Woolworths.228
 Morrison, Woolworths.229
 Jefferys, Retail Trading, 69.230
 Walsh, Shopping was good.231
 It opened its 1,000th store in 1914. The second largest, Kresge, had only 144 stores. 232
Raucher, Dime Store. 
 Morrison, Woolworths, 13 recounts a letter written by Frank Woolworth in 1909 which 233
refers to one British chain with 130 stores which "is rumoured ready to give up and not 
fight us."
 Walsh, Shopping was good.234
 Sieff, Memoirs, claims M&S's growth was partly driven by Simon Mark's fear of 235
Woolworths expansion.
 Jefferys, Retail Trading, 69.236
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and the market was dominated by Woolworths and M&S.  The increased volume 237
in the intervening years had been driven by a rapid increase in both the number of 
stores they operated and the average size of the stores. By 1939, Woolworths had 
759 stores compared to 375 in 1930.  M&S meanwhile had 236 stores compared 238
to 140 in 1926 but more importantly, had grown the amount of selling space to 
229,164 square feet from only 38,034 in 1928.  239
Variety store retailing was different from the specialist retailing of Boots and WHS. 
Initially it was based on fixed price points, such as a penny, and the shops focused 
on supply - sourcing the right range and highest quality of popular products under 
the price ceiling. Consequently, they offered a wide range of products and bought 
from a large number of producers. The customer experience was also different. 
Product was on open display and customers were encouraged to browse. Service, 
salesmanship, advertising and branding which were so important to specialist 
multiple store retailers were almost absent from the variety store retailers who 
thrived on the simplicity of their operations.  The need for operational simplicity 240
remained a tenet throughout the period.  There was also less need for overt 241
selling and they generally employed low-skilled and low-paid workers.
Over time, they abandoned fixed price points but remained focused on value for 
money and broad product ranges. By the 1930's there was some specialisation as 
they abandoned slower selling categories. This led to significant growth in their 
share of some retail sectors. In women's clothing, for example, variety stores 
played no part in the trade in 1920 and only a small part in 1930. However, by 
 Jefferys, Retail Trading, 70.237
 Morrison, Woolworths, 68.238
 M&S AO5/413F Annual Report of the Chief Accountants 1939; M&S E7/24 Corporate 239
Governance, Internal Reports 1934 - 1956: “Annual Report of the Chief Accountant 1950” 
 Jefferys, Retail Trading, 70.240
 “The War on Paper Bureaucracy” Lecture by Sir Derek Rayner to the Institute of 241
Administrative Management at Painters Hall, London, on 22 May1975 (M&S A04/117 K 
Various Papers and Speeches)
 63
1939 M&S sold as much as the multiple clothing retailers in underwear and 
hosiery and by 1950, nearly matched the multiples in skirts, dresses and coats.242
After 1940, the success of the variety chain sector becomes harder to separate 
from the individual success of Woolworths and Marks & Spencer, who dominated 
it. By 1970, Woolworths had 1,130 stores including three Woolco stores, an out-of-
town shopping format and generated sales of £334.2 million.  M&S had less 243
stores with only 241 but generated more sales with £338.8 million.  244
Marks & Spencer 1884 to 1970
Although founded only one year after Boots was incorporated in 1883 and more 
than 20 years before WH Smith opened its first shop, by 1920 M&S was still a 
relatively small firm. However, over the next 20 years the business was 
transformed. It revamped its range of products and largely replaced its store 
portfolio - only 18 of its 236 stores in 1939 pre-dated 1926.  Operationally, it 245
introduced management processes and structures borrowed from American 
retailers. Financially it easily surpassed the profitability of both Boots and WH 
Smith. By 1939, it was a very different business from only 20 years earlier. Table 
2.1 shows the relative growth of M&S, Boots and WHS over the period of the 
study. The profit is post tax but pre-distribution of profits to shareholders or 
partners (in the case of WHS in 1920). The table shows the rapid growth of M&S 
and their ability to sustain the growth throughout the whole period.
Although M&S's growth occurred only from the late 1920's onwards, much of the 
success was based on principles which emerged between 1884 and 1920. The 
following paragraphs will provide some background on the organisational 
development of M&S, the operational development of M&S and a discussion on 
the importance of these early years on their subsequent development.
 Jefferys, Retail Trading, 342.242
 Morrison, Woolworths, 156. Sales from Boots' corporate plan (BTC 2555/1, 1978)243
 M&S Annual Report and Accounts, 1970.244
 “Annual Report of the Chief Accountant” 1939 (M&S AO 5/413)245
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The business was founded in 1884 when Michael Marks, a recent Polish 
immigrant, opened a market stall in Leeds under the banner “Don’t ask the price, 
it’s a penny.” The focus was not on a particular product category but sourcing any 
good value products which could be quickly sold on. Initial success prompted 
expansion as he opened further shops across the north of England. In 1894, he 
went into partnership with Thomas Spencer, a cashier at one of his suppliers 
(Dewhirsts). In 1903, the business became a limited company with capital allotted 
equally between the two of them. They both worked well together but Spencer 
retired in 1904 and died in 1905. Michael Marks died soon after in 1907. The 
trustees of their relative estates clashed and for the next ten years disputed over 
who controlled the business. When Simon Marks, the son of Michael, joined the 
Board in 1911, he found himself outnumbered following the resignation of one of 
the Directors. It was only after a series of court rulings in 1916 and 1917 that 
Marks secured control. In June 1917, he became Chairman, replacing William 
Chapman of the Spencer estate. Chapman and Spencer’s son were voted off the 
Board the following year.  The family retained control throughout the period. 246
M&S became a public company in 1926 and Marks remained Chairman until his 
death in 1964. The executive board was dominated by the Marks and Sieff 
families. Israel Sieff, Marks' best friend since school and brother-in-law, joined the 
firm full-time in 1926 and succeeded Marks as chairman. Figure 2.1 shows the 
family tree of the Marks and Sieff families. As discussed in more detail below, the 
control of the board by the family and their closeness, particularly between Simon 
Marks and Israel Sieff, influenced how performance was managed throughout the 
period.  
Table 2.1: Distributable Profits (£'000s)
1920 1940 1961a 1970
Marks and Spencer 28 848 10,295 26,005
Boots 219 720 4,166 11,000
W.H. Smith 436 272 850 2,115
a WHS changed its accounting year in 1960. 1961 has been used to ensure a full year's trading
Source: M&S: Rees, St Michael; Boots from published annual accounts apart from 1920 (BTC Y 
192); WHS from audited accounts to 1949 (X 141 to X 170) and published accounts thereafter.
 Rees, St Michael.246
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Figure 2.1: Marks and Sieff Family Trees
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Operationally, the business grew steadily after 1894. By 1900, M&S had 36 
branches of which 12 were shops rather than market stalls. By 1907 they had 60 
branches and 140 by 1914 with less than 10% in market halls and arcades. Pre-
tax profit also grew steadily from £7,000 in 1903 to £30,000 in 1914.  If the 247
growth was slower than Boots or WHS, it reflected both internal and external 
factors. Internally, Simon Marks was frustrated with the Spencer preference for 
protection of the assets and income stream rather than growth. Chapman kept a 
tight control over stock and cash and the Board minutes note conflict with Simon 
Marks’ buying policies.  However, the relatively slower growth before 1920 also 248
reflected the industry. Variety store retailing was slower to expand than other 
multiple retailing in Britain as noted above. 
Rapid expansion of the business occurred after 1926 when the firm became a 
public limited company and could fund expansion. The rise of Woolworths was 
said to be one reason for the expansion. Israel Sieff later recalled that Simon 
Marks was heavily influenced by the power of Woolworths and the transformation 
from the mid-1920’s was at least in part driven by concerns that Woolworths 
success could drive the M&S business under.  Although their product ranges 249
grew apart over time with M&S focusing on clothing and food, Woolworths 
remained a competitor over the period. This did not stop Marks from borrowing 
operational ideas from Woolworths.  They may have also actively hired 250
Woolworths staff. There is a copy of a 1929 review of performance in the M&S 
archives from a Woolworths District Office addressed to one of their store 
manager’s. By 1942, he was working for M&S and had clearly taken some of his 
old reports with him.  251
 Rees St Michael, 18 and 26.247
 Rees, St Michael 248
 Sieff, Memoirs, 141.249
 Marks adopted the 'Checking List' from Woolworths.250
 This may have been an isolated incident but the letter, across 8 pages, provided an 251
insight into how Woolworths managed its stores and also included the financial results of 
the store for the year. The employee (L. Cooper) was working for M&S in 1942 but it is not 
clear when he joined. (M&S S/1/22/3 Hartlepool Store Letter 1929 and S22/32 Wood 
Green 1942)
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Table 2.2 below shows the growth of M&S between 1920 and 1970. The table is 
not intended to show the relative success of their PMM practices but rather to 
provide the context for the description of these practices which follows.
Much of the success of the business after 1920 appears to have been based on 
principles and practices that occurred between 1884 and 1920. M&S was a 
business which prided itself on its technological and operational innovation.  252
However, throughout the sources there are regular references to its own history 
and it appears to have played a central role in how they saw themselves internally 
and how they described themselves externally. There are repeated references to 
the legacy of Michael Marks, who died in 1907, and to the origins of the business 
Table 2.2: Key statistics
Retail Sales (£'000) Profit available for 
shareholders (£'000)
Stores
1920 n/a 28 n/a
1925 n/a 40 140
1930 3,605 261 n/a
1935 11,398 805 180
1940 27,031 848 236
1945 18,104 806 n/a
1950 52,591 2,221 230
1955 108,375 4,468 n/a
1960 148,023 9,081 237
1965 219,791 12,856 n/a
1970 338,843 26,005 241
Sources: Retail sales from Rees, St Michael, except 1965 and 1970 which are from published 
accounts.
 See section on Objectives below.252
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in external speeches and internal correspondence.  Based on these sources, 253
there are three themes evident in the first 40 years to 1920 which echo throughout 
the following 50 despite the evident changes in strategy and scope of the 
business.
First, Michael Marks formed close and enduring relationships with his suppliers 
and advisers. This may have reflected his first business ventures in Poland where 
he supplied clothing manufacturers with quality ‘scraps’. In what was a low margin 
business, Marks relied on the trust that his customers had in the quality he was 
providing to ensure on-going orders.  As a retailer operating through ‘penny 254
bazaars’ he was now the buyer but with the strictures of a fixed selling price, he 
worked closely with suppliers to source quality and innovative products to 
distinguish himself from the competition. This extended to advice and financial 
support. Isaac Dewhirst loaned Michael Marks the £5 which enabled him to start 
his business and Dewhirst recommended one of his own employees, Thomas 
Spencer, when Marks sought a partner in 1894. In 1970, M&S were still working 
closely with Dewhirst’s to improve welfare and productivity.  And, Dewhirst’s 255
were still a supplier to M&S in 2014.256
Secondly, the bitter experience of fighting for control of the the business between 
1911 and 1917 drew Simon Marks towards his family and friends. Following the 
court victory in 1916, Alexander Isaacs and Israel Sieff were appointed to the 
Board.  Marks had met Sieff at school in 1902 and they married each others 257
 e.g. ‘Thinking about the Business’’ Notes by Simon Marks 28.12.54 Reissued in August 253
1979 (M&S CR/C/2/80 Collated Business Reports 1950 - 1984), Speech by Marcus Sieff 
to unknown external audience c.1965 (M&S CR/B/2/3 Israel Moses Sieff speeches and 
notes), “The War on Paper Bureaucracy” Lecture by Sir Derek Rayner to the Institute of 
Administrative Management at Painters Hall, London, on 22 May 1975 (M&S A04/117 K 
Various Papers and Speeches)
 Sieff, Memoirs.254
 Relationship with Dewhirst explained in Rees, St Michael; Productivity review was part 255
of a memo to directors, 7/10/70 (M&S E 7/19 Corporate Governance Management 
Committee)
 Although there was some debate whether they would continue to do so as they looked 256
to increasing sourcing of products to the Far East. https://www.drapersonline.com/news/
ms-cuts-suppliers-as-efficiency-measures-take-hold/5062759.article
 Although Sieff did not become a full time director until 1926.257
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sisters. They remained close friends for the rest of their lives. Sieff followed Marks 
as Chairman after this death. Family remained the backbone of the senior 
management team throughout the 50 years between 1920 and 1970 and even 
where non-family members were promoted to the Board, they typically had worked 
for M&S throughout their careers.  This is discussed further in the section on 258
Organisation Structure below.
Thirdly, Simon Marks inherited a strong sense of social responsibility from his 
father.  He is reported as saying that “I learned my social philosophy from 259
Michael Marks and not Karl Marx.”  Michael Marks adopted a patriarchal attitude 260
towards the business and a humane attitude towards his staff.  When he 261
established his first premises in Manchester, he built a dining room and gave them 
a place where they could cook their food.  Israel Sieff attributed the attitude at 262
least partly to the Jewish religion and its historic importance on patriarchal 
authority and responsibility.  This extended beyond their own company. The 263
1903 Articles of Association stated the intention ‘to support and subscribe to any 
charitable or public object, and any institution, society of club which may be 
connected with any town or place where the company carries on business.’  264
How these themes influenced the objectives, the development of organisation 
structures and the performance management processes is discussed in the 
following sections. What becomes clear is that the performance management 
'system' that evolved in M&S was strongly linked to the firm's origins and the 
principles which underpinned its early success. The finding suggests that modern 
 In 1964, the only two members of the new Management Committee who were not 258
family members had been working for M&S since the early 1930’s (W.F Norris and B 
Goodman).
 The actions taken by Simon Marks to improve the welfare of his employees is 259
described in the Objective section below.
 Rees, St Michael,  11.260
 Rees, St Michael, 23.261
 Sieff, Memoirs, 157.262
 Sieff,  Memoirs.263
 Sieff, M, Don't ask, 224.264
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firms should be cautious in implementing new PMM systems without consideration 
of how their own practices have evolved. 
Table 2.3 summarises the key dates in the development of the business and is for 
context purposes only.
Performance Management and Measurement
Using the same format as the other case studies, the following sections will 
describe each of the main elements of a PMM system as defined in the framework 
Table 2.3: M&S expansion - key dates
Year
1884 Firm founded by Michael Marks when he opens a market stall in Leeds.
1894 Michael Marks forms a partnership with Thomas Spencer.
1903 The firm becomes a private limited company.
1905 Thomas Spencer dies.
1907 Michael Marks dies. While Michael Marks and Thomas Spencer had worked well 
together, the next generation did not. There was ten years of disputes between the 
two parties only finally resolved by a court ruling in 1916 which gave control to the 
Marks family. 
1917 Simon Marks becomes Chairman.
1924 Simon Marks visits the US to learn about US multiple retailing. He undertook 
several visits to the US thereafter but also visited retail stores in Europe.
1926 Firm becomes a public limited company.
1926 Israel Sieff joins the business on a full time basis as Vice-Chairman.
1928 Start of organisational improvements - new departments created in Head Office, 
product lines rationalised. Process took place over the 1930's and early 1940's.
1956 Operation Simplification. Resulted in the elimination of administrative paperwork 
and organisation manuals. On-going programme which continued in the early 
1960's.
1964 Simon Marks dies. Israel Sieff becomes Chairman.
1967 J. Edward Sieff becomes Chairman.
1968 M&S overtakes Woolworths in Britain in both sales and profits.
Sources: Rees, St Michael; Sieff, Memoirs; Morrison, Woolworths, 156
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introduced in the first chapter. The assessment includes both description and 
analysis of the PMM structures, processes and measures. A conclusion draws 
together those points particularly relevant to the research questions.
Objectives of the Organisation
This section will describe the objectives of the organisation and consider how they 
were communicated to the organisation. It will also consider any changes to those 
objectives. In well performing PMM systems, objectives, organisation structures, 
performance management processes and performance measures should all be 
linked.
Unlike in the other two case studies, the objectives of the organisation are 
repeated throughout the sources by different people and aimed at both internal 
and external audiences. These sources show that the objectives remained 
consistent from the first Annual General Meeting in 1926 to at least, 1970. 
A memo written by Simon Marks to his employees in 1954 and titled "Thinking 
about the Business" summarised these objectives. In introducing them he 
explained that they were not new and had been operating since before the war. 
The memo was reissued to senior management by the Chairman in 1979 as a 
reminder of the core objectives of the organisation.265
“Our main effort before the war had been directed to the production of a 
wide variety of specialised goods of outstanding value at prices the public 
could afford to pay. That policy enabled us to build up a goodwill which is 
one of the company’s most valuable assets. Our aim today is similar, to 
produce exclusive goods at inexpensive prices. The emphasis is more and 
more on quality, style and finish. Our organisation is geared to the carrying 
out of this conception by its specialist and technical approach to production, 
by the teamwork of our executives and their staff, and by the close and 
 M&S CR/C/2/80 Collated Business Reports 1950 - 1984265
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unique relationship which we have with our suppliers. Thus the principles 
on which the business was founded do not change.” (Lord Marks, 1954).  266
The sources show that each of the objectives underlined in the quotation were 
repeated in both internal and external speeches and in internal memos by the 
directors. The statement identified what he believed was their core principle - 
“exclusive goods at inexpensive prices.” At the first Annual General Meeting in 
1927, it was explained as a policy to “give to the public the best value for the price 
paid.”  It was repeated throughout the 1950’s, 1960’s and 1970’s by the directors 267
with only slight changes in wording - “inexpensive goods of quality”, “a selected 
range of goods of high quality at reasonable prices,” “improvement of the lines in 
value and quality.”  It was summarised by the Vice-Chairman, Michael Sacher, to 268
a Harvard researcher in 1975: "I think we have carved a market out here which is 
quality goods at lower prices.”  269
Marks' quotation also shows how they would achieve it. Marks referred to a 
"technical approach to production" and the sources demonstrate the application of 
the objective from the 1930's to the 1970's. Marcus J. Sieff explained to an 
external audience that “the application of scientific and technical work to the 
development and improvement of St Michael goods” was the second principle on 
which the business was based.  The Merchandise Research and Development 270
Department was created in 1936 and by 1964 it employed 60 scientists.  In the 271
 Notes by Lord Marks, 28/12/54 (M&S CR/C/2/80 Collated Business Reports 1950 - 266
1984) Author emphasis.
 "Marks and Spencer." Financial Times [London, England] 28 May 1927: 2. Financial 267
Times. Web.
 ‘The Principles of the Business’ A lecture by Mr Marcus J. Sieff at Staff Supervisors’ 268
Meeting 25/2/1954 (CR/C/2/80 Collated Business Reports 1950 - 1984), Marcus J. Sieff, 
speech to external company c.1965 (CR/B/2/3 Israel Moses Sieff speeches and notes), 
Edward and Marcus Sieff, internal memo to Executive (21/2/69) titled “Achievement and 
Growth” (CR/B/2/2 Israel Moses Sieff: Business Papers).
 M&S A04/117 I Harvard Business School Case Study 1975, 36.269
 Marcus J. Sieff, speech to external company c.1965 (CR/B/2/3 Israel Moses Sieff 270
speeches and notes)
 Marcus Sieff, speech to external company c.1965 (CR/B/2/3 Israel Moses Sieff 271
speeches and notes)
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1950’s, the in-house magazine included articles extolling the technical attributes of 
products under headings such as “A Million Air Bubbles under your feet - that’s 
Micro-celluar” and “M&S Colour Matching Delighted the Experts.”  Evidence from 272
internal reports in the late 1920’s and 1930’s show that support functions  regularly 
referenced technological improvements in their commentaries to the directors.   273
Marks' reference to the importance of the “teamwork of Executive and staff” was 
also echoed in other sources. In a speech at the Royal Albert Hall in 1969, Marcus 
Sieff explained that it was achieved by developing good human relations which, 
they argued, also generated loyalty to the principles of the business, generated 
labour stability and acceptance of new and more modern methods.  Israel Sieff 274
argued in another speech that the objective was based on the idea that theirs was 
“a very personal business” which put trust in their employees and treated them as 
individuals.  It was also reflected in the responsibility that the Executive put on 275
themselves and Head Office colleagues to develop personal contact with store 
staff in order to improve communication and to get a better shared understand of 
the issues and opportunities that the business faced. As such, it was arguably the 
core element of the central M&S idea of ‘probing’ which emphasised that the only 
real way to understand the business was to visit stores and suppliers, talk to 
salesmen and women and personally inspect garments and produce.  M&S were 276
also early and heavy investors in welfare which they believed fostered employee 
loyalty.  Later in his speech on the objectives of the business, Simon Marks 277
 St Michael News August and October 1955.272
 “Confidential Report to the Directors on the Conduct of Administration” 1934, 1935, 273
1937,  (E/7/24) and “Annual Report of the Chief Accountant”, 1938, 1939 (M&S AO 5/413)
 Marcus Sieff in a speech given at the Royal Albert Hall in 1969 and reproduced by 274
Harvard researchers (M&S A04/117)
 Israel Sieff speech to British-American Chamber of Commerce December 1965 (M&S 275
CR/B/2/3 Israel Moses Sieff speeches and notes)
 ‘Probing’ is explored in more detail in the section on ‘Evaluation’ below.276
 A welfare department was established in 1933 (M&S E/E1/3/2 Development of 277
Organisation 1926 - 1948).
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emphasised that “the loyalty and devotion of management and staff throughout the 
system” was one of the businesses greatest assets.278
The final 'great' asset explained by Marks in his speech was the "close and unique 
relationship which we have with our suppliers." The importance of these 
relationships was reflected in the first Annual General Meeting where the “Co-
operation with British Suppliers” was one of the banner headlines in their 
presentation and it was also emphasised in Israel Sieff’s speech at the meeting.  279
M&S had sought a different relationship with suppliers, working with them directly 
and cutting out the wholesaler.  Internal and third party sources support the close 280
working relationship they had with suppliers. In 1951, in the notes of a confidential 
meeting between M&S and Corah, one of their largest suppliers, Corah recorded 
Sieff's closing statement: 
“The relationship between M. and S. and Corah was based on mutual 
confidence. There are no secrets between the two organisations and 
collaboration must be based on knowledge of each others problems. M. and 
S. having regard to their turnover would do anything possible to keep 
Corah’s productive machinery working to capacity, and in turn Corah 
agreed to keep M. and S. in the forefront of competition.”281
The relationships extended beyond knowledge sharing and manufacturing 
agreements. There is evidence that M&S were keen that suppliers adopted the 
same principles as themselves. Suppliers were expected to adopt a similar focus 
on technology and to promote human relations. They audited supplier employee 
welfare arrangements and they were also not afraid to chide them in their own 
 Notes by Lord Marks, 28/12/54 (M&S CR/C/2/80 Collated Business Reports 1950 - 278
1984)
 "Marks and Spencer." Financial Times [London, England] 28 May 1927: 2. Financial 279
Times. Web. 4 Nov. 2016.
 This reflected the origins of the business as described above.280
 From Corah company archives. “Confidential notes on meeting between Marks and 281
Spencer’s and Corah's, 1951” (University of Leicester archive RO/C19/1-3 [ROLLR: 
DE4788 Box 3])
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magazine: “We tell all our Suppliers - our girls have this sort of welfare - what 
about yours.”282
Despite the considerable financial success of the business compared to both UK 
peer companies and US multiple store retailers, profit was rarely mentioned as the 
objective of the organisation. Rather, it appears that profit was both an in-put and 
out-put measure, necessary to fund the expansion of the business but also a 
consequence of leveraging their ‘assets’ as described above. Instead, the 
business, and Simon Marks in particular, seemed to be more driven by a 
determination to learn and to continually improve. Marcus Sieff, who joined the 
business in 1935, reflected that while the driving force of Simon Marks' life was 
improving the business “its mainspring was improving efficiency rather than 
making a fortune” and “nobody who observed him closely would say that these 
things (trappings of wealth) were anywhere near as important to him as the desire 
to run, and improve, a great enterprise which would benefit the public.”  283
The desire for constant improvement is supported by Marks' actions. He was an 
active learner and expected the business to be so as well. He visited the United 
States in 1924 to learn “the chain store art” and was a frequent visitor after that.  284
In 1928, he went with Israel Sieff to “study merchandising anew.”  He made a 285
further visit in 1932 and also toured France and Germany.  Sieff himself spent a 286
month in the US working with General Wood at Sears in 1934.  Head Office 287
managers visited the United States in the 1930’s to investigate further 
 Minutes 5/11/69 and accompanying report (M&S E7/19 Corporate Governance 282
Management Committee 1968 - 1972) and St Michael News August 1955.
 Sieff, Don't Ask, 146.283
 Sieff, Memoirs, 142.284
 M&S HO/3/2/2/1/1 Weekly Bulletin June 18th 1927 and onwards (8/9/28)285
 Reported at the AGM. "Marks and Spencer Ltd." Financial Times [London, England] 18 286
May 1933: 4. Financial Times. Web.
 Israel Sieff speech to British-American Chamber of Commerce December 1965 (M&S 287
CR/B/2/3 Israel Moses Sieff speeches and notes)
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opportunities for administrative improvement.  Internal reports presented to the 288
Directors in the 1930’s and 1950’s specifically referred to the administrative 
improvements made year on year and the same reports referenced US magazines 
such as Chain Store Age as sources for ideas. Handwritten annotations in the 
reports, presumably written by one of the Directors, emphasised their own focus 
on administrative innovations.  In the 1950’s and the 1960’s, the drive for 289
continual improvement led to “Operation Simplification” which reportedly 
eliminated the use of 26 million forms annually and was referred to in parliament 
and in a number of contemporary studies.  The idea that a business should 290
focus so heavily on continuous learning and improvement does not seem 
particularly noteworthy but as some of the other case studies in this thesis 
demonstrate, continual improvement is not a normal state for mature 
organisations.  Derek Rayner, Managing Director, reflected in a speech in 1975: 291
“We live in a world of change, yet the strongest force in a large organisation is 
inertia.”292
 “Confidential Report to the Directors on the Conduct of Administration” 1937  (M&S E/288
7/24)
 “Confidential Report to the Directors on the Conduct of Administration for the Year.” 289
1934, 1935, 1936, 1937 and “Annual report of the Chief Accountant” 1950 (M&S E7/24 
Corporate Governance, Internal Reports 1934 - 1956),  Annual Report of the Chief 
Accountant’s 1938, 1939 (M&S AO5/413F)
 “Publicity relating to the Simplification of paper Work”, September 1962. The most 290
comprehensive report was completed by the ‘Organisation and Methods Division of HM 
Treasury in collaboration with departmental Organisation and Methods Officers.’ The 
Article was called “The Marks & Spencer attack on Paperwork” and was published in O&M 
Bulletin (Vol. 14, 1, February 1959 (M&S A04/117 K Various Papers and Speeches)
 As has been noted in several studies (Stinchcombe, Social Structures; Hannan and 291
Freeman, Organisational Ecology;  Kelly and Amburgey, Orgainzational inertia.
 “The War on Paper Bureaucracy” Lecture by Sir Derek Rayner to the Institute of 292
Administrative Management at Painters Hall, London, on 22 May 1975 (M&S A04/117 K 
Various Papers and Speeches)
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Organisation Structures
This section will consider how M&S structured its organisation and whether this 
was consistent with the objectives. It will also consider the extent to which the firm 
changed its structure, if at all. 
Between 1920 and 1926, Marks led the business with little of the direct family 
support that he later relied on.  The sources suggest that Marks was keen to 293
introduce new organisational structures and processes in the early 1920's. Sieff 
reported, as noted above, that Marks was concerned about the impact of 
Woolworths' business on M&S and toured the United States in 1924 to learn from 
the practices being developed there.  Sieff also reports that Marks was frustrated 294
in implementing the changes by other members of the Executive. Sieff believed it 
was less about hostility to change and more due to ignorance.  Consequently, 295
Marks persuaded Israel Sieff to join the company permanently in 1926. It was from 
1926 that the business started to develop the organisational structures and 
processes that transformed the business.
The Board of Directors
Even after 1926, it is hard to determine how the Board was structured and 
operated, based upon the sources. There are few references to the structures for 
that period in the archive. This may reflect gaps in the archive but it may also 
reflect a relatively loose structure at board level and Simon Marks' own style of 
management.  There is some evidence to support this. It was not until 1964, just 296
before Simon Marks died, that a formal Management Committee was set up 
comprising senior members of the Board (see below) with clearly defined 
responsibilities. Perhaps Marks saw no need for a formal structure at Board level 
 Although Israel Sieff was nominally a director, he was based in Manchester involved in 293
his own family  business.
 Sieff, Memoirs, 142.294
 Sieff, Memoirs, 147.295
 Access to the Board minutes is restricted296
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to oversee operational issues while he was in charge and his relationship with 
Israel Sieff meant informal relationships were sufficient. Harry Sacher, a 
contemporary director, later recalled that Marks and Sieff were “a board in 
permanent session on the companies affairs.”  Sacher also recalled that on first 297
coming to London, Israel Sieff lived with Simon Marks and together they continued 
to discuss business issues long after they returned home in the evening. Simon 
Marks also met Israel Sieff on his return from every business trip to discuss 
findings.  Detailed letters show that during the war, when Israel Sieff was called 298
away from the business, Simon Marks wrote to Sieff explaining how the business 
was faring and the rationale for the decisions made.  Israel Sieff later 299
commented that from 1926, “a business association of the very closest kind was 
formed between us, in which, for over forty years, neither of us had a cross word 
with each other.”  This may have been hyperbole as Simon Marks was said to 300
have a challenging personality but the closeness of their relationship was evident 
to those who saw them together outside work. The autobiography of his step-
nephew recalled that “Israel and Simon were like the Tweedles - Dum and Dee, 
Box and Cox. Simon loved Israel….. Israel worshipped and always acknowledged 
his (Simon’s) mastery.”  When Israel Sieff died in 1972, he was buried alongside 301
Simon Marks and they share the same tombstone.302
The close relationship with Israel Sieff and with the other members of the 
extended family may well have influenced how performance was managed - 
formal structures could be by-passed or were not necessary when relationships 
were so close. Harry Sacher, who joined the Board in 1932, later recalled that 
these relationships, based as they were on complete confidence, understanding 
and collaboration, extended to new family members as they joined the Board and 
 Recollections of Harry Sacher in Rees, St Michael, 101.297
 Recollections of Harry Sacher in Rees, St Michael, 101.298
 Simon Marks to Israel Sieff. 2/10/40 (M&S CR/B/3/1/9) and 8/4/41 (M&S CR/B/3/1/54)299
 Rees  St Michael, 75.300
 Blond, Made in England, 60. Blond was a publisher and author.301
 Golders Green crematorium. (http://www.findagrave.com/cgi-bin/fg.cgi?302
page=pv&GRid=8244361&PIpi=749194)
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was an important factor in the development of the organisation.  This was partly 303
corroborated in comments made by Michael Sacher to Harvard researchers in 
1975: “The family is a binding force in another way. Members of the family can talk 
to each other in a candid way that I find extremely difficult to discover with 
professional managers.”  Even after Marks' death, the Board was still controlled 304
by the family. In the early 1970's, there were 22 directors but the Harvard 
researchers noted that it was a smaller group of ‘Managing Directors’ who met 
every Monday before the wider Board meeting to discuss the results and this 
smaller group continued to be dominated by family members.  305
Table 2.4 shows the composition of the Board at the end of each decade. It shows 
that family members dominated the Board throughout the period, even more so 
when it is restricted to executive board members (Amery, Benson and the 
Marquess of Blandford were non-executive directors). Where non-family members 
were admitted to the Executive Board, they typically had had a long relationship 
with the firm. WF Norris, who became a director in 1950, was the son of Michael 
Marks' warehouse manager at the turn of the century. Lewis and Rayner, 
appointed in the late 1960's, had joined as management trainees in the early 
1950's.  B Goodman, the Chief Accountant, had joined the company in 1932 306
before becoming a Board member in 1952.  307
There is some evidence that appointment to the Board was determined by 
personal qualities and overall knowledge of the business rather than role alone. 
After Goodman retired in 1974, his successor was not immediately appointed a 
'Managing Director'.  In the Harvard research, Gabriel Sacher explained that a 308
 Recollections of Harry Sacher in Rees, St Michael, 101.303
 M&S A04/117 I Harvard Business School Case Study 1975304
 Four out of six were family members. The other two were former graduate trainees 305
who had joined the firm in the 1950’s (M&S A04/117 Harvard Business School Case Study 
1975)
 Sieff, Don't Ask.306
 Rees St Michael, 138307
 Although he was one of the 22 directors. (M&S A04/117 I Harvard Business School 308
Case Study 1975)
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board member's primary expertise had to be in ‘M&S’.  Managing Directors also 309
assumed many functional roles over their careers, often at the same time. In the 
late 1950’s for example, Marcus Sieff was simultaneously responsible for Store 
Operations, Personnel and Food.  From a PMM perspective, this suggests an 310
important principle - for a Board member, overall knowledge of the business was 
more important than functional specialisation. Consequently performance 
management of the overall business was more important than performance 
management of a particular department/ function.
The sources lack any description of how the Executive Board operated or 
structured their work. Formal Board meetings were a statutory requirement but it is 
not clear how important they were in the on-going running of the business. There 
are very few references in the sources to these meetings and they may, like many 
 Interview with G Sacher. (M&S A04/117 I Harvard Business School Case Study 1975)309
 Sieff, Don't Ask 138.310
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Table 2.4: Board of Directors
1930 1940 1950 1960 1970
Simon Marks Simon Marks Simon Marks Simon Marks Israel Sieff
Israel Sieff Israel Sieff Israel Sieff Israel Sieff J. Edward Sieff
A. Isaacs N. Laski N. Laski J. Edward Sieff B.W Goodman
JL Green H. Sacher H. Sacher B.W Goodman W. F Norris
N. Laski L.S. Amery L.S. Amery E.W. Kann Marcus Sieff





A. Lerner J Lewando
J. Edward Sieff J. Edward Sieff W. F Norris M. Sacher
A. E. Lees H. Sacher G. Sacher
W. F Norris Marcus Sieff G. D Sacher
Michael Sieff Michael Sieff H. N Lewis
H Freeman
D Rayner
Names in bold were members of the extended Marks family
Source: Annual reports and Financial Times reports on the Annual General Meeting.
businesses, been used just for statutory formalities. Operationally, Simon Marks 
and Israel Sieff had met daily before the war and Marcus Sieff referred to regular 
meetings of the senior directors from at least the 1950’s including a scheduled 
meeting every Monday morning which Simon Marks dominated (see below). 
Further formal structure did not materialise until 1964, 8 months before Marks’ 
death, when a Management Committee was created under Israel Sieff. It 
comprised each of the Managing Directors. Their responsibilities covered what 
might be expected in a performance oriented committee such as the review of 
forecasts, targets, budgets and the ‘progress’ of departments and stores. 
However, their role also explicitly included activities consistent with the wider 
company objectives and demonstrated the engagement of directors in the details 
of running the business:
• “To maintain contact with our leading manufacturers.”
• “To receive reports from Technicians. To encourage them in the upgrading of the 
St Michael goods and in the development of new materials and lines.”
• “To review the number of store staff, their working conditions, rates of pay, 
recruitment and training.”  311
Memos towards the end of the decade suggest the committee remained true to 
these responsibilities. Based on minutes of meetings, they discussed topics which 
ranged from the “The Role of the Food Technologist”, how to run a week-end 
seminar with suppliers and store manager requirements over the next 5 years.312
Head Office Structures
Below the Board, formal organisation structures developed rapidly before the war. 
The size of the business grew significantly. Growth was accompanied by 
rationalisation of the product range and the introduction of new processes which 
 Memo 8/4/1964 “The Role of the Management Committee” (M&S CR/B/2/2 Israel 311
Moses Sieff: Business Papers)
 Memo 25 January 1969, minutes of meeting 4 August 1969, Report September 1969 312
(M&S E7/19 Corporate Governance Management Committee 1968 - 1972)
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Marks had copied from his American trips.  Existing departments grew to 313
accommodate the increased workload. The Statistics Department, for example, 
grew from 26 people in 1934 to 57 in 1939.  Departments were also created 314
reflecting a professionalisation of the organisation with new departments opening 
almost every year in the in the 1930’s. Table 2.5 shows a list of the departmental 
changes that took place between 1930 and 1940. It highlights the pace of the 
reorganisation and restructuring.
By 1937, the Head Office Structure comprised a Board of Directors supported by:
• Merchandise Committee. Comprised of 6 members who were responsible for 
the 23 buying departments. The Chairman was J. Edward Sieff.
• Merchandise Development and Research Department. It’s role was to “assist 
our manufacturers to create still better values for the benefit of our customers. 
It investigates new materials and new processes in order to adapt them to the 
Table 2.5: Organisational Changes 1930 - 1940
Year Department
1931 Printing Department created
1932 External Administration Department created
Legal Department created
1933 Welfare Department created
Merchandising Committee created
1934 Personnel Department created
New Equipment and Supply Department created
1936 Merchandise Development Department created
Personnel and Welfare Departments reorganised and merged
1938 Organisation Department reorganised
Designing Department created
Source: Development of Organisation 1926 - 1948 (M&S E/E1/3/2)
 For example, the Checking List was introduced in 1928. Development of Organisation 313
1926 - 1948 (M&S E/E1/3/2)
 M&S AO5/413F Annual Report of the Chief Accountants 1939 (March 1940)314
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goods we sell and to develop new types of goods which can be produced at 
favourable prices.”315
• Organisation Department. The department comprised 6 Inspectors with 
Norman Laski as Chairman. The department was responsible for controlling 
store operations. The department underwent a reorganisation in 1938 and 
1941 (see below).
• External Administration Department. Maintained control over branch 
administration. It comprised branch accountants, cashiers, stock takers and in-
store detectives. The branch accountants were expected to visit all of the 
stores several times a year and conduct two audits of the administration of the 
stores.316
• Administrative Department. Comprising:
• Statistics Department responsible for the provision of both financial and non-
financial data.
• Accounting Department which not only maintained the accounting records 
but was also responsible for monitoring and controlling store expenses.
• Accounting Research Department which conducted research into the 
profitability of merchandise departments as well as investigations into retail 
structures and equipment. The department merged with the Accounting 
Department in 1938.
• Personnel and Welfare Department. Its role included recruitment, training of 
managers and supervision of in-store training, maintaining staff records, setting 
quotas (for store labour), managing medical and other welfare services and 
reporting.  317
• Development Department. Responsible for new stores and extensions.
• There were also a number of smaller departments: the Store Order Placement 
Department, Building Maintenance Department, Maintenance Department and 
Equipment Department.
 Announcement at 11th AGM. "Marks and Spencer." Financial Times [London, England] 315
29 May 1937: 4. Financial Times. Web.
 “Annual Report of the Joint Secretary and Chief Accountant 1934” (M&S E7/24 316
Corporate Governance, Internal Reports 1934 - 1956)
 “Annual Report of the Joint Secretary and Chief Accountant 1937” (M&S E7/24 317
Corporate Governance, Internal Reports 1934 - 1956)
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The sources suggest that there was some internal criticism of how effectively the 
pre-war Head Office structure operated, particularly in the Administrative areas. 
The Chief Accountant included a section in his 1939 report titled “Executive 
Control” which highlighted the lack thereof. The primary concern was the lack of 
co-ordination between departments and the lack of any structure to facilitate this. 
He wrote that “Committees have from time to time been set up to act as an 
executive body, but as often they have functioned for a short period and fallen into 
desuetude.”  This may have been a consequence of the rapid growth in Head 318
Office during the 1930’s but may also have reflected the hands-on approach of 
Marks and Sieff which made it difficult to build an accountable structure below 
them. 
The structure appears consistent with the objectives of the business set out in the 
previous section. Consistent with a focus on product and value for money, the 
Merchandise departments appear to be the dominant department (over the stores 
- this is the opposite of Boots). Membership of the Merchandise Committee 
included the future leaders of the business; of the six managing directors under 
Israel Sieff when he became Chairman in 1964, four had been on the Merchandise 
Committee in 1938.  Even in 1974, the two joint managing directors (Henry 319
Lewis and Sir Derek Rayner) retained responsibility for the merchandising 
departments while Store Operations was run by a director, one level below.320
Furthermore, the existence of The Merchandise Development and Research 
Department and the Personnel Departments reflected the importance the firm 
placed on relations with suppliers and with their own employees. The Merchandise 
Development and Research Department also demonstrated the importance of 
research but this stretched to other departments - there was a Research 
 M&S AO5/413F Annual Report of the Chief Accountants 1939 (March 1940).318
 JE Sieff, MJ Sieff, MD Sieff, WF Norris. BW Goodman was the Chief Accountant in 319
1938 and Dr A Lerner, married to Hannah Marks (daughter of Simon Marks) joined the 
firm after the war (M&S E7/2/1/17 Corporate Governance 1939).
 M&S A04/117 I Harvard Business School Case Study 1975320
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Department within Accounting who investigated both process and hardware 
improvement.321
If new departments created in Head Office during the 1930’s reflected the priorities 
of the business, the weaknesses of this highly centralised and control focused 
approach were evident in the structures which managed the stores. In Head 
Office, the Organisation Department, External Administration Department, 
Personnel Department and Administrative Departments all had some responsibility 
for store operations. The former two with ‘Inspectors’ and ‘Auditors’ highlighted a 
‘control’ rather than ‘management’ bias.  Reporting into the ‘Organisation 322
Department’ were regionally based Supervisors and the only description of their 
role (1928) highlighted the importance of checking compliance in store and 
seeking approval from Head Office for changes to staffing or merchandising.  323
Even the name ‘Organisation Department’ suggests a focus on process, structure 
and compliance rather than on driving sales and profit.
The weaknesses were recognised in the business. An internal review in 1937 
reflected that “up to the present time, the division of our stores into Areas for the 
purpose of control by Supervisors, Branch Accountants, and other specialists was 
chaotic.”  The consequent reorganisation was implemented on the 1st of 324
January 1938 but continued to emphasise the importance of controlling the store 
operations.  A further review was undertaken within the year. The second review 325
highlighted how slow decision making was in stores as Head Office approval was 
required for even local repairs or local personnel issues. A radical proposal was 
presented to the Board which would have decentralised power from Head Office to 
 M&S AO5/413F Annual Report of the Chief Accountants 1939 (March 1940). 321
 “Annual Report of the Joint Secretary and Chief Accountant 1937” (M&S E7/24 322
Corporate Governance, Internal Reports 1934 - 1956)
 M&S HO/3/2/2/1/18 Memos re Organisation of Work and Staff and Supervisors' Duties 323
27 February 1928
 “Annual Report of the Joint Secretary and Chief Accountant 1937” (M&S E7/24 324
Corporate Governance, Internal Reports 1934 - 1956)
 “Annual Report of the Joint Secretary and Chief Accountant 1937” (M&S E7/24 325
Corporate Governance, Internal Reports 1934 - 1956)
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a smaller number of new 'Regions'.  The proposals were not implemented, or at 326
least not immediately nor in the form proposed. Store operations were not 
decentralised until 1941 and partly a consequence of the war as departments were 
transferred from London. Rather than Regions, the country was split into Divisions 
and led by a ‘Superintendent’ rather than a ‘Manager’. Each Division included an 
Accountant, Staff Supervisor, Catering Supervisor and Stock taker.  It is not clear 327
how many Divisions were created but in 1950, there were 13 reporting into a Store 
Operations Department.  328
Compared to both Boots and WH Smith, stores were very much the junior partners 
to Head Office. While in Boots, Territorial General Managers provided the link, 
transferring information both ways, in M&S, the role was more compliance based. 
However, it is unlikely that this was because the information flowing from the 
stores was considered less important but rather that there was more overt 
responsibility for Head Office managers, including the directors, to source the 
information directly themselves from the shops. This became even more evident 
after the war.
The organisation structure which emerged after the War was, at least broadly, the 
structure that the business retained for the next 30 years. During the War, a 
number of departments were relocated from London to spread the risk of war 
damage. Administration was reduced as processes were changed and distribution 
was centralised - previously stores ordered what they believed was required but 
limitations in supplies from manufacturers necessitated a ‘push’ system to ensure 
that all stores received some product.  Simon Marks viewed many of these 329
developments as positive but his biggest concern was the loss of communication 
between the various departments - Supervisors (later renamed Superintendents) 
 “Special Report of the Joint Secretary and Chief Accountant October 1938” (M&S 326
E7/24 Corporate Governance, Internal Reports 1934 - 1956)
 Development of Organisation 1926 - 1948 (M&S E/E1/3/2)327
 “Annual Report of the Chief Accountant 1950” (M&S E7/24 Corporate Governance, 328
Internal Reports 1934 - 1956)
 Letter Simon Marks to Israel Sieff on how war affecting the business 8/4/41 (M&S CR/329
B/3/1/54)
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were “missing the opportunity of visiting Head Office and obtaining at first hand 
current information,” while senior managers struggled to maintain direct contact 
with the Stores. Given his hands on approach and own involvement in 
understanding performance, his concluding comments suggest a personal 
frustration. 
“Similar remarks apply to the Administration, where there is little 
interference with the routine work flowing through the department but the 
great difficulty is in keeping abreast with their problems and obtaining 
sufficiently quickly information which is of considerable importance in 
forming policy."330
After the War, as the scattered departments returned to London, a structure 
emerged which endured over the following 30 years. Operating under an 
Executive Board, the rest of the business was run through six broad departments 




• Administration and accounting
• Personnel
• Other service department.
The Merchandise Departments underwent some reorganisations but from a 
performance management perspective, their responsibilities appeared to change 
little over the 30 year period. Run by a director (who reported into a Managing 
Director), each division included a number of operational roles (buyers, 
merchandisers) supported by an Administration Manager, Distribution Manager 
and a Sales Manager. It was the Sales Manager who provided the link between 
Head Office and  the stores. Their primary responsibility was to improve personal 
 Letter Simon Marks to Israel Sieff on how war affecting the business 8/4/41 (M&S CR/330
B/3/1/54)
 “Annual report of the Chief Accountant” 1950 (E7/24 Corporate Governance, Internal 331
Reports 1934 - 1956) and Rees (1969) p. 149. Rees notes that some of these included 
several departments but does not quote his sources.
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communication between the stores and Head Office and they achieved this 
through meetings in the regions, hosting store managers in Head Office and 
conducting store visits with the regional management teams.  In both Boots and 332
WH Smith, the responsibility for liaising with Head Office remained in the regions.
In the Administration Departments, Accounting continued to provide statistics and 
accounting support and their responsibilities changed little. They were supported 
by a “Research Co-ordination Department” created in 1944. Based upon the 
description of their activities, the focus of the new department was performance 
oriented - investigation and analysis rather than data provision. It conducted ad 
hoc investigations at the request of senior management and produced routine 
reports for the Board and certain senior executives. They were outward looking 
providing economic and competitor information and future focused with an explicit 
responsibility to supply information on retail management developments as well as 
economic and technical issues.333
The organisational structure also continued to reflect the key objectives of the 
organisation. The Personnel Department continued to provide welfare support, 
particularly focused towards the store staff, as well as responsibility for recruitment 
and training. In 1974, as in 1939, they had a secondary responsibility for the staff 
manageresses in each store who focused primarily on the welfare of the 
employees.  In terms of supplier relations, the Merchandise Development and 334
Research Department was expanded soon after the war. By the mid-1960’s it 
employed 60 scientists and qualified technologists.  A Production Engineering 335
Department was created in 1947 which similarly sought to help manufacturers but 
this time focused on their manufacturing capability rather than their products:
 Article titled “probing for the facts” c. 1959. (HO/3/2/2/3/83 Staff Management News) 332
and Memo 1 November 1971 “Merchandise Knowledge in Stores” (E7/19 Corporate 
Governance Management Committee 1968 - 1972)
  “Annual report of the Chief Accountant” 1950 (M&S E7/24 Corporate Governance, 333
Internal Reports 1934 - 1956). The role included circulating American trade magazines.
 M&S A04/117 I Harvard Business School Case Study 1975334
 Speech by Marcus Sieff to an unknown external audience c. 1965 (M&S CR/B/2/3 335
Israel Moses Sieff speeches and notes)
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“The department was designed to assist our manufacturers in the 
progressive modernisation of their plant, and to adapt themselves to the 
latest technical advances. Production engineering may seem a surprising 
activity for a retailer, but we found it absolutely essential to create a 
department capable of advising our manufacturers on factory 
administration, lay-out and production problems. This approach is an 
important aspect of our campaign to achieve better and better values.”336
In 1970, they remained active conducting audits of suppliers and their 
manufacturing capabilities.337
In the stores and after the reorganisation in 1941, there are few references in the 
sources to the Divisional structures. A description provided by Harvard researchers 
in 1974 suggests little change to the structure in the intervening years with the 
number of Divisions (11) barely unchanged from 1950 (13). As before, the 
Divisional Superintendent was supported by a Divisional Administrator and a 
Divisional Staff Supervisor who also had a dotted line into their respective Head 
Office departments. The lack of references to the Superintendents in minutes of 
meetings (where access is available), speeches and memoirs contrasts sharply 
with Boots (Territorial General Managers) and WH Smith (Superintendents/ Area 
Managers). It may partly have reflected their role. At M&S, they were described as 
‘the company’s representative in the field’.  They were there to ensure policy was 338
implemented and store managers managed rather than a conduit for information 
flowing upwards into Head Office and a driver of sales. As already noted above, 
that role was assumed by the Sales Managers in the Merchandising Departments 
who resided in Head Office. And, in terms of information flowing into Head Office, 
Marks and Sieff made it quite clear that this was important, it was just that they 
 Speech by Lord Marks of Broughton (Hansard: House of Lords Debate 12 July 1962 336
vol 242 cc 393-452)
 Minutes 5/11/69 (M&S E7/19 Corporate Governance Management Committee 1968 - 337
1972)
 M&S A04/117 I Harvard Business School Case Study 1975338
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expected senior managers to get this information themselves from the stores and 
store staff!339
Processes 
The next sections review the performance management processes operated by 
M&S over the period. Three broad groups of processes are analysed: those that 
focus on future performance (planning, targeting, forecasting), those that focus on 
evaluation of performance and finally, those that focus on motivating and 
rewarding performance.
Looking at the period as a whole, senior management had an apparent ambiguous 
attitude towards the formal core performance management processes. On the one 
hand, the business was keen to learn from the best practices of chain store 
retailers elsewhere in the World, particularly the United States, and introduced 
formal and extensive processes from the mid-1920’s. Marks visited the United 
States in 1924 to understand the methods and structures used by peer 
companies.  He undertook further trips in the late 1920’s and in the 1930’s as 340
well as visiting retailers in continental Europe.  Senior managers also visited the 341
United States to improve the organisations understanding of both process and 
administrative technology in the 1930’s.  American chain store journals such as 342
Chain Store Age were circulated and summarised for senior managers in the 
 See the paragraphs on ‘Evaluation’ below.339
 Israel Sieff speech at the British-American Chamber of Commerce Luncheon 340
December 1965 (M&S CR/B/2/3 Israel Moses Sieff speeches and notes)
 HO/3/2/2/1/1 Weekly Bulletin June 18th 1927 and onwards, 1933 Annual General 341
Meeting "Marks and Spencer Ltd." Financial Times [London, England] 18 May 1933: 4. 
Financial Times. Web.
 Including Israel Sieff in 1928 and 1934 where he worked in Sears (CR/B/2/3 Israel 342
Moses Sieff speeches and notes), one of the Administration team in 1935 (“Confidential 
Report to the Directors on the Conduct of Administration for the Year 1935” ) and JA 
Berger (Chief Accountant) in 1938 (“Special Report of the Joint Secretary and Chief 
Accountant October 1938” - (E7/24 Corporate Governance, Internal Reports 1934 - 1956)
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1930’s and the 1950’s.  Many new processes were introduced. The “Checking 343
List”, an idea copied from Woolworths, was first used in 1928 and, albeit in a 
modified (but recognisable) form, was still in use in the 1970’s.  The relatively 344
early introduction of budgeting, rapid development in statistical reporting and 
comprehensive procedures manuals are all indicative of a process oriented 
business keen to implement the best practices from peer companies. They also 
suggest a highly centralised, paternalistic organisation which sought to maintain 
control over operations spread geographically across the country.
However, through speeches, memos and even handwritten comments in the 
margin of reports, the managing directors consistently railed against bureaucracy 
and the blind following of formal processes and standard measures to understand 
and manage performance. Three times in the sources and across the decades 
(1928, 1954, 1969) there are references to the “unseeing eye” and the response 
(‘probing’) was a constant refrain from the mid-1950’s onwards.  There is also 345
evidence that the business sought to simplify its business with decentralisation in 
the late 1930’s, Operation Simplification in the 1950’s and ‘Good Housekeeping’ in 
the early 1970’s all of which sought to eliminate some of the processes (and as a 
consequence the data the processes provided).  In terms of managing 346
performance, the friction between corporate processes and individual 
responsibility, between formal systems and informal practices is evident across all 
of the case studies but it was in M&S that it was most publicly aired.
 “Confidential Report to the Directors on the Conduct of Administration for the Year 343
1935” and “Annual Report of the Chief Accountant 1950” (E7/24 Corporate Governance, 
Internal Reports 1934 - 1956)
 Development of Organisation 1926 - 1948 (E/E1/3/2) and A04/117 I Harvard Business 344
School Case Study 1975
 Weekly Bulletin 25 October 1928 (HO/3/2/2/1/1 Weekly Bulletin June 18th 1927 and 345
onwards), “Notes by Lord Marks 1954” (CR/C/2/80 Collated Business Reports 1950 - 
1984) and Marcus Sieff memo 21/2/69 (M&S CR/B/2/2 Israel Moses Sieff: Business 
Papers).
 “Special Report of the Joint Secretary and Chief Accountant October 1938” (M&S 346
E7/24 Corporate Governance, Internal Reports 1934 - 1956); M&S A04/117 K Various 
Papers and Speeches); M&S A04/117 I Harvard Business School Case Study 1975.
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Planning for the future: strategic planning, budgeting, forecasting and 
targeting
This section will explore the processes that M&S used to plan for the future. It will 
consider whether they were consistent with the objectives and how they were 
converted into measurable targets or budgets.
There are no references to any formal strategic or operating ‘plan’ in speeches or 
memos. The archives do not refer to any corporate plans before 1985 - well after 
both Boots and WHS.  However, despite the lack of any apparent planning 347
processes, the consistency of the actions undertaken suggest that M&S had a 
clear idea of its 'strategic' objectives from the mid-1920’s onwards and successful 
methods for implementing them over long periods of time. Two examples help to 
illustrate it.
In store development, following his return from the US in 1924, Simon 
Marks sought to convert a chain of small shops and bazaars, primarily 
leased, into a business of large stores with the land owned or subject to 
long leases. Financed by the capital raised through incorporation in 1926 
and subsequent share issues in the 1930’s, the business consistently 
extended existing stores and opened new ones. Of the 236 stores in 1939, 
218 had opened since 1926 and the business also undertook 184 
extensions. Between 1928 and 1939, counter footage increased from 
38,034 sq. ft. to 229,161 sq. ft.  Following the ending of building 348
restrictions in the 1950’s, there was a deliberate change in ‘strategy’ with a 
focus on extensions rather than opening of new stores.  The number of 349
new stores grew only marginally from 237 stores in 1960 to 251 in 1974. 
 The documents in the archives are ‘closed’.347
 Store opening and extensions are not mutually exclusive. (AO5/413F Annual Report of 348
the Chief Accountants 1939)
 Explained to the Financial Times. "Marks & Spencer Building Plans." Financial Times 349
[London, England] 9 Mar. 1960: 11. Financial Times. Web.
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However, selling space grew by nearly 100% over the same period.  350
In simplifying the product portfolio from the late 1920’s, Marks rationalised 
the number of departments, closing down those which did not generate a 
sufficient return from the counter space they occupied. It was a gradual 
process based upon accumulating data on product level sales and counter 
space using the newly introduced ‘Checking List’ to analyse and rationalise 
over the following 20 years. Of the goods listed in the 1926 prospectus, 
70% had disappeared by 1932.  Over the rest of the 1930’s and into the 351
1940’s, departments were closed down including stationery, enamel and 
hardware (1935), haberdashery (from 1936), gramophone records and 
aluminium-ware (1948).  By 1950, sales outside the core textiles and food 352
divisions had fallen from 31% in 1933 to 12% in 1950.353
These are just two examples. Traces of longer term planning are evident in the 
development of administrative functions in the 1930’s and 1940’s consistent with a 
focus on supplier development (Merchandise Research and Development 
Department in 1936, Production Engineering Department in 1947) and employee 
relations (Welfare Department in 1933 and Personnel Department in 1934).  354
Within the departments, reports produced by the Chief Accountant and the 
Merchandise Departments in the 1950’s illustrate the emphasis the directors 
placed on future planning. Unlike the organisational inertia that affected other firms 
in this review, M&S seemed to follow a clear plan despite the lack of any formal 
processes to produce or communicate it.
 From 2.8m sq. ft. in 1960 to 5.5m sq. ft. in 1974. From Financial Times ("Marks & 350
Spencer Building Plans." Financial Times [London, England] 9 Mar. 1960: 11. Financial 
Times. Web and Harvard review (M&S A04/117 I Harvard Business School Case Study 
1975)
 Rees, St Michael.351
 Development of Organisation 1926 - 1948 (M&S E/E1/3/2)352
 “Annual Report of the Chief Accountant 1950” (M&S E7/24 Corporate Governance, 353
Internal Reports 1934 - 1956)
 Development of Organisation 1926 - 1948 (M&S E/E1/3/2)354
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At an operational level, the sources suggest that M&S was an early adopter of 
budgets and targets albeit those terms were not used until later. Early adoption 
partly reflected Simon Marks’ own focus on organisational development in the 
1920’s but also the nature of the business; M&S was a highly centralised and 
paternalistic organisation having to manage geographically dispersed operations.
The Weekly Bulletin, a magazine sent to stores at the end of the 1920's until the 
early 1930's, described 'stock credits' supplied by Head Office which managers 
had to comply with. These determined the maximum stock they could hold 
although they had the freedom to determine the mix of stock.  The stock credits 355
formed the basis for the budgets the managers created and which helped them 
identify the ‘fast sellers’ which drove performance.  Managers were also 356
expected to plan staff requirements but their freedom was limited and any increase 
required authorisation from Head Office.  By 1934, store headcount, like stock 357
was subject to a ‘quota’ provided by Head Office (Personnel Department).  The 358
calculation was based on the level of sales and the size of the store subject to the 
the advice of the Divisional Superintendent.   359
Although stores and departments may have developed their own budgets in the 
early 1930’s, a consolidated budget probably existed from 1939 when “the 
preparation of budgets and estimates” was added to the list of the Accounting 
Departments activities.  In the same year, the business began reporting 360
consolidated expenditure against estimates. By the end of the war, budgeting and 
 Weekly Bulletin 20/08/27 (HO/3/2/2/1/1 Weekly Bulletin June 18th 1927 and onwards)355
 Weekly Bulletin 28/11/28 (HO/3/2/2/1/1 Weekly Bulletin June 18th 1927 and onwards)356
 HO/3/2/2/1/18 Memos re Organisation of Work and Staff and Supervisors' Duties 357
(27/2/28)
 “Confidential Report to the Directors on the Conduct of Administration for the Year 358
1934 (E7/24 Corporate Governance, Internal Reports 1934 - 1956)
 Personnel and Welfare Manual (Q/Q1/3/1).359
 First reference to a store budget is in a 1928 Weekly Bulletin article. Departmentally, in 360
the 1937 AGM, Marks referred to a welfare budget of £100,00. ("Marks and Spencer" 
Financial Times [London, England] 29 May 1937: 4. Financial Times. Web. 10 Nov. 2016. 
Accounting Department responsibilities listed in AO5/413F Annual Report of the Chief 
Accountants 1939
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targeting was extended to sales with merchandising managers presenting their 
proposed targets to the Board following which they were required to build their 
plans covering the following 12 months.   361
Budgeting continued to evolve over the following 25 years. By the early 1960’s it 
was a central part of the newly formed Management Committee’s activities.  362
Departmental budgets were highly detailed, based upon the anticipated sales of 
each line.  By the end of the decade, the business had weekly estimates for 363
sales and stock and quarterly targets built into the ‘Checking Lists’.  If these 364
were used to motivate performance, it is not clear from the sources. The emphasis 
seemed to be on control with the Management Committee responsibilities focused 
on using budgets to control costs and manage levels of stock in both stores and 
departments.365
Evaluation
This section examines both the formal and informal processes that M&S used to 
evaluate the performance of the business and of the employees. 
Even before 1928, there were formal processes in place to evaluate the 
performance of the stores. The Weekly Report refers to a ‘Weekly Departmental 
Sales Report’ and a ‘Weekly Report Merchandising’ which managers had to 
complete. The former included departmental sales and space utilisation. In the 
latter, managers explained unusual movements, identified fast selling lines and 
highlighted ‘items of interest to other branches.’  Managers were also reminded366
 Rees St Michael, 150.361
 Memo 8/4/64:  “The Role of the Management Committee (CR/B/2/2 Israel Moses Sieff: 362
Business Papers)
 Memo 6/2/64: “Highlights of a Department should include” (CR/B/2/2 Israel Moses 363
Sieff: Business Papers)
 Minute 21/0170 (E7/19 Corporate Governance Management Committee 1968 - 1972)364
 Their responsibilities were listed under the heading “Forecasting and Budgetary 365
Control” in a memo (8/4/64): “The Role of the Management Committee” (CR/B/2/2 Israel 
Moses Sieff: Business Papers)
 Weekly Report  20/08/27 (HO/3/2/2/1/1 Weekly Bulletin June 18th 1927 and onwards)366
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about the importance of discussing performance with their area Supervisors, 
employees and peers. The knowledge of their salesgirls was emphasised: 
“Salesgirls are constantly in touch with the public, they hear the comments of 
purchasers and obtain a pretty good idea as to colours and sizes as well as the 
type of articles which are most in demand.”  The biggest sin was the “unseeing 367
eye” - managers failing to see what was going on in their business and passing 
insights on to Head Office.  368
The ideas on performance evaluation expressed in the first few copies of the 
Weekly Bulletin remained remarkably consistent through to the 1970’s and applied 
to both Head Office and store managers. They are also ideas consistent with PMM 
practices in both Boots and WHS. Standard reports were important but they 
couldn’t replace a personal understanding of the drivers of performance and the 
actions that then flowed. Nearly 30 years later Simon Marks wrote that “unseeing 
eyes and deaf ears have no place in our organisation” and introduced the idea of 
‘probing’ which became the dominant motif of M&S’ approach to performance 
evaluation over the next 30 years.  His memo was reissued to senior 369
management in 1979. It was not a rejection of formal reports and statistics but 
rather a recognition that they were not (and in their opinion could never be) 
sufficient to understand the performance of the business.
Formal evaluation
Formal performance reporting and presumably performance evaluation was 
transformed in 1928 by the introduction of the “Checking List.’ Described in an 
internal magazine in 1960 as the “most important document in the business”, the 
contents changed little over the period.  Table 2.6 shows the contents of a 370
 Weekly Report  21/01/28 (M&S HO/3/2/2/1/1 Weekly Bulletin June 18th 1927 and 367
onwards)
 Weekly Report 25/10/28 (M&S HO/3/2/2/1/1 Weekly Bulletin June 18th 1927 and 368
onwards)
 Simon Marks memo 28/12/54: “Thinking about the Business.” (M&S CR/C/2/80 369
Collated Business Reports 1950 - 1984)
 M&S HO/3/2/2/3/83 Staff Management News: Selected articles 1950 - 1969370
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checking list in 1938, 1958 and 1974. It demonstrates that the business focused 
on the same core measures over the period. It also shows the level of detail that 
was analysed - item level.
In 1936, the annual report by the Chief Accountant referred to the reports 
generated. He noted that the Statistical Department produced 10 separate weekly 
reports as well as a number of monthly and ad hoc reports. In addition to these 
reports, the Financial Accounting Department produced monthly management 
accounts and there were regular reports produced by the Administration, 
Personnel, Welfare, Merchandising and Technology Departments.  Very few of 371
the reports and those that followed in the later decades have been retained and 
there are few indications of who they were circulated to nor how the Managing 
Directors reviewed them. However, based on the few that are available, a number 
of common themes emerge: 
Table 2.6: Checking List contents 1938 to 1974
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Sources: 1938 and 1958 (M&S E13/7 Statistics 1930 to 1988), 1974 (M&S A04/117 I Harvard Business 
School Case Study 1975)
 “Annual Report of the Joint Secretary and Chief Accountant 1936” (M&S E7/24 371
Corporate Governance, Internal Reports 1934 - 1956)
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(1) The Managing Directors were keen to understand the detail. The directors 
still received “Checking Lists’ in the 1970’s which included item level 
performance.  Regular reports switched between summary and detail 372
including total annual sales to the results of individuals stores or specific 
weeks in the same report. A sentence from a merchandise development 
report shows the amount of detail that the directors received: “Seventeen 
different shades of Ives’ cloths, mostly 1275 and 1814, have been examined, 
i.e. approximately 110 dyeing, and some of these include as many as eleven 
deliveries per shade. Of these, approximately ten or eleven dyeings have 
been rejected, but this includes five of the shade D.175 which are all bad.”  373
(2) The Managing Directors engaged with a broad range of topics beyond their 
own areas of expertise. A single report for the Managing Directors, 
particularly in the 1930’s, could cover summary reports from each of the 
Finance, Personnel, Welfare, and Administration Departments. 
Accompanying statistics included both financial and non-financial 
information. A single commentary could range from the explanation of the 
financial results through to technological developments in their 
department.  These reports went to all of the directors and not just those 374
directly responsible for the departments. 
(3) There was a lack of uniformity. For an organisation which introduced and 
revised processes regularly, the reports were relatively free flowing and 
commentaries reflected personal opinions. Authors were always identified 
(and sometimes signed the reports). Alongside analysis of the financial 
performance of the business, topics in the Chief Accountants report in the 
1930’s ranged from personal opinions on the merits of an external 
consultants report, the need to examine the chain store system in the United 
 M&S A04/117 I Harvard Business School Case Study 1975372
 Development Report 1950 (M&S E7/24 Corporate Governance, Internal Reports 1934 373
- 1956)
 E7/24 Corporate Governance, Internal Reports 1934 - 1956; “Review of 374
Manufacturers” 7/10/70 (M&S E7/19 Corporate Governance Management Committee 
1968 - 1972).
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States and the poor quality of the organisation structure.  A development 375
report in 1950 included financial results from only one department and the 
presentation style varied by department.  It was not until 1964 that the 376
Management Committee specified what should be included in “Departmental 
Highlights” reports but even then, managers were given considerable 
freedom on the exact contents.  377
It is also not clear whether the review of these reports were part of routine 
performance management meetings or reviewed on an ad hoc basis. Much like in 
Boots, the only references to regular meetings were the weekly performance 
reviews which took place every Monday. The nature and content of the meeting 
support the idea that directors were required to focus on the detail and expected to 
have a broad understanding of performance.
Marcus Sieff described a formal meeting of the Managing Directors every Monday 
morning from at least the 1950's to review the performance of the business.  378
While he was Chairman, Simon Marks dominated the meeting, highlighting the 
issues he had identified in the previous week in his visits to the Head Office 
departments and stores. The emphasis was on the quality of the products. He was 
particularly concerned with breakdowns in processes which allowed poor quality 
products to be sold in stores.  Based on the Harvard case study and Sieff's 379
memoirs, the process appears to have changed little over the following 20 years 
although the style did - less autocratic by the 1970’s with all directors sharing their 
views.  Although all participants at the Monday meeting (8.30am) in 1974 had 380
sales and stock figures available before the meeting, no mention was made of 
them in the transcript of the meeting. Discussion was future focused. Topics were 
 Annual Report of the Chief Accounts (M&S E7/24 Corporate Governance, Internal 375
Reports 1934 - 1956).
 Development Report December 1950. (M&S E7/24 Corporate Governance, Internal 376
Reports 1934 - 1956).
 Memo 4/3/64 (M&S CR/B/2/2 Israel Moses Sieff: Business Papers).377
 Sieff, Don't Ask.378
 Sieff, Don't Ask.379
 Sieff, Don't Ask.380
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wide ranging, issue based and reflected personal experiences. Quality remained a 
central part. For such a senior group, detail was important as the following 
exchange at one of the meetings demonstrates:
J. Edward Sieff: “I ran across a fabric yesterday, 5-8. I think its inferior. I 
hear our people saying it’s lousy. It may be an achievement for technology 
but not for women. And ICI is pushing it.
Sir Marcus Sieff: “Are we telling them.”
J. Edward Sieff: “We have a meeting Thursday.”381
While the principal focus was on short term issues, they also switched to the 
longer term and at the same meeting as the above extract, they also discussed the 
key merchandising priorities for the following year.
Issues raised and decisions made in the meeting were then cascaded to the 
directors at a meeting which followed immediately afterwards (10.00am). The 
same Managing Directors were joined by the directors and other senior 
executives, a total of 25 to 30 people. The performance issues were similarly wide 
ranging including how the Chairman personally dealt with complaints. Directors 
took the feedback to their own teams for further cascade.
The meetings seemed to lack structure and were based on personal experiences 
as much as data. However, it was remarkably similar to the equivalent Monday 
morning meeting and subsequent cascade held at Boots. That meeting also had a 
long history, taking place from 1920. It too focused on short term and long term 
issues. It too considered very detailed issues raised through store visits and the 
findings of each of the Territorial General Managers. The Harvard researchers do 
not comment on the effectiveness of the meetings but at Boots, a 1966 report by 
Peat Marwick were highly critical of the lack of structure in the meeting. However, 
the long history and similarities between the processes at the two companies 
suggest they may have been more effective than KPMG thought.  382
 M&S A04/117 I Harvard Business School Case Study 1975.381
 BTC 314/4 - Peat Marwick Mitchell: Report on Management Structure (Part II) 14 June 382
1966
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The reports that the directors received and the descriptions of the Monday 
morning meeting highlight some core principles of performance management at 
M&S - directors were required to engage with the detail and were required to have 
a broad knowledge about all aspects of the business. This contrasts sharply with 
the consolidated (and therefore summarised) measurement systems such as the 
Balanced Scorecard and the narrower, functional focus of modern Board 
members.
Informal evaluation
The transcript of the meeting demonstrates that performance evaluation involved 
both formal and informal processes. Indeed, as the business organised and 
became better at gathering data, it also appears from the sources that it became 
increasingly frustrated on the reliance on statistics and formal reports to 
understand the performance of the business. 
From as soon as the business was incorporated (and probably before), visiting 
stores was an integral part of a Director’s role. Employees recalled how in the 
early 1930’s Simon Marks used to visit the Marble Arch shop floor twice a day.  383
Marcus Sieff recalled that the day he died, Marks had just returned from inspecting 
the rainwear and coat departments in Marble Arch when he collapsed with a heart 
attack.  He also recalled that visits could be unannounced and the focus was 384
wide ranging: from stockrooms to sales floor. They spoke to both employees and 
customers.  The sources suggest that the same practices continued into the 385
1970’s. The directors were expected to be in the shops every week-end, to take 
home M&S food and wear M&S clothes.386
 Reminiscences of the store manager (M&S S392/11/23 Documents: Marble Arch Store 383
1930’s)
 Sieff, Don't Ask.384
 Sieff, Don't Ask.385
 M&S A04/117 I Harvard Business School Case Study 1975. Corroborated by Michael 386




The importance of visiting shops was a constant refrain throughout the period. It 
reflected a fear common to all multiple retailers in these case studies. Simon 
Marks raised the question in 1954 - “are we in Head Office too remote from the 
Stores?” It was a rhetorical question and he postulated on both the cause and the 
solution: 
“As figures and statistics become more important, there was a risk that the 
unique, close personal contact would disappear. It is this live contact which 
must be preserved. We cannot do without it. The facts are in the stores if 
we probe for them, and that is what must be done.”387
The risks posed by statistics, remoteness and the importance of probing were 
reiterated repeatedly by management over the following 20 years both internally 
and externally as reflected in the following quotations:
“Probing is the method whereby the interested and enquiring mind of the 
Executive and his colleagues penetrate beneath the surface of things and 
discovers the real facts.” Israel Sieff, internal memo, 1958.388
“Perhaps the greatest evil is the growth of statistics, because management 
too often encourages this growth in the belief that statistics illuminate the 
business and that the more there are the better will be the management 
control… Where lies the danger? It lies in the fact that statistics come to be 
valued for themselves to the neglect of the people or things they represent.” 
MJ Glenn (M&S Personnel Manager) ‘The Manager’ 1959. 
“We do not believe that written reports can replace visits to Stores to see 
how goods are selling, if their quality is satisfactory, to see how the Stores 
are operating. We believe that operating too much through written reports 
 “Thinking about the Business” Notes by Lord Marks, 28/12/54 (M&S CR/C/2/80 387
Collated Business Reports 1950 - 1984)
 “A Definition of Probing” Memo written by Israel Sieff. Reissued to management 10 388
September 1984 (M&S CR/C/2/80 Collated Business Reports 1950 - 1984)
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leads to remoteness.” M.J Sieff, 1965.  389
“You will find your most cherished documents and reports conceal a 
multitude of inaccuracies and omissions. Do not be afraid of only a sample 
first hand investigation. It is often far more valuable than the all-embracing 
written one. And do not mistake for personal probing a meeting held in a 
private office.” Sir Derek Rayner (Joint Managing Director), 1975.390
The importance was such that the Management Committee, on more than one 
occasion, expressed concern that ‘probing’ was not being conducted properly by 
senior management. Formal training was proposed in 1969 and an internal guide 
was produced  - “Probing in the 1970’s.”391
The idea of probing highlights a feature of multiple retailing often overlooked in the 
PMM  literature. Scientific principles of organisation may have allowed chain 
stores to develop but the store manager was not a compliance officer following the 
rules and regulations passed down from Head Office. Rather, they were active 
participants in managing the performance of the business and given more 
discretion to drive performance than sometimes recognised.  And, probing 392
highlighted two elements which encapsulated how senior management were 
expected to evaluate performance. Firstly, it was about learning but learning which 
was both deep and broad. Management became experts in the business and not 
just specialists in one area. As Michael Sacher explained to Harvard researchers: 
“in the end, the decision has to be taken by management, not the experts.”  393
Secondly, it emphasised the personal responsibility for the learning and for acting 
on the insights. Directors could not rely alone on others to provide the insights but 
 “Growth of a Distributive Enterprise” Speech to an unidentified external audience (M&S 389
CR/B/2/3 Israel Moses Sieff speeches and notes)
 “The War on Paper Bureaucracy” Lecture by Sir Derek Rayner to the Institute of 390
Administrative Management at Painters Hall, London, 22/5/75 (M&S A04/117 K Various 
Papers and Speeches)
 Minutes 4/08/69, 2/11/70 and 12/10/71 (M&S E7/19 Corporate Governance 391
Management Committee 1968 - 1972)
 Purvis, Direction and discretion.392
 M&S A04/117 I Harvard Business School Case Study 1975, 37.393
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had to seek it out themselves. Suppliers and employees similarly had a shared 
responsibility to learn but also act. Marcus Sieff recalled how Marks would return 
from visiting shops with products which did not meet his quality standards. “How 
did this muck pass the manufacturers and our quality control? How did this rubbish 
get past the manager and his staff?”  Responsibility for quality control, as with 394
performance in general, sat with all members of the extended network and not just 
the buyers or technicians.
By 1969, performance evaluation, despite the advances in reporting and data 
gathering in the intervening 40 years, was based on similar principles as the M&S 
of the late 1920’s. M&S had not abandoned statistical reporting. Managing 
Directors still received copies of the ‘Checking List’ and reports still included 
detailed statistics. However, as store managers were once encouraged to discuss 
performance with their staff in the 1920’s, as Simon Marks used to personally 
inspect products on the Marble Arch shop floor in the 1930’s, 1940’s and 1950’s so 
too were the senior managers of the late 1960’s. As Marcus Sieff wrote to his 
directors in 1969, unwittingly repeating comments in the 1920's: “Both the 
Executives and the merchandisers should probe into the goods in stores with 
seeing eyes and a critical mind. The departmental supervisor and the sales girl are 
his best sources of information. To depend upon statistics is to asphyxiate the 
dynamic spirit of the business.”395
 
Employee performance evaluation
Unfortunately absent from the sources are comprehensive indications of how the 
Managing Directors evaluated the performance of individuals.  The business 396
introduced staff training programmes in 1934 and operated a store management 
 Sieff, Don't Ask.394
 “Achievement and Growth” Memo by Marcus Sieff to Directors 21/2/69 (CR/B/2/2 Israel 395
Moses Sieff: Business Papers)
 Those sources referring to individual employees are closed. Some of these sources 396
may refer to individual performance evaluation.
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training programme soon after.  A more general management training 397
programme operated from at least the 1950’s which lasted 18 months.  A 398
number of the trainees went on to become directors including future Managing 
Directors such as Henry Lewis, Derek Rayner and Richard Greenbury who all 
joined in the early 1950’s.  The Personal and Welfare manual also refers to a 399
system of ‘Progress Reports’ used for store employees which was operational 
from at least 1946.  Employees were assessed on qualities (e.g. attention to 400
customers and courtesy and helpfulness) but the lack of examples in the archival 
sources nor any detailed descriptions means that it is not possible to assess who it 
covered nor whether it covered all store staff or just certain grades.  Personnel 401
systems may have been sophisticated but it is not clear how they fed into the 
overall evaluation of managers. 
Motivating performance
This section will examine the formal and informal processes used to motivate 
performance and includes both an assessment of how employees were rewarded 
financially but also of any non-financial mechanisms. PMM literature would 
anticipate that the reward mechanisms would promote the objectives of the 
organisation.
While Simon Marks adopted a number of ideas from US retailers, particularly 
Woolworths, he did not introduce the variable pay systems common to many of 
them. Instead, he maintained fixed pay rates at M&S both in store and in Head 
Office. Similarly, there were no small scale competitions that Boots and US 
retailers used to motivate selling in the 1920’s. The business did pay a Christmas 
 “Annual Report of the Joint Secretary and Chief Accountant 1937” (M&S E7/24 397
Corporate Governance, Internal Reports 1934 - 1956)
 Rees St Michael,180 and 246. 398
 Sieff, Memoirs.399
 Personnel and Welfare Manual 1946 (M&S Q/Q1/3/1)400
 HO/3/2/2/3/35 - Staff Management News (Aug. 1953). "The Old & The New Progress 401
Report.” There are no other references in the archives and the archivists are not aware of 
any uncatalogued sources relating to the ‘Progress Reports.’
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bonus but the amount was linked to length of service rather than performance.  402
The lack of any performance based pay contrasts with all of the other retailers in 
this study.
M&S also promoted their system of welfare and non-financial benefits both 
internally and externally. When a new store opened in Slough in 1955, St Michael 
News included a picture of the facilities under the heading “Sales Girls at Slough 
will enjoy Welfare like this.” Another article was headed “We tell all the Suppliers - 
our girls have this sort of welfare - what about yours.”  AGM’s regularly boasted 403
of the welfare facilities at M&S. Should this be considered part of reward for 
performance? The Welfare Department was established in 1933 with a 
responsibility:
“to study and make continual improvements in working conditions; to create 
an atmosphere of contentment; and to maintain a stable staff who, in return, 
will work with greater enthusiasm while deriving real satisfaction from their 
work, thus benefitting both the business and themselves.”  404
Over the rest of the decade, the business introduced medical services (1934), a 
dental service (1935), a pension scheme and a benevolent trust.  A 48 hour 405
maximum working week was introduced in 1937.  The business also sponsored 406
social and sports events. In 1934, they opened a new 10 acre sports ground in 
North London and already had a Literary and Debating Society and an Operatic 
and Dramatic Society.  The investment in welfare remained a feature of M&S 407
throughout the period. The Welfare Committee held its 1,500th meeting in 1962 
 Payment ranged from 4 weeks wages for those with more than 10 years service to 1 402
week for those will less than 12 months. Personnel and Welfare Manual 1946 (M&S Q/
Q1/3/1)
 St Michael News July and August 1955403
 Staff Management News No. 1 June 1938 (M&S HO/3/2/2/3/1)404
 Development of Organisation 1926 - 1948 (M&S E/E1/3/2)405
 1937 AGM. "Marks and Spencer." Financial Times [London, England] 29 May 1937: 4. 406
Financial Times. Web. 10 Nov. 2016.
 Sparks Easter1934 (M&S HO/3/2/2/2/1-15 Sparks 1934 onwards)407
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and the Harvard review highlighted the importance of employee relations and 
welfare to the business in the 1970’s.408
The directors may have had philanthropic motivations but they also recognised the 
benefits to the business of good employee relations and a strong welfare policy. In 
the 1930’s, the Welfare Department attributed the significant improvement in 
absentee rates and staff turnover to the improved welfare.  At the end of the 409
1960’s, M&S conducted audits of the welfare facilities at suppliers convinced that 
better welfare would reduce both absenteeism and staff turnover rates.  The 410
belief was echoed in external speeches where welfare was linked to loyalty, trust 
in management and therefore greater productivity and higher profit.  However, 411
while good employee relations and investment in welfare was considered good for 
the business, it was not dependent upon the performance of individuals. Reward, 
including welfare, was good for the general performance of the business but at 
M&S, it was not directly linked to the performance of either individuals or the 
financial performance of the business as a whole.
Measures
This section will examine the financial and non-financial measures the firm used to 
manage performance. In particular, it will consider whether there was a dominant 
measure or a wide suite of measures and how these changed over the period.
The focus on ‘probing’ and repeated concerns about the inadequacies of statistics 
might suggest that statistics were relatively unimportant within the business. There 
 “A Report on Personnel, Welfare and Human Relations in the Stores of Marks and 408
Spencer” October 1962 (M&S Q/Q1 Flora Solomon) and M&S A04/117 I Harvard 
Business School Case Study 1975
 Store staff turnover was reported as falling from 69% in 1932 to 26% in 1936 (“Annual 409
Report of the Joint Secretary and Chief Accountant 1936” (M&S E7/24 Corporate 
Governance, Internal Reports 1934 - 1956)
 Minutes 5/11/69 and accompanying report (M&S E7/19 Corporate Governance 410
Management Committee 1968 - 1972)
 Marcus Sieff speech given at the Royal Albert Hall 1969. Extracts included in M&S 411
A04/117 I Harvard Business School Case Study 1975
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was certainly a tension between the administrative burden created by statistical 
accumulation and the benefits of statistical analysis. The completion of ‘Checking 
Lists’ became a fortnightly exercise rather than weekly in 1939 largely because the 
cost of processing the lists in Head Office had doubled between 1934 and 1937.  412
Similarly, the business could boast in 1960 that by no longer requiring the shops to 
complete employee absence cards, they could eliminate 12,000 pieces of paper a 
year.  However, it was at a cost. The business could no longer produce the 413
absence statistics used in the 1930’s to justify the welfare policy. It was not 
because welfare was not important. In 1969, they audited supplier working 
practices and gathered statistics on their absence rates to show the benefit 
provided by welfare policies. It seems curious that they should stop generating the 
data which allowed them to monitor absence while expecting their suppliers to 
continue to generate the statistics. It could be that they were sufficiently convinced 
of the need for good working practices that they did not need to measure them.
But, this did not reflect a rejection of performance measures. Capturing sales and 
counter space statistics in the 1920’s and 1930’s resulted in significant changes in 
merchandising and profitability. Rather, the growth of statistics in the 1930’s led to 
a reaction in the 1940’s and 1950’s. Using measures was not eliminated but 
became just one element in helping to manage the performance and subject to the 
same cost-return principles as the rest of the business.
Range of measures
As noted above, many of the reports used by the business are no longer available. 
However, those that remain show that M&S used a broad range of measures.
Breadth. The business recognised the importance of both financial and non-
financial measures and combined them as appropriate. The Accountants reports in 
the 1930’s and 1950’s included as many pages devoted to employee numbers as 
 “Special Report of the Joint Secretary and Chief Accountant October 1938” and 412
“Annual Report of the Joint Secretary and Chief Accountant 1934, 1936 and 1937”(M&S 
E7/24 Corporate Governance, Internal Reports 1934 - 1956)
 The Guardian 16/5/1960 (M&S A04/117 K Various Papers and Speeches)413
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sales in the statistical appendices. There was also more analysis of sales per 
employee and counter space than of gross margins in the body of the reports. The 
breadth of analysis also extended to the time periods analysed. Statistical 
appendices included both short term measures (Christmas trading by week) and 
long-term trends (sales, counter space, employee numbers for every year since 
incorporation - more than 20 years of data by the 1950’s).414
Depth. Measures reviewed by the Managing Directors included both summary 
information of total company/ departmental performance to individual item/ 
employee grade data in the same report. In 1950 and within 5 pages, there were 
measures for total annual sales, total number of employees and total space and 
average wage by type of employee.  415
While the core measures remained largely the same (see below), both the number 
and range of statistical schedules changed from year to year and the authors of 
the reports appear to have some discretion about which measures to use. A memo 
in 1964 by the Management Committee identified what measures should be 
included in the departmental reports they reviewed - the need for such a list 
suggests that it had not existed before.  The flexibility is in marked contrast to 416
Boots. In 1939, the M&S accountants report included a number of schedules 
reflecting the impact of the war on the business but the Boots Statistical Book was 
largely unchanged from the previous year.
Key performance measure
The core objectives of the business may have been to offer quality products at 
lower prices, to develop supplier and employee relations and to focus on 
 “Annual Report of the Chief Accountant 1950” (M&S E7/24 Corporate Governance, 414
Internal Reports 1934 - 1956)
 “Annual Report of the Chief Accountant 1950” (M&S E7/24 Corporate Governance, 415
Internal Reports 1934 - 1956)
 Management Committee memo 6/2/64:  “Highlights of a Department should 416
include” (M&S CR/B/2/2 Israel Moses Sieff: Business Papers)
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innovation and  technological improvements but, they measured their success 
through sales growth.
The importance of sales growth (compared to margin, for example), mirrors many 
other multiple retailers. However, there were important differences. At Boots, if the 
primary measure was sales growth, the secondary measures were sales volume 
and the average transaction value - measures which placed the focus on stores 
and customers. Reports disaggregated sales by store - largest, smallest, fastest 
growing. At M&S, the secondary measures focused on product. Sales per square 
foot (counter) helped identify the optimum product mix in store. Early store reports 
required managers to identify “best sellers” and “fast sellers ordered but not 
delivered.”  Similarly, the aggregate Checking Lists which the Managing 417
Directors received in the early 1970’s listed product performance (sales, selling 
price and in-store availability). Even stock, a key measure at WHS because it 
identified how much capital was tied up, was a measure of product desirability at 
M&S. Stock was described as a ‘counter clogger’ if it was a slow selling line or a 
‘proven shortage’ if fast selling.  When the Management Committee specified the 418
measures they required in department reviews in 1964, they listed the 
performance of main lines, new lines stock shortages but no disaggregation by 
type or location of store.  The focus on product measures is consistent with the 419
objectives of the organisation (quality products at low prices) and also the informal 
evaluation practices of directors which focused on examining products in store. 
There were two other measures which the business reported throughout the 
period. Firstly, there was regular reporting of staff numbers and the average wage 
costs. Census data was included in the statistics reports showing the number of 
employees by role (Head Office and stores), their average wage and year on year 
changes. Sales per employee appeared on the performance summary page 
 Weekly Bulletin, October 1928 (M&S HO/3/2/2/1/1 Weekly Bulletin June 18th 1927 and 417
onwards)
 “A Definition of Probing” - a memo from Israel Sieff 1964 (M&S CR/C/2/80 Collated 418
Business Reports 1950 - 1984) and Management Committee memo 6/2/64:  “Highlights of 
a Department should include” (M&S CR/B/2/2 Israel Moses Sieff: Business Papers)
 Management Committee memo 6/2/64:  “Highlights of a Department should 419
include” (M&S CR/B/2/2 Israel Moses Sieff: Business Papers)
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throughout the 1930’s and 1950’s. Levels of absence and staff turnover were also 
widely reported until the data was no longer collected in the late 1950’s and used 
to justify the investment in welfare.  All of these measures featured more 420
prominently than conventional accounting analyses of expenses (e.g. annual wage 
cost by department). They showed not only the underlying drivers of the cost 
(volume and value) but also waste (absence and turnover) and effectiveness 
(sales per employee).
Secondly, the business started to record the amount of counter space from 1926 
alongside the number of new stores and extensions. Sales per square foot of 
counter space appeared on the summary page of the statistical appendices 
throughout the 1930’s and 1950’s. However, it was also a measure used in the 
shops. Managers were encouraged to monitor sales per square foot of lines to 
ensure that fast selling lines received the appropriate allocation of space.  In the 421
1950’s there are fewer references to counter space although as ordering and 
space allocation became increasingly controlled in Head Office from the 1940’s, 
there may have been less need to monitor the measure.
Other performance measures
Gross margin, although measured and reported, was not a key performance 
measure perhaps because of the wide variance in product margins made 
communication difficult. In 1928, the Weekly Bulletin reminded managers that “we 
will eventually find it on the whole more profitable, by giving the best value 
possible, to work on a smaller margin of profit, providing that a compensating 
increase of turnover is achieved.”  A similar sentiment was expressed to a 422
Harvard researcher nearly 50 years later by one of the store mangers: “we are not 
 “Confidential Report to the Directors on the Conduct of Administration for the Year 420
1934" (M&S E7/24 Corporate Governance, Internal Reports 1934 - 1956).
 
 Advice supplied regularly in Weekly Bulletins from the first bulletins in 1927 (M&S HO/421
3/2/2/1/1 Weekly Bulletin June 18th 1927 and onwards)
 Weekly Bulletin 17/3/28 (M&S HO/3/2/2/1/1 Weekly Bulletin June 18th 1927 and 422
onwards)
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interested in high margins - we’re interested in high turnover.” The Finance 
Director confirmed the view. As reported by the researcher:
“gross margin did not, however, preoccupy the thoughts of the senior 
management. They were more interested in the balance of food and 
clothing sales as related to margins and the volume itself. They believed 
fully in the pursuit of high sales and were not unaccustomed to reducing 
prices in order to increase sales. Only the senior members of the board 
were aware of the profitability of the company and only they dealt with the 
direction it would take. The rest of the company was totally immersed in 
sales.”  423
Like in Boots, overall margin was monitored through mix of products (a sales 
measure). In the 1930’s and 1950’s, departmental gross margins were reported in 
the statistical appendices but not consistently and they were not included on the 
summary schedules. 
Operating costs may well have been reported in detail in some of the Directors’ 
reports no longer retained but they were not included in the statistical appendices. 
As noted above, the primary operating costs (people and space) were considered 
in terms of the returns they provided rather than an absolute cost and subject to 
standards defined by the Personnel department.
There are traces of measures of product quality and supplier performance in the 
sources but they are relatively scarce compared to sales, employees and space. 
The amounts suppliers paid employees was measured in the 1930's.  The 424
largest suppliers were listed in the 1937 Accountants report but not thereafter. By 
the 1960’s, technologists were setting standards for suppliers and measuring their 
performance but there are no surviving examples of the reports which may have 
been issued to the directors with the information. A ‘Review of Manufacturers ‘ in 
the late 1960’s rated the principal suppliers on measures such as the quality of 
 M&S A04/117 I Harvard Business School Case Study 1975.423
 Rees, St Michael, 216.424
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management (e.g. “middle management needs strengthening”) quality of product 
(good to poor) and their contribution in the development of new merchandise. 
There were also reviews of supplier welfare arrangements including absence and 
employee turnover.  It is not clear, however, whether this was part of a periodic 425
review or a one-off exercise. Product quality was measured prior to the 1950’s by 
complaints made in stores and fed through to Head Office but reporting was 
stopped in the late 1950’s saving 250,000 punched cards annually. Head Office 
management were expected to obtain the information personally when visiting the 
shops.  ‘Probing’ was considered a better way of understanding product quality 426
than a collection of statistical measures.
Measures were therefore extensively used and widely reported throughout the 
period. They were comprehensive incorporating both financial and non-financial 
measures and they were aligned with the objectives of the organisation. They 
were also used dynamically, reflecting the issue being reviewed rather than 
reported mechanistically. However, they were not the central element of the 
performance management ‘system’ and there is no evidence that they bound this 
wider system together as is advocated in the current literature. Indeed, M&S were 
not afraid to discard measures even when what they were measuring remained 
important (absence, staff turnover and product quality). They were also happy to 
eschew accuracy in favour of "sensible approximation" if it saved time or money.  427
Measures were one tool but not the only tool in understanding performance.
Linking the system
This section will examine how the separate elements described above were 
connected and the strength of the links. The analysis should help our 
 Review of Manufacturers 7/10/70 (M&S E7/19 Corporate Governance Management 425
Committee 1968 - 1972)
 “The Marks & Spencer attack on Paperwork” produced by the ‘Organisation and 426
Methods Division of H.M. Treasury in collaboration with departmental Organisation and 
Methods Officers.’ February 1959 (M&S A04/117 K Various Papers and Speeches)
 “The War on Paper Bureaucracy” Lecture by Sir Derek Rayner to the Institute of 427
Administrative Management at Painters Hall, London, 22/5/75 (M&S A04/117 K Various 
Papers and Speeches)
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understanding of the strength of the overall system - whether the whole was 
greater than the sum of the parts. This section will also consider any cultural 
factors and how they related to the overall way that performance was managed.
There appears to have been strong alignment across the structures, processes 
and measures that are part of a modern performance management system. The 
core elements also remained consistent over the period. What helped create this 
alignment and consistency, however, appears to have been a number of factors 
with cultural factors at least as important as any formally designed processes.
Formal communication mechanisms, particularly those aimed at management or 
focusing on business issues, were less well developed than in the other case 
studies. A number of magazines, newsletters and bulletins were issued during the 
period including the Weekly Bulletin (1927), Sparks (1934), Staff Management 
News (1938) and St Michael News (1954).  However, only the Bulletin and Staff 428
Management News were primarily performance focused. The Bulletin lasted, 
however, for only three years and Sparks, which followed in 1934, was primarily 
about social activities and aimed at all staff. It is not clear why the Bulletin was 
stopped. Purvis suggests it was a victim of more important priorities in Head Office 
such as the store expansion plans.  However, there were also other mechanisms 429
for communication which may have been more effective. Employees were regular 
visitors to Head Office and conferences for store managers and supervisors 
operated from 1928.  A letter from Simon Marks shows the importance he 430
attached to these visits as important conduits for transferring knowledge. He 
bemoaned that one of the biggest administrative problems created by the war was 
the lack of personal contact between stores and Head Office.  One of the 431
 There were also operational communications such as a ‘Note’ issued to stores every 428
day. The distinction between a note and the magazines was the the notes were more 
directional - timing of price changes, changes in process, etc (St Michael News, 
3/12/1954).
 Purvis, Direction and discretion.429
 M&S HO/3/2/2/1/18 Memos re Organisation of Work and Staff and Supervisors' Duties 430
27 February 1928.
 M&S CR/B/3/1/54 Letter Simon Marks to Israel Sieff on how war affecting the business 431
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outcomes of Operation Simplification in the 1950’s was to replace letters and 
information circulars with conferences where information flowed more 
effectively.  The emphasis on the directors regularly visiting stores, as referred to 432
above, further helped communicate a consistent message.
Alignment across the business was also helped by the clear and consistent 
enunciation of the objectives of the business and the stability of the senior 
management team. As already noted, the objectives clarified not only what should 
be achieved but how it should be achieved and these were consistently and 
regularly communicated throughout the period not least through the AGM’s (see 
section on 'Objectives' above). 
Alignment was also helped by maintaining a stable and long-serving senior 
management team. Of the three Chairmen during the period, Simon Marks (1926 
to 1964) had joined the business in 1911, Israel Sieff (1965 - 1967) in 1926 and J. 
Edward Sieff (1967 to 1972) in the early 1930’s.  In addition, all of the directors 433
during the period were either part of the Marks/ Sieff families or long serving 
employees who had spent all of their working lives at M&S. At AGM's in the 
1960's, M&S explained the benefit of employing family and long-serving 
employees to the Board. After announcing new directors in 1966 they explained: “It 
continues to be our policy to make appointments to our Board from those who 
have been trained in the philosophies and principles which underlay the 
development and growth of our business.”  At the 1969 AGM, they announced 434
more appointments and explained: “this continues our policy of recruiting to the 
Board those within the organisation who have been educated in its philosophy and 
bred in its traditions.”435
 Rees St Michael, 211.432
 Rees, St Michael.433
 "Marks and Spencer." Financial Times [London, England] 3 June 1966: 4. Financial 434
Times. Web.
"Marks & Spencer Ltd." Financial Times [London, England] 5 June 1969: 26. Financial 435
Times. Web.
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References to “philosophy” and “traditions” highlights the importance placed on 
cultural factors in managing the business. They can be interpreted as a way of 
aligning people and systems and ensuring consistency and continuity over the 
period. In a speech in 1975 to the Institute of Administrative Management, a 
director criticised the description levelled at M&S that they were a paternalistic 
organisation: “there is nothing paternal in treating other people decently, especially 
when they play a major role in the success of the organisation.”  The sources 436
suggest that they preferred to describe themselves as a family, of being a personal 
business and the importance of respecting the individual.  At Board level, 437
reliance on family members and those who had been promoted within the 
business created relationships which transcended the formal organisation 
structures and helped create a consistency of approach in formal and informal 
practices.  Stores were structured through the whole period with a store 438
manager (operational management and financial performance) and a store 
manageress (welfare and amenities). Harvard researchers argued that this 
replicated the family structure: “in effect, the store was run by a ‘father’ and 
‘mother’. The company tried very hard to maintain the family feeling throughout all 
of their stores.”  The extensive welfare arrangements administered through Head 439
Office but delivered in store augmented this feeling. At AGM's and in internal 
memo's, they explained that this engendered collaboration and loyalty.  440
The business also argued that it created a culture of trust which allowed 
individuals to thrive. There is an apparent paradox that Head Office was highly 
centralised but also sought to allow individuals to thrive. In the histories of M&S, 
 “The War on Paper Bureaucracy” Lecture by Sir Derek Rayner to the Institute of 436
Administrative Management at Painters Hall, London, 22/5/75 (M&S A04/117 K Various 
Papers and Speeches)
 Israel Sieff speech at the British-American Chamber of Commerce Luncheon 437
December 1965 (M&S CR/B/2/3 Israel Moses Sieff speeches and notes)
 Michael Sacher explained the importance of these close relationships to Harvard 438
researchers. 
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much is made of Simon Mark’s trip to the United States in 1924 and the methods 
of control he brought back with him.  The structures and processes subsequently 441
introduced certainly allowed Marks to exert more control over operations. 
However, the tension between centralised and decentralised control existed 
throughout the period. While store managers were encouraged to use their 
initiative to drive sales in the Weekly Bulletins of the late 1920's, they were also 
repeatedly reminded to complete forms on time and accurately. The store 
operations department in the 1930's was structured to exert control over the stores 
but a series of reorganisations suggest that it was not an effective way to manage 
the business (see section on 'Structure' above). After the War, there was a gradual 
shift as systems of control were watered down or abandoned. The two most 
important initiatives emphasised the importance of the personal/ individual over a 
system and a set of rules. Operation Simplification reportedly eliminated 26 million 
forms including many which provided statistics previously used to manage the 
business. It also eliminated the extensive personnel manuals. What replaced it 
was “a set of principles and an understanding of the company’s philosophy. 
Management began to manage instead of becoming interpreters of the written 
word.”  The other initiative, ‘probing’ similarly pushed the emphasis for 442
understanding performance away from the accountants and statistical reports and 
onto the individual. M&S remained a highly centralised business but managing 
through principles and trusting individuals also played a part in linking the 'system.'
Conclusion
Of all of the case studies in this thesis, M&S’s structures, systems and measures 
most closely resembled what we might now call a performance management 
system as defined by Fereira and Otley. This study has not attempted to prove the 
effectiveness of the systems of performance management at M&S and modern 
studies have shown the futility of trying to link financial performance to the 
 Sieff, Memoirs, 142.441
 “The War on Paper Bureaucracy” Lecture by Sir Derek Rayner to the Institute of 442
Administrative Management at Painters Hall, London, 22/5/75 (M&S A04/117 K Various 
Papers and Speeches).
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development of performance management systems.  Perhaps the most that can 443
be said is that the durability of their structures, processes and measures in an 
organisation otherwise open to change suggests that they, at least, considered 
their approach effective. However, a number of themes can be identified running 
across M&S which raise questions about how we now understand a performance 
management system.
Much as Chandler concluded in the much abridged maxim that structure follows 
strategy, the organisational structure that emerged in M&S in the 1930’s reflected 
the objectives of the organisation.  The creation of the Welfare Department, 444
Personnel Department and Merchandise Research and Development 
Departments as well as the creation of the Merchandise Committee are all 
consistent with a firm which placed product, innovation and relations with suppliers 
and their staff at the centre of their business. Indeed, M&S provides a better 
example of the strategy/ structure dynamic than Chandler’s retail example, Sears. 
General Wood took 20 years to finally introduce his new retail structure in Sears 
while most new structures were introduced in M&S in less than half the time. In 
M&S, the organisational structures, the processes that were created and the 
measures that were monitored were consistent with objectives of the business. 
While, this is still some way from the structured, formal frameworks advocated by 
modern performance management academics such as Kaplan and Norton, it is 
consistent with their principle that performance management systems emerge 
from and are internally consistent with the strategy (or objectives) of the 
business.445
However, even this conclusion is overly simplistic and deterministic. The 
performance management systems at M&S also reflected the management style 
preferences of its leaders, particularly Simon Marks, which were themselves 
influenced by the firms history and the wider retail environment. Take the 
relationship with suppliers. It may have been a core objective of the business but it 
 Franco-Santos et al. Contemporary.443
 Chandler, Strategy and Structure.444
 Kaplan and Norton, Mastering.445
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can be traced back to Michael Marks’ relations with suppliers in his native Poland 
and in England where Dewhirsts initially supported the business and where 
Thomas Spencer had been initially employed. Miriam, Israel and J. Edward Sieff, 
who all played such an important part in Marks and Spencer and the personal life 
of Simon Marks, were from a family who owned a textile business (Sieff and 
Beaumont) and Israel had worked there before permanently joining the board of 
M&S in 1926.  Norman Laski, who also became a director in 1926, was from a 446
prominent textile manufacturing family business (Laski and Laski).  Similarly, the 447
focus on the relations with employees had complex roots in Michael Marks’ own 
views on welfare which in turn reflected his own humble background and the 
familial emphasis of his religion. It may also have been influenced by the activities 
of peer firms. John Boot at Boots was similarly focused on welfare issues in the 
1930’s extending holidays, shortening the working week and introducing a pension 
plan.  Spedan Lewis at John Lewis was also experimenting with an ownership 448
model which transferred the ownership of the business to the employees 
(partners).  The importance of the firm’s history and wider environment in which 449
it developed is not surprising to business history scholars but it is a feature which 
is lacking from the performance management literature which so often advocates 
tight frameworks while ignoring the firms foundations or the wider environment. 
Failure to consider these factors may also explain why so many PMM 
implementation projects have failed.   450
A second feature of the M&S performance management structures and systems 
was the focus on learning. The primary purpose of a performance management 
system remains contested. Many argue that its primary purpose is control while 
others argue that it is a tool to operationalise strategy.  However, while M&S may 451
have been well controlled and the processes introduced enhanced control, the 
 Sieff, Memoirs.446
 Blond, Made in England.447
 Greenwood, Cap.448
 Cox, Spedan's partnership.449
 Franco-Santos and Bourne, Examination. 450
 Bititci et al., Challenges.451
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emphasis of their performance management appears to be more oriented towards 
understanding and learning as exemplified by the focus on 'probing'. A focus on 
learning itself is not distinctive but three other features of learning stand out at 
M&S. Firstly, it was detailed. Directors examined individual products, were 
presented with the details of specific dyes and the efficiency of the latest 
accounting machinery. The level of detail did not change over the period. 
Secondly, it was broad. Directors were expected to have a good understanding of 
all parts of the business. Thirdly, much of the responsibility for learning fell on the 
individual. Derek Rayner in the 1970’s referred to personal probing to emphasise 
the individuals responsibility to understand performance. It was a feature also 
prevalent in the first memos introducing probing in the 1950’s and was 
emphasised in training material which highlighted the importance of “personal 
knowledge right from the start” for new Supervisors.  The importance of breadth, 452
depth and a personal responsibility in getting understanding runs counter to the 
idea of a small number of strategic KPI's presented to an Executive as the primary 
tool for understanding performance.
Where do measures and statistics sit as sources of knowledge and learning? A 
number of current studies situate them at the centre of performance management 
systems.  Before the war, measures and statistics played an increasing part in 453
the management of performance. The business invested heavily in their capacity 
to generate statistics, doubling the size of the statistics department and investing 
in equipment which they claimed to be the most up-to-date available.  The 454
number of statistical schedules in the Appendix to the Accountant’s report 
increased from 12 to 25 between 1937 and 1939 and the statistical department 
reported how much the various departments used them for special 
 M&S HO/3/2/2/3/83 Staff Management News: Selected articles 1950 - 1969452
 See recent literature reviews by Bititci et al. Challenges; Franco-Santos et al. 453
Contemporary.
 “Annual Report of the Joint Secretary and Chief Accountant 1936” (M&S E7/24 454
Corporate Governance, Internal Reports 1934 - 1956)
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investigations.  However, even in the 1930’s there were already some concerns 455
about over-reliance on statistics.
After the war, statistics played a lesser role. The 1950 Accountants report only 
included 13 statistical schedules in the appendix and none from 1951.  It is not 456
clear if the report was even produced after 1956 with no references in the 
archives. Indeed, over time, M&S chose to reduce its ability to generate measures 
rather than increase them. Checking Lists were produced weekly in the 1930’s but 
fortnightly in the 1960’s. Absence records, statistics on customer complaints and 
attendance records were all submitted to Head Office in the 1930’s but not in the 
1960’s. The increasing concern about the use of statistics did not come from a 
lack of available statistics but recognition that statistics were insufficient to provide 
the level of understanding that they believed was necessary to manage the 
performance of the business (and didn't justify the cost). Indeed, one director went 
further to a Harvard researcher: "We get concerned when statistics get on paper 
because they hide things.”  His view is corroborated in the various memos and 457
speeches about the importance of ‘probing’ which criticised the reliance on 
statistics. It is also reflected in how they conducted their performance reviews. In 
the transcripts of the directors Monday morning performance review reported by 
Harvard in the 1970’s, despite the availability before the meeting, not one statistic 
or measure was referred to.
The rapid development of statistical capability in the 1930’s in M&S followed by 
stagnation or even a diminution in their importance mirrors a similar trend in Boots 
where rapid development in the statistical schedules in the 1920’s was followed by 
stagnation. In neither company is there evidence that the businesses took 
performance management less seriously over time - rather that they recognised 
the deficiencies of relying on statistics in providing the required level of 
 M&S AO5/413F Annual Report of the Chief Accountants 1939 (March 1940) and 455
“Annual Report of the Joint Secretary and Chief Accountant 1937” (M&S E7/24 Corporate 
Governance, Internal Reports 1934 - 1956)
 “Annual Report of the Chief Accountant 1950” (M&S E7/24 Corporate Governance, 456
Internal Reports 1934 - 1956)
 Brian Howard, Director of Food (M&S A04/117 I Harvard Business School Case Study 457
1975), 8.
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understanding. This represents a significant challenge to measure driven PMM 
systems and is discussed in more detail in the conclusion.
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Chapter 3: Boots the Chemists
Introduction
The chapter presents the case of the British retailer Boots the Chemists (Boots). 
Boots has a number of similarities with the other firms in the thesis. Like the other 
two, it was a multiple retailer which operated throughout the whole period and still 
trades today. It operated in similar locations to the other retailers and although 
operating primarily in the chemist and drugs trade, still competed for the 
discretionary spend of customers. Like the other cases, Boots' stores were 
geographically spread across the country and had to manage large numbers of 
customer transactions generated away from Head Office - by 1920, it was 
processing more than 1.5 million transactions a week.  However, there are a 458
number of features which which make it distinct. Firstly, its ownership and control 
was different from the other two firms which remained family 'controlled' 
businesses throughout most of the period.  Although at the start of 1920, Boots 459
was still run by its founder, Jesse Boot, it was sold during the year to an American 
retail firm who retained ownership until 1933. Subsequently, Jesse Boot's son, 
John, became Chairman but the rest of the board comprised directors who had 
been promoted through the business or recruited externally. In particular, the 
American ownership exposed Boots to new management practices, most of which 
touched PMM. Secondly, it was the only firm to undertake its own manufacturing. 
'Own-goods' products were nearly 25% of sales in 1932 and, still 14% in 1969.  460
While M&S sold almost entirely own-brand products (albeit manufactured by third 
parties) and WHS sold very little, Boots had to manage the potential conflict 
between higher margin 'own goods' and lower margin but better known, 
proprietary brands.
 Annual number of sales transactions was 81,939,961. BTC 461 Statistical Books.458
 Although both M&S and WHS were public companies by 1949, the executive boards 459
were dominated by family members.
 BTC 345/2 - Expense Report 12 months ended march 31st 1932; BTC 462, Statistical 460
Books.
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The principal sources were the company archives, the memoirs of one of the 
directors and a published history of Jesse Boot.  The Boots archives are private 461
and maintained by Boots. There were no restrictions on access to the sources 
apart from the Board minutes and any salary information which included named 
individuals. Based on testimony of the archivist, the board minutes focused on 
statutory issues and property matters rather than performance issues. This is 
consistent with some short notes made by Jesse Boot's biographer, Stanley 
Chapman, who had access to the minutes.  The archive is extensive albeit with 462
some gaps, particularly covering the period 1940 to 1960. It is particularly strong 
on management accounting records (to 1955). Conversely, there are few 
personnel records and very little on the reward systems operated by Boots. 
Specific gaps are identified in the detailed sections that follow. It is also in the 
process of being re-catalogued which made the identification of sources more 
difficult and time consuming.
As in WHS, company magazines were important sources. The Beacon and The 
Bee were published monthly in the 1920's before becoming bi-monthly thereafter. 
They were also not published during the war. There is no information on the 
editors nor the extent to which directors were directly involved in deciding on the 
content. However, both magazines were uncritical of Boots and, particularly in The 
Bee, included articles written by the directors.  The Beacon was first published in 463
September 1919 with the stated aim of creating a sense of fellowship.  Based on 464
reviewing copies, its primary focus was on reporting the social matters for Head 
Office staff, including the results of the sports teams and descriptions of social 
events and therefore of only limited use for this case study. The Bee was more 
 The memoirs were written by JE Greenwood who was a director between 1920 and 461
1958 (Greenwood, Cap). Chapman, Jesse Boot.
 His notes are held in the archive. He took very few notes after 1923 and wrote that 462
entries primarily related to reports on shops due renovation, re-leasing or purchase. (The 
notes did not have an archive reference).
 Particularly in the first months when each director contributed an article.463
 From the opening page of the fist edition. The Beacon, September 1919.464
 125
valuable. It was first published in November 1921 and was more business oriented 
than The Beacon.  The opening paragraph of the first page stated its aims:465
"The Bee comes among you to do many things. To thank you, inform you, 
encourage you, inspire you, stimulate you, congratulate you, perchance 
to amuse you. It wants to single you out as a busy bee - a worker for that 
great organisation of which you are a member. And, occasionally, if need 
be, to sting you."466
As a source, it is particularly useful as it appears that it was the primary conduit for 
communicating with stores. Directors and Head Office departments wrote articles 
describing what they did and therefore provide an insight into their objectives, their 
structures and some of their processes. Store managers shared advice, the 
magazine published examples of best practice and reproduced speeches of senior 
managers at local events - all provide insights into the objectives of the 
organisation and some store practices and procedures (although not on the 
effectiveness of those practices). However, over time, it gradually lost its business 
focus and increasingly resembled The Beacon albeit with a focus on social matters 
in the stores rather than Head Office. It therefore was less useful as a source from 
the 1950's onwards. A magazine called the Leader was published from the 
mid-1960's (it was undated but references in the first edition suggest it was after 
1964). It was aimed at senior management (members of Committees) and had a 
broad remit: “Leader will be devoted to information, ideas and discussions on 
management topics.”  Articles provided general advice about good management 467
practice and few articles were about Boots specifically.
The secondary literature on Boots principally comprises the memoirs of JE 
Greenwood, a biography of Jesse Boot and an unfinished corporate history of 
 The magazines slogan was, according to the editorial, "More Sales" (The Bee, 465
November 1921).
 The Bee, November 1921. 466
 BTC A 92 - The Leader.467
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Boots, both by Stanley Chapman.  While they provide information otherwise 468
absent from the archives, they have limitations and have been corroborated with 
primary sources where available. Greenwood's memoirs were published in 1977 
and recall his career with Boots between 1920 and 1953. He was a director 
throughout the period with responsibility for expense management in the stores 
and for accounting. The principal contribution of the book is to provide an insight 
into the thinking behind certain decisions during the period and the state of the 
management practices before 1920 - a period not well covered in the archives. 
Greenwood's views, however, may have been tainted by a falling out he had with 
John Boot when the business was bought back from the Americans in 1933. 
Greenwood argues that he was largely ignored by John Boot following the 
acquisition and this may have influenced his recollection of Boot's style of 
management.  Chapman's biography of Jesse Boot actually goes beyond Jesse 469
Boot's retirement from active management of the business in 1920 and documents 
the period of American ownership as well as a short chapter at the end highlighting 
developments since 1932. His unfinished corporate history repeats much of the 
earlier book with some additional information about Boots in the 1960's and 
1970's. Chapman notes that apart from company accounts and board minutes, he 
was almost entirely reliant on third party sources and on oral evidence as the 
archives were "meagre."  He also had access to The Beacon, one of the two 470
company magazines, but makes no reference to The Bee which, for this case 
study was a more useful source. Based on the acknowledgements, Chapman 
interviewed many of the directors active during the period (including Greenwood) 
but does not reference them within the body of the book and therefore it is 
impossible to understand how they contributed. This is particularly relevant in 
Boots where Greenwood, as noted above, fell out with John Boot and where there 
 Greenwood, Cap; Chapman, Jesse Boot. Parts of the unfinished book are available in 468
the Boots archive and are an early draft. They were written in 1994. The Boots archivist 
says that the book was never completed as there was some dispute between Boots and 
Chapman
 Greenwood is particularly critical of Boot's management style which he argued was 469
autocratic and secretive. He also argues that Boot was not at all interested in financial 
matters but it is difficult to corroborate this from other sources.
 Chapman, Jesse Boot, 9.470
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appears to have been disputes among directors in the 1960's leading to the 
Managing Director leaving at short notice in 1967.471
The chapter follows the same format as the other chapters. Some context is 
provided on the development of the chemists and drugs markets from the middle 
of 19th century and in particular, the impact of regulation on those markets. It is 
followed by a brief overview of the development of Boots since it was founded in 
1849 with a specific focus on what underpinned its early success The remainder of 
the chapter documents how Boots managed and measured performance using the 
framework described in Chapter 1. The chapter finishes with a short conclusion 
which highlights the main findings of the case study.
Background and Context
The Chemist Trade
This section explores the growth of the chemists trade from the middle of the 19th 
century. It identifies the main drivers in the development of the sector and the way 
that the regulatory environment influenced the drivers.
The chemist trade developed from the market for medicines which expanded 
rapidly in the second half of the 19th century. During the first half of the century, 
'medicines' comprised herbal remedies, spices, proprietary and non-proprietary 
medicines and various chemicals. While a trained medical profession was 
evolving, most people relied on self-medication provided by a wide range of 
suppliers. There was, however, relatively little demand for these medicines and 
they formed only a small part of expenditure, especially among the working 
classes.  The market expanded rapidly after 1870 as wages rose and costs fell 472
dramatically - between 1833 and 1897, an ounce of bromine fell from £1 to £0.105, 
 Arthur Cockfield joined Boots in 1952 and became Managing Director in 1961. 471
Chapman refers to a falling out between Cockfield and the Board but does not disclose 
the reason. 
 Chapman, Jesse Boot; Jefferys, Retail Trading.472
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caffeine from £6 to £0.95 and iodine from £8 to £0.03.  Despite the fall in prices, 473
the value of proprietary medicines sold between 1850 and 1914 grew 400% while 
real wages grew only 180%.  As the market grew, provision also expanded 474
rapidly and the number of licensed vendors grew from 10,922 in 1865 to 43,413 in 
1910, many part of corporate bodies.  475
Expansion contributed to professionalisation. The Pharmaceutical Society had 
been founded in 1841 and as the market expanded it tried to influence legislation 
to protect the rights of its members. Two Pharmacy Acts (1852 and 1868) 
established that titles such as 'chemist', 'druggist' and 'pharmaceutical chemist' 
were restricted to those qualified and registered by The Pharmaceutical Society. 
The 1868 Act also included a 'Schedule of 'Poisons' which could only be sold by a 
registered 'chemist', 'druggist' or 'pharmaceutical chemist'.  The Society also 476
tried to limit corporate bodies use of the terms but they were defeated in an 1880 
ruling by the House of Lords which allowed limited liability companies to call 
themselves chemists and druggist as long as the sale of 'poison' was conducted 
by a qualified person. The ruling opened-up the market to multiple chemists and 
although  the Pharmaceutical Society made further attempts to limit their growth, 
the 1880 ruling was effectively endorsed in the 1908 Poisons and Pharmacy Act. 
The Act required a qualified chemist in every branch but it was not a hinderance to 
the multiple sites who already complied - Boots for example, employed 364 
chemists across its 278 branches in 1903.  The 1908 ruling effectively ended the 477
attempts to stop the growth of corporate and therefore multiple chemists. Over the 
following decades, the multiples continued to take more and more of the market. 
 Chapman, Jesse Boot, 26. Chapman did not reference his source.473
 Chapman, Jesse Boot, 23. His calculations were based on patent medicine stamp duty 474
as reported in the Report from the Select Committee on Patent Medicines, 1914, xxxiv.
 Chapman, Jesse Boot, Appendix 1. Analysis based on the Report of the 475
Commissioners of Inland Revenue from 1857 to 1908 and the Annual Report of H.M. 
Customs and Excise from 1909.
 Jefferys, Retail Trading, 379.476
 Chemist and Druggist, 16 May 1903, 786. The magazine argued that the number of 477
chemists employed was only part of the problem. The aim of the Bill was to ensure that 
each shop was managed by a qualified chemist and that the Board similarly comprised 
qualified chemists but these measures were never introduced.
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Table 3.1 shows the share of retail sales made in multiple stores for both all retail 
and sales relating to chemist and photographic products only. It shows that the 
multiples were able to take a greater share earlier than in other sectors. The 
growth in the multiple share was driven by a small number of firms - in 1900, Boots 
controlled 44% of all multiple chemist branches and this grew to 50% by 1930. By 
1950, Boots still held 51% of the multiple branches and Timothy White and Taylors 
held a further 30%.  478
While the small and independent chemists failed in their attempts to legislate 
against multiple retail, they were more successful in controlling the prices charged. 
Multiple retailers thrived on discounting; selling high volumes allowed them to buy 
in bulk at reduced wholesale prices. Savings could be substantial, a price list form 
Holloway's in 1896 offered a nearly 10% discount for bulk purchases.  Hoping to 479
remove the advantage, an independent chemist, Samuel Glyn-Jones founded the 
Anti-Cutting Record in November 1895 (the multiples were known as 'cutters') and 
in the first edition called for guaranteed margins for chemist products. In January 
1896, he created the Proprietary Articles Trade Association (PATA) to promote 
resale price maintenance (RPM). Although the multiples initially opposed RPM, the 
Table 3.1: Multiple share of retail goods sold
1900 1910 1920 1930 1939 1950 1961 1970
Multiple share (%) of:a
All retail 
goods




6.5-8.0 10.0-12.0 14.5-16.5 24.0-28.0 33.0-37.0 32.7 36.3 42.0
a Multiple defined as 10 or more stores. They exclude co-operative societies and department stores
Sources: 1900 to 1939 from Jefferys, Retail Trading, 396. After 1950, Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission, Discounts to Retailers, 80, Table 5, published 31 May 1981 (https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/235898/0311.pdf). The latter was 
based on census of distribution returns. 1950 is common to both sources and shows a small 
difference (Jefferys estimated 18.0-20.5 for all retail and 35-39% for chemists).
 Jefferys, Retail Trading, 387.478
 Chapman, Jesse Boot, 103. From an article in the Anti-Cutting Record, June 1896.479
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PATA campaign was largely successful. From 1902, the multiples tended to follow 
prices on PATA goods.  480
The impact of RPM on markets and on buyers and sellers is well documented in 
the literature. RPM helped manufacturers as stable prices reduced volatility which 
made it easier to plan production runs.  It also benefitted the smaller retailers as 481
it undermined one of the principal weapons (discounting) that the multiples used to 
take market share.  Important as it was, the impact on the multiples and the retail 482
market as a whole should not, however, be overstated. Firstly, the multiples still 
had control over prices, just not all prices. They could source non-RPM controlled 
goods by manufacturing themselves or expanding their range. In store, they could 
influence what customers purchased through advertising, promotions, product 
location in store and the salesmanship of employees. Gross margin, the difference 
between sales and product costs, was therefore not fixed by RPM for the retailer; 
between 1922 and 1932, Boots' gross margin expanded by nearly 10 percentage 
points to 49.2%.  Secondly, the higher gross margins that RPM offered made 483
secondary locations more attractive for the multiples and they could either acquire 
existing small stores or open their own. Consequently, the multiples were able to 
continue to grow their market share despite RPM throughout the period (see table 
3.1).
After the multiple's acceptance of RPM and the 1908 Poisons and Pharmacy Act, 
the regulatory environment stabilised and the following 60 years did not see the 
same level of antagonism as the previous 60. RPM was gradually expanded both 
in terms of the number of products covered and the margins earned.  This was 484
 Chapman, Jesse Boot, 114.480
 Mercer, Retailer-supplier relations; Jefferys, Retail Trading.481
 Yamey, Origins.482
  BTC 461 - Statistical Books 1923/24 to 1941.483
 In 1897, the list of price maintained goods was 142 and had grown to 2,000 by 1924 484
(Scott and Walker, Retailing under Resale Price Maintenance). When RPM was abolished 
in 2001, there were approximately 2,300 OTC products covered (BBC News, 16 May 
2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1333397.stm)
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consistent with practices across UK retail.  And, while the 1956 Restrictive Trade 485
Practices Act and the 1964 Resale Prices Act ended RPM across most retail 
products, it continued on over-the-counter medicines until 2001.   486
Greater changes took place in dispensed products. Prior to Lloyd-George's 1913 
National Insurance Act, 90% of all dispensing took place in doctor's surgeries.  In 487
the following decades, dispensing switched to pharmacies and became an 
increasingly larger part of their businesses. Between 1920 and 1938, the number 
of prescriptions dispensed grew 3 fold to £5m a year and represented between 
10-15% of chemists trade.  Following the War, the 1946 National Health Act 488
transformed the market and by 1950, there were nearly 30 million scripts 
dispensed comprising between 20-30% of chemists trade.  Margins on 489
dispensing were low, Taylors of Leeds claimed that they needed to process 100 
scripts to make a £1 profit in 1914.  However, this favoured the multiples who, 490
relative to independent retailers, had high footfall generated by the wide range of 
other products sold and also benefited from scale economies.
Boots the Chemists: Background 1849 to 1970
What was to become Boots the Chemists started as a single store selling herbal 
remedies in Nottingham in 1849. It was founded by John Boot but he died in 1860 
and it was son, Jesse, who was to transform the business into what he described 
in 1907 as the "Largest, best and cheapest RETAIL CHEMISTS in the World”.  491
 In 1938 about 30% of consumer expenditure was a on price maintained goods. By 485
1956, this had risen to between 44-55%. No separate analysis of Chemists goods 
available. Mercer, Retailer-supplier relations.
 CMS Law Now, 15 May 2001: RPM in the UK ends with removal of exemption for OTC 486
medicines (http://www.cms-lawnow.com/ealerts/2001/05/rpm-in-the-uk-ends-with-removal-
of-exemption-for-otc-medicines?cc_lang=en)
 Chapman, Jesse Boot, 28. Unreferenced by Chapman.487
 Jefferys, Retail Trading, 383.488
 Jefferys, Retail Trading, 383.489
 Chapman, Jesse Boot, 89. Chapman does not reference his source.490
 Advertisement in the Financial Times [London, England] 24 Sept. 1907: 8. Financial 491
Times. Web.
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Growth had not been smooth but the policies which had established the business 
by 1907 formed the basis for those that underpinned its continuing growth over the 
following sixty years.
Firstly, Boot had recognised the importance of the growing medicines business 
and  consequent professionalisation of the industry. He repositioned the business 
away from herbal remedies towards medicines (in the 1870's) and dispensing (in 
the 1880's). He managed to appoint his first qualified chemist in 1883, despite 
opposition from the rest of the trade, and ensured that all his subsequent shops 
had a qualified chemist.  Pharmacy remained at the core of the business 492
thereafter and the business advertised their expertise in pharmacy throughout the 
period. In 1926, they described themselves as "Chemists to the Nation", a slogan 
still used today.  They also used endorsements from doctors and advertised their 493
healthcare expertise (such as employing a 'hospital-trained nurse).494
Secondly, he positioned himself as a volume retailer which allowed him to buy in 
bulk from wholesalers and manufacturers. Initially, volume came from charging 
lower prices (or the same price for twice the amount).  He aggressively promoted 495
his policy in the press - in a letter to the Nottingham Guardian in 1894, he 
compared his price for a fluid ounce of quinine (1s.9d) with those of eight chemists 
he had sampled in Nottingham (between 4s.10d and 15s).  Following the 496
introduction of RPM, there was less focus on discounting but Boots remained 
committed to driving volume through sales events and promotions. In 1905, Boot 
appointed GI Akeroyd and he toured Britain staging special events to promote 
particular lines in store.  Akeroyd continued in various sales roles throughout his 497
career - he was responsible for setting up 'a first class sales organisation' in 1921 
 Chapman, Jesse Boot.492
 The Bee, January 1926; Campaign, 13 May 2016.493
 Radio Times, 25 April 1932; John Bull, 8 October 1932. BTC archives: press cuttings. 494
 A contemporary recalled how in his first shop, rather than sell soft soap at 4d per 495
pound, he charged 4.5d for two pounds.The Beacon, January 1934.
 Chapman, Jesse Boot, 104.496
 Chapman, Jesse Boot, 104497
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and became Sales Director in 1935.  Driving footfall through volume discounts 498
remained a feature of Boots' promotional campaigns during the period.499
Thirdly, and linked to the drive to increase volumes, Boot expanded selling space. 
In 1888, he still only had 4 branches but from the 1890's he aggressively 
expanded the number of stores through organic growth and acquisition; by 1900, 
the business had 181 stores, by 1910 he had 394 stores and they opened their 
1,000 shop in 1933.  Although growth in store numbers slowed after the Second 500
World War, the merger with Timothy White and Taylor's in 1968 meant that by 
1970 they had 1,695 stores (see table 3.2).  Continual expansion meant that 501
Boots was comfortably the largest of the multiple chemist retailers with 51% of all 
multiple branches in 1950.  However, Boot not only increased the number of 502
stores but also the size of some of the stores. In the late 1880's, he experimented 
by broadening the range of products sold and helped by his new wife Florence, 
expanded into perfumeries, toiletries and 'fancy goods'. In 1891, he opened a 
'departmental' store in Nottingham and this provided a template for a large store 
format in the bigger cities.  Boots continued to trade through both large and 503
small stores. By 1966, of the 1,265 stores, 54 had annual sales of less than £26k 
(about 8 staff) while 26 had sales of more than £500k (about 300 staff).504
Fourthly, Boot expanded into manufacturing products for resale in his own stores. 
He opened a production department in 1885 and a small factory in 1888 in 
 Memo to TGM's June 1921, BTC A 361/3 Memo’s re TGM’s; The Bee, June 1935.498
 BTC A 48/1 Market Research Report 1929.499
 BTC 461 - Statistical Books 1923/24 to 1941500
 Immediately before the acquisition, they had 1,256 stores. Some stores had to be 501
disposed of because of the acquisition. BTC Annual Accounts 1971.
 Mutliple firms with more than 10 stores. The next largest had 17% in 1900 and 30% in 502
1950. Jefferys, Retail Trading, 387.
 The non-chemist products were referred to as Department No. 2. In 1900 they 503
represented 24% of total sales (Chapman, Jesse Boot, 72).
 BTC 314/4 - Peat Marwick Mitchell: Report on Management Structure (Part II) 14 June 504
1966.
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Nottingham.  During World War I, Boots expanded into pharmaceuticals and fine 505
chemical production.  They continued to invest heavily in manufacturing after the 506
war. In 1927, work started on a new factory in Nottingham and it opened in 
1933.  There was further investment after World War II in both the Nottingham 507
factory and a new production plant in Airdrie.  Own-label products were a core 508
part of sales - in 1939, they accounted for 31% of retail sales.  Not only were 509
gross margins much higher on own-label products but they allowed more scope to 
compete on price as they were unaffected by RPM.510
The policies adopted saw the business grow significantly and they were the largest 
of the multiple retail chains in Britain throughout the period. As noted above, there 
was only one other large multiple chemist retailer (Timothy Whites and Taylors) 
and between them, they controlled 81% of multiple chemists branches by 1950 
(79% in 1935).  Timothy Whites and Taylor had been created through a series of 511
mergers between 1928 and 1934 and had branches across the country.  In 512
1935, they operated 765 branches of which 172 were 'double shops' which sold 
hardware as well as drugs.  Boots eventually bought Timothy Whites and Taylors 513
in 1968. While they had roughly half the number of shops compared to Boots (700 
to 1,400), their sales were only 20% of Boots'.  Over the preceding decades, the 514
 Chapman, Jesse Boot, 61.505
 Chapman, Jesse Boot, 91.506
 The Bee, July 1933.507
 "Boots Pure Drug Company." Financial Times [London, England] 21 July 1950: 6. 508
Financial Times. Web.
 BTC 1167 - Final Accounts: Report on Boots Pure Drug Company Limited and 509
Associated Companies Accounts for the Year Ended 31 March 1939, 6. Internal document 
unreferenced.
 In 1939, gross margin on own-label products averaged 61% compared to proprietary 510
brands of up to 45% (toiletries). BTC 1167 - Final Accounts.
 Jefferys, Retail Trading, 387. 511
 Jefferys, Retail Trading, 387.512
 "Timothy Whites and Taylors." Financial Times [London, England] 11 Dec. 1935: 11. 513
Financial Times. Web.
 "The Chemists Come Together—at Last." Financial Times [London, England] 16 May 514
1968: 13. Financial Times. Web.
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impact of the competition generated by Timothy White and Taylors on Boots' 
objectives and practices may have been less than the relative shares might 
suggest. Although both sold chemist goods, the focus of their other sales created a 
quite different shopping environment and attracted different customers. While 
Boots sold cosmetics, perfumes and what they called fancy goods, Timothy Whites 
continued to sell hardware.515
Table 3.2 shows the growth of the business between 1910 and 1970. The table is 
for illustrative purposes only and is not intended to show the relative success of 
their PMM structures and practices.  As noted in the introduction, PMM literature 516
has been unable to prove the link between PMM systems and the financial 
performance of the business recognising the impact of external market factors and 
the difficulty in isolating the impact of performance management practices from 
other drivers of performance.
Organisationally, the business became a private limited company in 1883 and a 
public limited company in 1888 when it was renamed Boots Pure Drug Company. 
Jesse Boot, however, retained ownership and expansion of the business was 
funded by retained earnings and the sale of preference shares. In 1920, partly 
through failing health, a desire to fund a university in Nottingham and lack of 
confidence in his son, Boot accepted an offer for the business from Louis Liggett 
of the American firm, United Drug Company.  Although a substantial business, 517
United Drug’s retail operations (Liggett’s) were relatively small in comparison to 
Boots with only 211 stores.  The Americans retained control until 1933 when 518
 "The Chemists Come Together—at Last." Financial Times [London, England] 16 May 515
1968: 13. Financial Times. Web.
 Some caution needs to be used in analysing the figures. The retail and chemists goods 516
market went through different periods of growth during the period. For example, while the 
chemists goods market grew by only 4% between 1920 and 1930, it grew by 142% 
between 1939 and 1950 (Jefferys, Retail Trading, 453).
 Greenwood, Cap.517
 Hayward and White, Chain Stores, 343. They were, however, the largest multiple 518
chemists in the United States at the time.
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financial problems in their own country forced a disposal.  Thereafter, the 519
business returned to public ownership until it was acquired by KKR in 2007 and 
subsequently merged with the the American company, Walgreen, in 2014.520
Although Jesse Boot remained as Chairman after the American acquisition, he 
played a minor role, retired from the company in 1926 and died in 1931. His son, 
however, was more prominent. He became Joint Managing Director in 1920 and 








1910 1,915 n/a 394 n/a
1915 2,941 n/a 569 n/a
1920 7,575 219 618 5,438
1925 8,572 522 738 8,625
1930 9,830 678 876 11,226
1935 10,508 705 1,079 12,092
1940 13,776 720 1,210 14,391
1945 19,531 673 1,171 15,022
1950 36,253 1,060 1,276 20,482
1955 54,441 1,658 1,313 23,325
1960 81,981 3,767 1,307 26,506
1965 119,279 6,761 1,270 27,749
1970 214,381 11,000 1,695 28,427
a 1920 data refers to 1921 (first year employee data recorded). 1970 refers to 1969 and excludes 
employees from the Timothy White acquisition. Annual accounts form 1970 do not separate retail 
employees from all employees.
Sources: Retail sales, number of stores and retail employees from BTC 461 and 462: Statistical 
books except for 1970 which are from the annual accounts. Group shareholder profit: 1920 from 
detailed accounting ledgers (BTC Y 192), 1925 to 1955 from management accounting reports 
(BTC 1167 - Final Accounts), 1955 to 1970 from published annual accounts.
 "Boots Drug Shares." Financial Times [London, England] 9 Jan. 1933: 5. Financial 519
Times. Web.
 "KKR wins Boots battle." Financial Times [London, England] 28 Apr. 2007: 14. 520
Financial Times. Web.
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ran the business after the Americans sold it until his retirement in 1953. After the 
American sale, John Boot was said to exert considerable influence and was every 
bit as autocratic as his father.  He was succeeded by JP Savage, who had joined 521
the firm directly from school in 1911.  When he retired in 1961, the roles of 522
Chairman and Managing Director were separated. FA Cockfield, who had been 
appointed as Finance Director from the Inland Revenue in 1952 became 
Managing Director while WR Norman, who had been with Boots since 1939 and 
had married John Boot's daughter, became Chairman.  Cockfield subsequently 523
resigned in 1967 and he was replaced by Keith Williamson who had been with the 
business for 39 years.  With the exception of Cockfield, the majority of senior 524
appointments were from within the business.
Table 3.3 provides a summary of the major events in the development of Boots 
between 1849 and 1970. It is for reference purposes only.
 Greenwood, Cap.521
 The Bee, March 1954.522
 "Boots Pure Drug Company Limited." Financial Times [London, England] 23 June 523
1960: 4. Financial Times. Web. 17 July 2016.
 "Boots Pure Drug Company Limited." Financial Times [London, England] 14 June 524
1968: 30. Financial Times. Web.
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Performance Management and Measurement
As discussed in Chapter 1, and using the same format as the other case studies, 
the following sections will describe each of the main elements of a PMM system as 
described in the framework. While much of it is descriptive to allow an assessment 
of the system as a whole, more detailed discussion and analysis is presented on 
those areas which are specifically relevant to the research questions raised in the 
Introduction. A conclusion will identify the key relevant themes as they relate to 
Boots and will feed into the overall conclusion.
Table 3.3: Boots expansion - key dates
Year
1849 John Boot opens a store in Nottingham selling herbal medicines.
1863 Jesse Boot leaves school at 13 and joins the family shop in Nottingham.
1883 Firm incorporated as Boot and Company Limited selling a range of proprietary 
medicines. Boot employs his first qualified pharmacist.
1888 The firm becomes a public limited company (Boots Pure Drug Company) with four 
branches. Expands rapidly through organic growth and acquisition.
1891 Develops a larger store format by creating a departmental structure offering a 
dispensary, perfumeries, toiletries and 'fancy goods'. Business develops using two 
formats - large departmental stores in city centres and smaller pharmacy focused 
stores elsewhere.
1920 Jesse Boot sells the whole business to United Drug of the United States. Jesse 
Boot remains as nominal head of the business. His son (John) has effective 
operational control as head of the Executive Committee.
1933 Boots sold and becomes a public limited company with John Boot as Chairman.
1933 Boots opens its new manufacturing facilities at its Nottingham headquarters.
1933 Opens 1,000th shop.
1953 John Boot retires. Succeeded by JP Savage.
1961 Savage retired and replaced by WR Norman (Chairman) and FA Cockfield 
(Managing Director).
1967 Organisational review completed by Peat Marwick Mitchell. They propose a 
divisional structure which was gradually introduced over the following 5 years.
1967 FA Cockfield resigns as Managing Director and is replaced by K Williamson.
1968 Acquire Timothy White and Taylors chain of chemists.
Sources: Chapman, Jesse Boot; The Bee; Financial Times; Greenwood, Cap; BTC 314/3 - Peat 
Marwick Mitchell: Report on Management Structure.
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Objectives of the Organisation
As explained in the first chapter, one of the benefits of a PMM system is that it 
aligns the structures and processes behind the objectives and strategy of the 
organisation. Following the framework introduced in the first chapter, this section 
will consider whether Boots had a dominant objective or several objectives and 
how the business communicated these to the organisation. It will also consider 
whether the objectives changed over the period.
Boots did not explicitly identify its objectives during the period and a review by 
external consultants in 1966 criticised them for not doing so.  However, a variety 525
of sources suggest that not only did Boots have a dominant objective but that it 
was retained throughout the period. 
The editorial of the first edition of The Bee in November 1921 communicated a 
very clear objective: “But our whole living - our salaries - our reputation are 
summed up in our magazine slogan - more sales.” On the opening page, the Sales 
Manager exhorted "colleagues and salesmen" to "LET US GO AFTER MORE 
VOLUME IN REAL EARNEST."  In the rest of the pages and over the coming 526
months and years, articles focused on how to improve sales and in particular, 
volume. The objective was consistent with how Jesse Boot ran the business over 
the previous forty years. The primacy of the objective over others is supported by 
other sources. George Gales, seconded from the American business and 
appointed Managing Director in 1920 explained in a speech to employees in 1924, 
"sales are the lifeblood of the business. Without sales, there would be no 
necessity for anything else."  Training guidance emphasised sales above other 527
objectives. A 1930's memo to Territorial General Manager's (TGM's), who were 
responsible for several shops in an area, encouraged them to challenge store 
 BTC 314/3 - Peat Marwick Mitchell: Report on Management Structure (Part I) 14 June 525
1966.
 From the Editorial and the first page, The Bee November 1921.526
 The Bee, April 1924. 527
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managers: 'Are you a salesman? How do you show it? Who is the leading 
salesman in your shop? Can you show them how to sell?'  In the organisation 528
structure, the first person to hold the role of ‘Sales Director’ in 1932 was the 
Chairman, John Boot.  Published statistics focused on sales growth with 1/3rd of 529
the schedules in the statistical pack relating to sales.  The timing of Executive 530
meetings were determined by the availability of the previous week’s sales statistics 
(4.00pm, Tuesday in 1922 and 12.00am, Monday in 1966).  While store 531
managers' bonuses had several components, they were conditional on achieving 
sales growth.  532
Volume growth was prioritised over price in driving sales and the terms ‘sales’ and 
‘volume’ were used interchangeably. In driving volume, Boots promoted heavily 
(Boots was running their still ubiquitous '2 for the price of 1' promotions as early as 
1929) and in store prioritised 'salesmanship' and customer service.  In his 533
"Service Letter No. 1" issued in 1925, John Boot stressed that "the customer is 
always right" and the refund policy required store managers to refer to Head Office 
before refusing a customer a refund.  TGM's were encouraged to personally visit 534
customers who complained about poor service received in one of the shops.  535
Price promotion, salesmanship and customer service were complementary: 
promotion of the non-price regulated products drove footfall into the store and 
salesmanship and customer service converted the footfall into paying customers - 
particularly important for the price regulated products.
 The questions were part of a memo sent to TGM’s: “TGM Duties”. It is undated but 528
probably produced in the 1930’s as there is reference to a 1934 legal act. BTC A 89/33.
 Memo 28 January 1932 (BTC A 129/7 - Various Memo’s TGM’s).529
 BTC 461 - Statistical Books. In 1939, 15 of the 43 schedules related to sales.530
 The Bee July 1922; BTC 314/4 - Peat Marwick Mitchell Report Part II..531
 The exception was a profit earnings bonus introduced in 1955 - see section on 532
motivating employees below.
 Report by J Walter Thompson, September 1929 (BTC A 48/1 Market Research 533
Report).
 The Bee, July 1925.534
 Memo 17 November 1930 (BTC A 129/7 - Various Memo’s TGM’s).535
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As noted above, sales volume had been a central focus for Jesse Boot but not the 
only one. Furthermore, analysis of the drivers of profit growth in the 1920's and 
1930's show that improvements in gross margin were the biggest contributor to 
overall profit growth.  However, even if margin growth was a specific objective of 536
the business, it was couched in terms of sales growth in communications. Sales 
volume allowed the business to secure supplier discounts but profit was also 
boosted by the sales of 'own-goods' which earned margins 16 percentage points 
higher than proprietary brands.  While the priority was overall sales growth, staff 537
were reminded about the importance of selling ‘own goods’. A 1923 article in The 
Bee explained the importance of ‘own goods’ and ran a competition across stores 
on ‘own goods sales.’  In 1930, the store manger bonus was adjusted to include 538
an ‘own good’ element (although conditional on overall store sales growth).  This 539
was extended to the store staff commission scheme in 1936.  The introduction of 540
the company staff discount scheme in 1952 offered twice the discount for own 
goods compared to proprietary goods.  Other than 'own-goods' sales, however, 541
margin was rarely mentioned in communication with stores.
Costs were also an immediate focus of the post-acquisition business and 
Greenwood aggressively reduced costs by cutting salaries and other controllable 
expenses.  In The Bee, he also reminded employees of the importance of 542
generating 'profitable' sales: “It has been said at Managers’ meetings that any fool 
can increase sales if he has unlimited stocks and expenses to do it with.”  543
 Gross margin grew from 39.6% in 1922 to 48.5% in 1940. Gross profit defined as sales 536
less cost of goods and direct labour. 1922 was the earliest year that it was recorded in the 
Statistical Book. BTC 461 - Statistical Books 1923/24 to 1941.
 In 1939, own brands had an average margin of 61% compared to 45% on proprietary 537
toiletries, the highest proprietary margin. Report on Boots Pure Drug Company Limited 
Accounts for the Year Ended 31 March 1939, 6. Internal document unreferenced.
 The Bee, June 1923. The competition was repeated in May 1925.538
 BTC A 129/7 - Various Memo’s TGM’s, 4 February 1930.539
 BTC 780/5 - Sales and Increased Sales Bonus Scheme (1 March 1936).540
 BTC 456/6 - General Benevolent Fund, Other Funds and Sundry letters.541
 Chapman, Jesse Boot, 150.542
 The Bee, January 1922.543
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However, the focus on costs and stocks differed from sales - while there was a 
clear objective to maximise sales, costs and stocks only needed to be controlled. 
And, where this control was delegated to store managers, it was achieved through 
cost to sales ratios which recognised the close links between sales and costs (see 
section on 'Measures'). Expenses and net profit, therefore, did not get the same 
focus as sales in communications with stores, in the measures of performance and 
in the reward mechanisms. Even in 1960, a store training programme belatedly 
stated that “the company was coming to think more and more in terms of profit.”544
In PMM literature, one of the central roles of a PMM system is to communicate the 
objectives of the firm thereby aligning all levels in the organisation with all strategic 
objectives. Field studies suggest that although PMM systems are successful in 
communicating the objectives, they are less successful in helping employees 
understand the relationship between different objectives.  At Boots, it was 545
simpler. Throughout the period there was one dominant objective despite changes 
in the external environment and despite the frustration expressed sometimes by 
senior management. In 1966, the Managing Director conceded that “regrettably, 
when it comes to the pinch many of our people still react in the traditional Boots 
way of sales at any price.”  However, the singularity of the objective had certain 546
advantages. Its simplicity helped ensure a consistent message across a 
geographically spread workforce and its breadth gave some flexibility to store 
managers on how the growth could be achieved - salesmanship, customer 
service, a focus on 'own-label' products and in-store merchandising.
Organisational Structure
This section will consider how Boots structured its organisation and whether this 
was consistent with the objectives. The section should also, based on the 
framework, consider how the structures changed over the period. Following 
Chandler and as outlined in Chapter 1, organisation structures are expected to 
 BTC A 57/16 - Managers’ Course Reportage (8 February 1960).544
 Franco-Santos et al., Contemporary; Bititci et al. Challenges.545
 BTC A 49/3 - Memorandum on the Peat Report by the MD (FA Cockfield) Nov. 1966.546
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change as strategy and the external environment change.  In this sense, PMM 547
systems are considered dynamic. However, Boots acknowledged in 1967 that 
there had been little change in their structures since 1920 and subsequently 
announced that they had commissioned a review by Peat Marwick Mitchell and 
Co.  The section will therefore consider the structure introduced in the early 548
1920's and highlight which features still existed in 1967. It will conclude with an 
analysis of the report by Peat Marwick and what their comments, and Boots' 
response, tell us about how the firm was structured to manage performance.
According to Greenwood's memoirs and a 1959 speech given by Arthur Cockfield, 
Finance Director, Jesse Boot had run the business with little formal structure and 
relied upon his direct involvement to maintain control.  Even if this was 549
hyperbole, the sources suggest that the business went through a major 
restructuring in the early 1920's and that the resultant organisation structure was 
modelled on the American companies retail operations. After the acquisition, 
Liggett appointed George Gales as Managing Director of Boots. Although Gales 
remained the Managing Director of Liggetts' retail operations in the US, he 
regularly visited Britain.  Immediately after his appointment, he toured the UK, 550
visiting branches and speaking to managers.  Gales was a strong advocate of 551
organisation and told store managers that “the greatest asset we have is 
organisation, greater in value than all the other assets combined.”  Three British 552
directors also toured the US (John Boot, Greenwood and HR Gillespie) in Autumn 
1920 to understand Liggett’s system of management.  Soon after, three of the 553
 Chandler, Strategy and Structure.547
 "Boots Pure Drug Company Limited" The Financial Times [London, England], June 16, 548
1967. Web.
 Greenwood, Cap; “The Development and Organisation of Boots Pure Drug Company 549
Ltd” - an address to LSE March 1959 by Cockfield (unreferenced).
 Chapman's review of the minutes notes Gales' attendance (Notes written by Chapman, 550
unreferenced); The Bee also recorded some visits: Feb. 1923, Mar. 1923, Mar. 1924.
 Memo from George Gales 5 August 1920 (BTC A 361/3 Memo’s re TGM’s).551
 The Bee February 1924. Article written by the Sales manager referring to a speech 552
given by George Gales to the Bristol Managers meeting in March 1923.
 BTC 3341/5 - Interview with Greenwood by Chapman (undated).553
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accountants also visited “to investigate American methods of business 
organisation.”  In 1922, The Bee described a restructuring that had lasted 18 554
months and resulted in “changes in method, some of them causing a good deal of 
trouble at the branches.”  The changes appear to have delivered immediate 555
benefits. In 1923, The Financial Times attributed the sharp increase in company 
profits to the organisational improvements: “The introduction of the American 
element has certainly done the company no harm. It has very much livened up the 
administration and has modernised executive methods.”  Over the following ten 556
years, the two business continued to learn from each other. Based on articles in 
The Bee, Boots managers visited the US regularly and American managers also 
toured British shops.  The Bee included extracts from its sister magazine in the 557
US, The Liggett Leader.  A letter written by a United Drug Executive in 1930 558
praising the contents of The Bee also suggests that it was read by senior 
managers in the US.559
The resulting structure was based on the belief that performance was dependent 
upon meeting the needs of the customers in each store. Store managers were 
given autonomy to meet local needs - they decided, for example, which products 
purchased by the central buyers to stock in their stores. It was still the case in 
1966.  Given their importance, the structure therefore sought to narrow the gap 560
between head office and the stores. A memo to Branch Managers explained why:
 Recollections of A Johnson, The Bee, June 1954.554
 The Bee, March 1922.555
 "Boots Pure Drug Report." Financial Times [London, England] 9 May 1923: 4. Web.556
 Gales visited a TGM Conference with the Liggett’s Vice President (The Bee Feb. 1923) 557
and spoke at managers meetings (The Bee Mar. 1923, Apr. 1924); Three Liggett’s TGM’s 
visited the UK in 1924 (The Bee, Feb. 1924); Three Boots TGM’s toured the US in 1921 
and two in 1923 (The Bee, Dec. 192, Jul 1923); In 1927, 12 Boots employees toured the 
US business (The Bee, Mar. 1927); An accountant visited in 1931 (The Bee, Jun. 1954).
 Throughout 1922, The Bee included selected articles from the Liggett Leader. It was 558
less regular thereafter.
 The Bee, Feb. 1922; Nov. 1922; Mar. 1928. The Bee, July 1930 included a letter from a 559
member of United Drug Executive explaining that he read every copy of the The Bee.
 BTC 314/4 - Peat Marwick Mitchell Report Part II.560
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“The very size of a business of this kind, and its scattered nature, makes it 
imperative that everything possible be done to promote contact and 
understanding between headquarters and branches, and that simple and 
direct methods be devised to get quick action and decision on important 
matters.”561
Figure 3.1 is a reconstruction of how the organisational structure may have looked 
in 1924. It is based on articles in The Bee, Statistical Books and memos written in 
the early 1920's. It shows the narrow reporting lines between a store manager and 
the Executive with only one tier of management between the two (the TGM) - 
consistent with the aim of maximising direct contact between store and directors. 
The other significant feature was the use of cross-functional committees to 
manage processes (e.g., pricing, merchandising). These committees were not 
profit accountable but managed as cost centres to support the performance of the 
individual stores.  Both the TGM and Committee structure still operated in 1967. 562
The roles of the directors, TGM and committee are explained in more detail below.
 Memo to Branch Manages, 5 August 1920 BTC A 361/3 Memo’s re TGM’s.561
 Profit was based on a standard margin (by department) in store. BTC 3341/5 - 562
Interview with Greenwood by Chapman (undated).
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Figure 3.1: Organisation Structure 1924
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The Board comprised a combination of permanent Executive members and 
members of the US parent company who visited the UK regularly. Below the 
Board, sat the Executive who represented the different functions within the 
organisation and comprised, principally, managers who had held senior positions 
before the American acquisition. The main exception was Greenwood who had 
been appointed by Jesse Boot in 1920 to bring an external perspective to the 
business.  Greenwood remained with the business until his retirement in 1953.  563 564
The Board was responsible for general issues of policy and for the financial 
oversight of the business while the Executive Committee was responsible for the 
actual conduct and management of the business.  BTC retained this structure 565
throughout the period.  Until 1961, the Chairman of the Board was also 566
Chairman of the Executive Committee but the roles were split in 1961. The 
Chairman was confined to the Board while the Managing Director sat on both.567
Reviewing the membership of the 1920 Executive Committee suggests it had a 
strong ‘performance’ bias. The seven members included the heads of both the 
Expense Control Department (Greenwood) and the Accounting Department 
(Gillespie).  Articles written in The Bee suggest that both Departments were 568
focused on the overall performance of the business and not just their own 
functional responsibilities. In an editorial in 1922 Greenwood challenged store 
managers with the headline “Are you making more profit for the Company” and in 
an accompanying article (“Why are we employed by Boots the Chemists”) 
stressed the importance of sales and gross profit before providing guidance to 
 Greenwood, Cap.563
 The Bee, June 1953.564
 “The Development and Organisation of Boots Pure Drug Company Ltd” - an address to 565
LSE March 1959 by Cockfield (unreferenced).
 Initially there were separate Retail and Manufacturing Executives but they merged in 566
1924. The business restructured in the late 1960's but it retained a separate Board and 
Executive Committee although the Executive Committee confined themselves to the retail 
activities (BTC A 49/4 Shaping Up for the Future - Boots New Management Organisation, 
1966).
 Handwritten note in margin of “The Development and Organisation of Boots Pure Drug 567
Company Ltd” - an address to LSE March 1959 by Cockfield (unreferenced).
 Notes from Chapman's review of the minute books (unreferenced)568
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managers on how they could improve productivity and reduce waste.  An article 569
authored by the Accounting Department in 1922 suggests they had a similar 
performance bias as they made it clear how “we are out to make the business as 
profitable as possible” through the provision of statistics supplied to the 
departments, territories and shops.  Reviewing reports written by them in the 570
1930's through to the mid-1950's suggest they retained a focus on analysing and 
interpreting performance through commentaries on performance supported by 
statistical analysis.  This suggest an active rather than passive approach to 571
managing performance and, with a focus on sales and margins, broader than 
expense control. Based on literature from the United States, this was still rare 
among controllers and emphasises the strong performance focus in the 
Executive.572
By 1966, both departments still existed but the sources suggest that they no 
longer retained the broad performance focus that they exercised in the 1920's and 
1930's. Neither of the heads sat on the Executive and a separate Management 
Accounting department had been established (also not on the Executive).  The 573
Peat Marwick report explained that the Chief Accountant was now primarily 
responsible for statutory reporting and Expense Control focused on store costs 
rather than the "encouragement of profits.”  To fill the gap, a new Management 574
Accounting department had been created in 1960. Its role was “the development 
of management information systems, for the production of management accounts 
 The Bee, January 1922.569
 The Bee, March 1922. (BTC 1167 - Final Accounts). There are no copies or references 570
to their reports after the mid-1950's.
 Reports included commentary with sophisticated statistical analysis using ratios to 571
focus on specific issues (e.g. 1932 - productivity of sales staff: BTC 345/2 ) or scenarios to 
highlight opportunities (e.g. 1950 - profit impact from improvements in 'own brand' 
percentage of sales: BTC 1167, 1950). 
 Mazur, Principles. Mazur, writing in the 1920's, was a strong advocate of accounting 572
departments taking a more active part in interpretation of statistics and overall 
management of the business. However, he argued in 1927 that this was still rare and 
contentious.
 Established in 1960 by Cockfield (BTC 314/4 - Peat Marwick Mitchell Report Part II.)573
 BTC 314/3 - Peat Marwick Mitchell: Report on Management Structure (Part I) 14 June 574
1966, 41.
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and for the interpretation of the information to management.”  These were, 575
however, the roles undertaken by the Accounting and Expense Control 
Departments in the 1920's and 1930's.  Even the generation of statistics was 576
dispersed across five departments as well as the ‘Statistical Department’.  The 577
Statistical Department did not even report into a Accounting Department but was 
instead part of Administrative Services which reported into the Executive through 
the Head Buyer.  It is not clear from the sources why they lost the performance 578
focus they previously had. It may reflect the fall-out between John Boot and 
Greenwood during negotiations to take back control of the business in 1933. 
According to Greenwood, John Boot largely ignored him thereafter and this may 
have led to a decline in his influence of the structures.579
Aside from managing their own departments, the members of the Executive sat 
with senior managers on cross-functional committees responsible for specific 
activities. Table 3.4 shows the committees in 1922 and 1966 and shows that there 
was little change. Other committee’s were created in the intervening years such as 
a Gross Profit Committee in 1932, a Sales Committee in 1935 and a Chemical 
Cost Committee in 1946 but there is no record of them in 1966 suggesting that the 
Committee system was used to resolve short term issues as well as on-going 
activities.  580
 BTC 314/4 - Peat Marwick Mitchell Report Part II., 90.575
 The archives include a number of statistical packs created in the 1920’s and 1930’s 576
covering individual store performance as well as the overall performance of the business 
produced by the Departments. See ‘Measures’ section below.
 BTC A 48/5 Investigation into Administrative Procedures February 1959.577
 BTC 314/3 - Peat Marwick Mitchell Report Part I, 42.578
 BTC 3341/5 - Interview between Greenwood and Chapman (undated).579
 BTC 345/2 Expenses Report (1932); The Bee, June 1935; BTC A 48/3 Accounting 580
Procedure and Costing System for the Chemical Department 1946.
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Territorial General Managers
Also reporting into the Executive, as a collective, were the Territorial General 
Managers (TGM’s). They were the only tier of management between a shop and 
the Executive. The TGM was a new role created in 1920 and a direct copy of the 
Liggett system.  Previously a senior store manager had overseen smaller local 581
stores, his role primarily operational. Head Office control was also maintained 
through ‘inspectors’, who visited stores to check on operational compliance and 
‘auditors’, who counted stock.  The new role was quite different - its primary 582
function was not control but improving performance and was arguably the core 
performance oriented role in the new structure as it linked the only profit centres in 
the organisation (the store and the Executive). The role reflected a concern 
expressed to Gales on his tour of the country, that store managers did not have 
Table 3.4: Committees 1922 and 1966
1922 1966
Name Responsibility Name Responsibility
Merchandise 
Committee
New Lines Merchandise 
Committee
Development of 
own goods sold 























Development of all 
properties
Sources: The Bee, April 1922; BTC 314/4 - Peat Marwick Mitchell Report Part II. There is little 
description of the activities of the Committee’s in 1922. 
 Memo to Branch Managers,  5 August 1920 BTC A 361/3 Memo’s re TGM’s.581
 The Bee, August 1922582
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sufficient information “to get the maximum results.”  As Greenwood later recalled 583
“That [appointment of TGM] was a very big thing, because a lot of the managers 
had never seen anyone from Nottingham for years and years."  And, their 584
importance in the business was emphasised by them reporting directly into the 
Executive - the complications of up to 39 people reporting into the Executive offset 
by the advantages of narrow reporting lines. In 1967, they still reported directly into 
the Executive.
The TGM role had two essential components. The first was knowledge transfer. 
TGM’s, through their own experience, were expected to coach store managers, 
questioning them on both operations (“Can you wrap a parcel. Do it.”) and selling 
(“Are you a salesman?”) They were to encourage managers to look outwards, 
challenging them on whether they knew the size of the local population, the 
average earnings of the local community and the make up of local industry.  An 585
article in a new internal magazine in the 1960's suggests their role had changed 
little. They still challenged store managers on how to drive sales and volume, to 
control expenses and to question the managers on their knowledge of technical 
matters such as pharmacy and of local retail patterns.  Knowledge transfer was 586
also upwards to Head Office and the Executive. Each TGM wrote a weekly report 
to the Chairman.  A TGM representative was invited to join the weekly Executive 587
meetings from 1924 because:
“it is the desire of the Executive Committee to keep in even closer contact 
with the Retail Branches than in the past, and it has been decided the best 
way to do this would be to arrange for one of the General Managers, who is 
 Memo to Branch Managers, 5 August 1920 BTC A 361/3.583
 BTC 3341/5 - Interview with Greenwood by Chapman (undated).584
 The questions were part of a memo sent to TGM’s titled “TGM Duties”. It is undated but 585
probably produced in the 1930’s as there is reference to a 1934 legal act (BTC A 89/33 - 
Role of the Territorial General Managers).
 “The Manager and his TGM” The Leader, third edition. Not dated but there were 586
references to the 1960’s (BTC A 92 - The Leader).
 BTC A 89/33 - Role of the Territorial General Managers587
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in direct working contact with a Territory, to be present at each meeting of 
the Executive Committee.”  588
TGM’s were also encouraged to hold “frequent meetings of Branch managers, to 
discuss matters pertaining to the progress of the business and to invite to those 
meetings various Directors and representatives from headquarters so as to still 
further promote contact and understanding.”  The Executive attended the annual 589
TGM conference in 1922.  TGM conferences continued through the 1960’s 590
where “he will hear a good deal about what the Board is expecting, the Sales 
Department is programming….. Equally he is passing back what retail is 
thinking.”  It is not clear if they attended Executive meetings in the 1960’s but 591
each of them continued to submit a weekly report to the Executive.592
The second significant component of the TGM role was to lead the store 
managers he was responsible for and to identify the right successors - “his most 
important duties deal with men and women, customers and staff.”  When new 593
appointments to TGM were announced in The Bee, it was often their leadership 
qualities which were highlighted:
“The ability to develop a staff and by personal contact to get the best out of 
each member has been a very strong point with Mr Cook and it is that 
quality of staff leadership, allied to his merchandising ability, which has 
marked him out for the well merited promotion.”594
 Memo to TGM’s dated 31 April 1924. BTC A 361/3 Memo’s re TGM’s. It is not clear 588
from the sources whether this arrangement continued throughout the period.
 Memo to Branch Manages 5 August 1920 BTC A 361/3 Memo’s re TGM’s.589
 The Bee, December 1922.590
 “The Manager and his TGM.” (BTC A 92 - The Leader).591
 BTC 314/4 - Peat Marwick Mitchell Report Part II.592
 BTC A 89/33 - Role of the Territorial General Managers.593
 The Bee, May 1931.594
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The role changed little over the period. The span of control remained the same so 
that as store numbers increased, the number of TGM’s also increased.  595
However, by 1966, a TGM was supported by two secretaries, a Territory staff 
trainer, four display staff and a group of branch relief staff.  For the then 596
Managing Director, FA Cockfield, who only joined the business in 1952, “the 
creation of the TGM role was was one of the most effective and enduring 
contributions they [Liggett’s] made to the management structure of the 
business.”  Cockfield did not explain why but from a PMM perspective, the 597
importance given to them reflects the belief  that to deliver the performance, the 
stores and the directors needed to be as closely connected as possible. It is a 
principle which is echoed throughout the PMM processes described in later 
sections.
Change?
On the surface, the organisational structure in the late 1960's closely resembled 
the 1920’s structure. There was still a Board, an Executive Committee and cross 
functional committees to manage certain activities. TGM’s still reported directly into 
the Executive and largely fulfilled the same role. However, reviewing the structures 
suggests that it was were not operating as effectively as in the 1920's and 1930's. 
The Executive now included 11 people and the performance bias evident in the 
1920's had been lost with no representative from any of the accounting and 
finance departments and no Financial Director. There were also concerns about 
dysfunctional behaviours at Board level.  Although not explicitly stated, this may 598
 Each TGM, on average, was responsible for 32 stores in 1924 and 33 stores in 1966. 595
Statistical Books 1923/24 to 1941; BTC 314/4 - Peat Marwick Mitchell Report Part II.
 BTC 314/4 - Peat Marwick Mitchell Report Part II.596
 Cockfield did not have a retail background and was relatively new to the business. 597
“The Development and Organisation of Boots Pure Drug Company Ltd” - an address to 
LSE March 1959 by Cockfield (unreferenced).
 “Boots the evolution of a Modern Business”, Stanley Chapman (unpublished). A draft 598
argues that the Board operated dysfunctionally but Chapman does not reference his 
sources.
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explain why the directors consequently commissioned Peat Marwick Mitchell in 
1965 to undertake a review of the organisation structure.599
Peat's review was wide ranging and they were critical of all aspects of the head 
office organisational structure. From a performance management perspective, 
they were particularly critical of the various finance and accounting departments 
which seemed to work independently of each other (see above). Boots accepted 
the findings about the finance structure and accepted the recommendation for 
consolidation of the various activities under a Finance Director. Cockfield, 
commented that “the appointment of a Financial Director would be more valuable 
than the whole of the rest of the Peat’s report put together.”600
More controversially, Peat's made wider recommendations which challenged some 
of the underlying principles which had underpinned the performance management 
structures over the last 40 years. Retail had changed since the 1920’s, they 
argued, it had become more centralised due to the development of advanced 
techniques.  They argued that Boots suffered because they had failed to adapt - 601
problems of 'a small firm grown big.'  Recommendations followed two principles. 602
Firstly, they believed that the directors needed to cascade accountability to head 
office managers through the creation of a divisional structure. Directors would 
focus on longer term plans while operational responsibility should be pushed down 
onto each senior manager through clear objectives which could be measured. 
Their second recommendation was increased centralisation of decision making. 
The retail division would be primarily an administrative function responsible for the 
administration of the shops and the provision and control of merchandise supplied 
to the shops. Regionally, TGM’s would report into Regional Shop Controllers who 
would assume some of the Head Office administrative functions. TGM’s would 
 BTC 314/4 - Peat Marwick Mitchell Report Part II.599
 That Cockfield, as Managing Director, Deputy Chairman of the Board and previously 600
Finance Director, could not recruit a Finance Director hints at the divisions within the 
Board (BTC A 49/3 - Memorandum on the Peat Report by the MD (FA Cockfield) 
November 1966).
 BTC 314/3 - Peat Marwick Mitchell Report Part I, 40.601
 BTC 314/4 - Peat Marwick Mitchell Report Part II, 2. Boots could have challenged 602
whether they were really a small firm in 1920.
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become Territorial General Inspectors ensuring compliance with Head Office 
decisions. Ironically, and perhaps unknown to Peat's, TGM's had been created in 
1920 to replace the existing compliance focused 'Inspectors.'603
Cockfield wrote a 60 page response to the Peat's report.  He was highly critical 604
of these two recommendations but it was not a simple plea for preservation of the 
status quo. Cockfield was unique among the Executives as he had joined the firm 
as a member of the Executive straight from the Inland Revenue and did not have a 
background in retail.  He had been brought in as an agent of change and took an 605
academic approach to business referencing trends in the wider business 
environment in speeches and reports.  Indeed Chapman quotes Cockfield’s view 606
of Boots in the 1950’s as "a place of intellectual atrophy with a homegrown 
management quite unaware of outside business practice."  He recognised, 607
however, that Peat's recommendations undermined the principles which Boots had 
followed in managing performance over the last 40 years and would damage their 
ability to manage their future performance. His views, therefore, help illustrate 
what Boots thought were the key elements of their performance management 
structure.
Cockfield was wary of divisionalisation and the delegation of accountability and 
responsibility. He recognised the difficulties of creating divisions when all parts of 
the business were so dependent upon each other. He was particularly critical of 
the idea proposed by Peat's, that all of the separate strands of the organisation 
should only come together at the 'Top Management Committee' level. For him 
there needed to be constant linkages throughout the structure.608
 Memo 1924, BTC A 361/3 Memo’s re TGM’s.603
 BTC A 49/3 - Memorandum on the Peat Report by the MD (FA Cockfield) November 604
1966.
 Biography, The Bee, June 1960.605
 “The Development and Organisation of Boots Pure Drug Company Ltd” - an address to 606
LSE March 1959 by Cockfield (unreferenced); BTC A 49/3.
 “Boots the evolution of a Modern Business”, Stanley Chapman, 7.607
 BTC A 49/3, 4.608
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“The truth is that none of our “Divisions” can be truly independent nor can 
they be fully “accountable in terms of profit”. They are on the contrary 
intimately dependent upon one another. This must be recognised: it must 
be constantly present in our thinking; and it must be reflected in the pattern 
and procedures of the organisation we set up.”  609
It was a view which could equally have been expressed in the 1920’s. Gales may 
have argued that accountability and responsibility for performance was clear - it 
sat with the store managers who were directly responsible for bringing together all 
of the resources and ideas of the business to serve the local customer needs. 
Head Office departments were there to support the shops rather than pursue their 
own, narrower objectives. Structures had to be created to ensure the maximum 
amount of contact between these areas and to ensure the best result for the 
overall business.
Cockfield’s other concern was the proposed centralisation of decision making and 
the conversion of the TGM role to that of an inspector. In 1959, Cockfield had 
argued that “the organisation is an interesting and possibly paradoxical example of 
great centralisation coupled with a large degree of local autonomy” - the benefits 
of central buying and supply combined with local autonomy on stock selection and 
where to direct sales.  This created, in Cockfield’s view, a highly flexible 610
organisation which had tried to avoid rigid lines of responsibility. In such a 
structure, the TGM role was critical in providing the link between HO and the 
shops which ensured the flow of knowledge between the two. He supported the 
current number of TGM’s (the same ratio as 1924) but recognised that this was too 
many to report into the Managing Director. He proposed Area Directors to act as 
span breakers between stores and the Executive. Meanwhile, TGM’s would 
remain as managers rather than inspectors. While Cockfield was to leave soon 
 BTC A 49/3, 20.609
 “The Development and Organisation of Boots Pure Drug Company Ltd” - an address to 610
LSE March 1959 by Cockfield (unreferenced).
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after, it was his views on the TGM's and not those of Peat's which prevailed. They 
still prevail today.611
The exchange between the two went to the heart of how performance should be 
managed at Boots. As Cockfield acknowledged, the Peat's proposals were 
consistent with the then current trends towards divisionalisation and delegation of 
accountability and responsibility.  Cockfield's response was a defence of the 612
principles that had underpinned the Boots system since its creation but also a 
recognition of how far they had strayed from some of those principles in 
practice.  613
The exchange mirrors debates that continue in the PMM literature today. One can 
interpret PMM frameworks and balanced scorecards as mechanisms to improve 
the effectiveness of the type of divisional structure and delegated levels of 
accountability that Peat's were suggesting. As outlined in earlier chapters, PMM 
systems help communicate organisational objectives, align different parts of the 
business behind those objectives and provides data on whether the objectives are 
being met. However, there have been challenges to such mechanistic approaches 
which, it is argued, cannot capture the patterns of relationships that connect the 
complex structures that exist within a business. Performance is the outcome of a 
set of complex interactions between people, products, processes and 
environment, among other things. To understand performance, it is necessary to 
observe it where these interactions combine to produce the product or the service 
- the production line or the shop floor. Johnson describes it as 'going to the place' 
to see for yourself.  Mintzberg expresses similar views albeit in more colourful 614
 Boots subsequently implemented a from of divisional structure in the 1970’s, but it was 611
a much diluted version of the Peat's recommendations. Although manufacturing was 
separated into a new division, retail was maintained in much of its existing format. TGM’s 
retained their managerial role although regional directors were introduced to reduce the 
number of direct reports of the Executive Committee. Knowledge of the current system is 
based on the author's own experience of working in the business.
 BTC A 49/3, 4.612
 He was particularly critical of the disjointed delivery of statistical information and lack of 613
analytical support. 
 Johnson, Lean Dilemma, 8.614
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language as he stresses the need for senior management to get much closer to 
'the ground'.  615
Gales' explanation of the 1920's structure and Cockfield's defence of the 1966 
structure are more consistent with the latter perspectives: narrow reporting lines 
between Executive and store and all support functions working towards a common 
objective rather than operate in functional silo's or hierarchical 'slabs'.  It is an 616
idea which contrasts with much of the current PMM guidelines but it is an idea 
retailers are returning to - Wal-mart recently removed a layer of regional 
management. Explaining the decision, the Chief Executive reminded financial 
analysts in June 2015 that “there are no cash registers in Head Office” as he 
stressed the need to work more closely with the stores.  As Forbes noted “direct 617
reporting will certainly allow for more initiatives and flexibility in the company… I 
also believe that the company is returning to its heritage and empowers its store 
management to respond to local demands.”  618
Processes 
The next sections review the performance management processes operated by 
Boots over the period. Three broad groups of processes are analysed: those that 
focus on future performance (planning, targeting, forecasting), those that focus on 
evaluation of performance and finally, those that focus on motivating and 
rewarding performance.
 Mintzberg has consistently argued that directors need to spend more time with 615
employees and observe first-hand how the business is operating, e.g. Mintzberg, 
Musings; Managing; on management.
 Mintzberg refers to both silo's and slabs as problems of modern hierarchies. Mintzberg, 616
Enough of Silos. See also Tett, Silo Effect, which highlights the negative consequences of 
organisational silo's.
 Reuters 2 October 2015: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-wal-mart-stores-layoffs-617
idUSKCN0RW1I220151002
 Forbes 4 may 2015:  http://www.forbes.com/sites/walterloeb/2015/05/04/walmarts-618
management-changes-indicate-important-new-direction-for-u-s-stores/#b3912d5b55c2
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Planning for the future: strategic planning, budgeting, forecasting and 
targeting
In PMM, the strategy and long-term planning help ensure the objectives of the 
organisation are translated into activities. This section will explore the processes 
that Boots used to plan for the future, if any, and consider how these were 
converted into measurable targets or budgets.
The first corporate plan was presented in 1978 although, as the introduction to the 
plan explained, “The Boots Company Limited (the Group) has in effect had a 
corporate plan for many years, although it has never existed as a single document. 
Before 1970 discussions on corporate planning between executive directors were 
largely informal.”  619
While there are no references to even informal plans in the archives, the actions 
taken by the business between 1920 and 1970 suggest that the business was 
following, at the least, broad long-term principles consistent with their objectives of 
growing sales and improving gross margin. This strategy changed over time. 
Before 1950, they focused heavily on developing their 'own brand' capability. 
Reviewing capital expenditure shows that although they continued to open new 
stores throughout the period, they invested heavily in factory and plant in the early 
1930's.  In 1927, they started work on a new factory in Nottingham which was 620
completed in 1933.  This increased both the range of products exclusive to 621
themselves (such as the cosmetics brand No. 7 launched in 1935) and the volume 
of own-brand goods.  Focus on production continued after the war: another plant 622
was opened in Airdrie in 1950 and and there was further investment in the 
 BTC 2555/1 The Corporate Plan 1978 (October).619
 In 1932 they spent £56,299 of capital acquiring retail properties but £333,585 on the 620
new Nottingham factory (BTC 345/2 - Expense Report 12 months ended march 31st 
1932); BTC 1167 - Final Accounts.
 The Bee, July 1933.621
 Manufacturing sales to retail grew 50% from £1.6 million in 1929 to £2.4 million in 1939 622
while shop sales only grew 29% (BTC 1167 - Final Accounts)
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Nottingham production facilities.  After 1950, focus shifted back to growing sales 623
volume. In an address to the LSE, Cockfield explained that from 1950, partly 
reflecting the lifting of building constraints, investment had switched back to 
growing sales volume with 66% of projected capital allocated to modernisation and 
expansion of the existing shops.  Cockfield explained to the Financial Times in 624
1960: “What we hope to achieve is to double the total sales area of our shops 
within the next 10 years.”  The acquisition of Timothy Whites business in 1968, 625
was consistent with a policy of expanding sales area albeit through more shops.
At a local level, at least from the 1930's, guidance for TGM's shows that they were 
also encouraged to think about the future of their stores, to identify "new sites", 
"plan for shops individually" and to "try new ideas."  In doing so, they were 626
required to consider their mix of customers, the local economy and competition. 
However, any 'planning' was informal and there are no references to formal plans 
in the archives. However, by the 1960's, even as the business started to think 
about centralised planning processes, there was still a focus on local planning. A 
speech given by Cockfield in 1967 explained to the TGM's that central planning 
was limited and they needed to set objectives and to translate them into a specific 
operating plan for the year: 
"In a business such as ours, the detailed operational decisions are taken in 
the individual branch and in the individual territory. It is only you and your 
managers who really know in sufficient detail precisely what goes on and 
only you therefore who can identify the improvements which can be made 
and ensure that they are made.”627
 "Boots Pure Drug Company." Financial Times [London, England] 21 July 1950: 6. 623
Financial Times. Web.
 “The Development and Organisation of Boots Pure Drug Company Ltd” - an address to 624
LSE March 1959 by Cockfield (unreferenced)
 "Boots' Big Rebuilding Plan." Financial Times [London, England] 12 Feb. 1960: [1]. 625
Financial Times. Web. 17 July 2016.
 BTC A 89/33 - Role of the Territorial General Managers. (Undated but probably the 626
1930’s).
 Speech at TGM conference 22 February 1967. BTC A 129/8 - Briefings to Senior 627
Managers
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The approach was consistent with the structures described in the previous section 
which placed each store at the forefront of the firm's overall performance.
At a company level, Boots use of budgets and forecasts evolved over time and 
they were relatively slow to introduce practices already being used by retailers in 
the United States by the end of the 1920's.  There are no references in the 628
sources to budgets until 1966. Chapman argues that Savage would not touch 
budgetary control and he retired in 1961.   However it is not clear why. The 629
Peats report shows that by 1966, budgeting was well established with the Expense 
Control Department responsible for administering the store budgets and the 
Management Accounting Department managing the main Head Office 
departments and the consolidated budget.630
While Boots did not prepare formal budgets until the 1960’s, they used ‘standards’ 
for particular expenses and occasionally used targets for sales promotions or 
competitions. From the early 1920’s to the late 1960's, stores managed to a salary 
standard set by headquarters.  Managers were expected to keep within the 631
standard and TGM's monitored compliance but they were not linked to managers' 
bonus. The business also created stock standards at the start of the 1920’s and 
these were still operational in the 1960's. These were created in Head Office 
based on existing warehouse and store stock levels and monthly sales.  The 632
process still gave some discretion to store managers; the overall value of the stock 
was fixed but store managers decided the mix of products.
 Mazur, Principles; McNair, Retail Distribution.628
 “Boots the evolution of a Modern Business”, Stanley Chapman (7). Unpublished draft. 629
The statement was not referenced by Chapman.
 BTC 314/4 - Peat Marwick Mitchell Report Part II; BTC A 49/4 Shaping Up for the 630
Future - Boots New Management Organization 1966.
 The Bee March 1923; BTC 314/4 - Peat Marwick Mitchell Report Part II.631
 The Bee, February 1922; BTC 784/3 Stock Management - a paper from the Staff 632
Training Dept 1958; memo dated 6 February 1961 BTC 450/10 - Training Notes of Miss M 
Waterhouse.
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There was also limited use of sales targets at a store level. In the early 1920's, 
stores used daily targets and monitored performance using a barometer on display 
in the store.  There was also widespread use of targets (or quota’s) for in-store 633
competitions. These were set in Head Office and allocated to the stores who were 
encouraged to break these down into daily targets for the duration of the 
competition/ promotion.  However, like cost standards, sales targets were local 634
and similarly were not consolidated.
Based upon the review of the planning processes, Boots were slow to develop 
formal plans and it was only in the 1960's that budgets were introduced and only in 
the 1970's that their first strategic plan was produced. However, based upon the 
actions that they took and comments in memos, there were informal processes at 
both Head Office and also locally in stores throughout most of the period. 
Unfortunately, it is not clear whether the failure to develop formal plans was a 
deliberate policy or inertia. Chapman commented that Savage would not touch 
budgetary control which suggests at least a reluctance to develop formal 
processes but it is not clear why he was against them.  
Evaluation
This section considers both the formal and informal processes the organisation 
used to evaluate the performance of individuals, stores and the business as a 
whole. It will also consider the extent to which evaluations were primarily objective 
or subjective.
Greenwood argues that prior to the American acquisition, Jesse Boot had been 
frustrated by the amount of financial information available and the time it took to 
obtain it.  Based on a review of statistical records and references in The Bee, by 635
 The Bee, October 1922.633
 The Bee, September 1923.634
 Greenwood, Cap.635
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the early 1920's Boots was already producing a wide range of statistics.  Every 636
Tuesday, the previous week's sales results were prepared showing the sales split 
by category and customer numbers.  A monthly profit statement was also 637
produced as well as “innumerable statistics which are prepared for the help of all 
the people who are engaged in producing the profit.”  The business also 638
produced quarterly and annual summaries of performance throughout the period. 
An annual ‘Statistical Pack’ was published every year from 1925 to 1969 and 
there were also various quarterly and annual summaries produced from the 1920's 
to the 1960's more focused on the financial results.639
The weekly report was analysed by the Executive at 4.00pm every Tuesday. The 
timing was dictated by the availability of consolidated information from the 
Accounting Department.  No copies of the report are available and there are no 640
minutes of the meeting but both the timing and attendees suggest its principal 
purpose was to discuss performance - a TGM attended the Executive Committee 
meeting and TGMs were required to submit a weekly report on general matters in 
their territory as well as specific comments on the stores they had visited.  The 641
Executive Committee continued to meet weekly throughout the period, bringing 
forward the timing of the meeting as the data became available earlier - by 1960 it 
 Recollections of A Johnson, The Bee, June 1954. Collation and reporting of statistics 636
were based on the American practices. Johnson visited the United States with two 
colleagues in 1922.
 The Bee, July 1922.637
 The Bee, March 1922638
 BTC 461 - Statistical Books 1923/24 to 1941 and BTC BTC 462 - Statistical Books 639
1942 to 1969. (See section on 'Measures'); BTC 345/2 - Expense Report 12 months 
ended march 31st 1932 and BTC 359/3 (1930); BTC 1167 - Final Accounts. Comprises (1) 
year-end management accounts of the business between 1927 and 1955. Primarily 
quantitative with commentaries providing interpretation and (2) Report on the Accounts - 
quarterly commentaries of which only a few are in the archives (1936 to 1953)
 The Bee, July 1922. In the week described, only 27 stores were late (out of 650)640
 Copies of the reports are not in at the archives but guidance for the 1920's lists a wide 641
range to topics to include -  general housekeeping issues (cleanliness of the shop, general 
appearance), quality of merchandising (review window, interior and special displays), 
quality of staff, trading and local competition.  BTC A 89/33 - Role of the Territorial General 
Managers.
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was Monday afternoon and by 1966, they met at noon on the Monday.  They 642
also continued to receive the weekly TGM report.  643
Beyond the weekly Executive Committee meetings, there are few references to 
monthly/ quarterly/ annual meetings where performance may have been formally 
evaluated.  Performance was not discussed in the monthly Executive meetings 
which instead focused on merchandise reviews, real estate investments, 
appointments, promotions and salaries.  In the 1960's, the Peat Marwick report 644
makes no reference to monthly/ quarterly Executive Committee meetings. Peat’s 
were also critical of the performance reviews that took place in the various 
committee’s where reviews took place infrequently if at all.  This presents a 645
paradox: the business produced extensive statistical data and its structures helped 
ensure the flow of performance information but it is not clear when they were 
reviewed. It could have been at the weekly performance review meeting or 
completed on a more informal basis - the archives are not clear.
For evaluating the individual performance of store managers, Boots had formal 
processes from at least 1922. Personnel records of store managers show that on 
every store visit, Head Office managers included comments about the 
performance of the manager in a ‘log’. With three to four entries a year in the 
1920’s (but fewer in the 1930’s and 1940’s), it was relatively easy to monitor the 
progress of the manager over several years. There was no structure to the 
comments and they could range from a few words to several sentences. Two 
examples from one store manager's file are included below.646
 BTC A 57/16 - Managers’ Course Reportage (8 February 1960); BTC 314/4 - Peat 642
Marwick Mitchell: Report on Management Structure (Part II) 14 June 1966.
 BTC 314/4 - Peat Marwick Mitchell: Report on Management Structure (Part II) 14 June 643
1966.
 Explanation of the purpose of the Executive monthly meeting by Gales, August 1920. 644
Notes from Chapman's review of the minute books (BTC Archives - unreferenced).
 The performance of new lines was only discussed after one year and the profitability of 645
promoting were not reviewed at all (BTC 314/4 - Peat Marwick Mitchell Report Part II.).
 BTC 298 - Personnel file of Mr Steer.646
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“Do not think he is very strong. Rather young [he was 25] but of good 
appearance. I think some working class experience would be valuable to him. 
Seems very keen but doubt if he would be inclined to suffer much 
inconvenience.” Mr Greenwood (1925).
“Nice type of manager - of good appearance and nicely spoken. Has done well 
at this branch. Takings somewhat down and appeared worried. Concluded that 
now he was really up against his own figures he was not thinking sufficiently 
about the business. Not merchandising his quick sellers.” Mr Lee (1932).
Copies of the “Annual Staff Report” in the 1940's, show that staff were graded 
across 16 categories by their manager. Managers used the same form but it was 
completed by the TGM. All the measures were subjective reflecting objectives of 
the organisation (Sales Ability), operational competence (Display Work, Organising 
Ability) and personal qualities (Loyalty, Reliability, Enthusiasm).647
Based upon personnel files, managers due promotion worked for a TGM over 
several months. TGM's commented on their performance in their weekly report to 
the Executive.  The process was broadly unchanged in the 1960’s.  While the 648 649
personnel files show considerable subjective feedback over many years there 
were no statistics (financial or otherwise) on the performance of the shops that the 
manager had run. This is despite the breadth of statistics available. Boots 
appeared to place operational excellence ahead of financial performance achieved 
when deciding on the capability of prospective TGM’s.
The formal performance evaluation processes were supplemented by informal 
processes. In the 1960's, TGM’s visited each of their stores at least once a 
month.  It is not clear how often they visited before that but guidance issued to 650
them in the 1930's suggests that they spent most of their time visiting their 
 BTC 298 - Personnel file of Mr Steer.647
 BTC 298 - Personnel file of Mr Steer.648
 BTC 314/4 - Peat Marwick Mitchell Report Part II.649
 BTC 314/4 Peat Marwick Mitchell Report Part II.650
 166
stores.  Their feedback went to Head Office and to the store managers. As well 651
as providing feedback while visiting the shop, they also wrote to the shop manager 
after a visit. Figure 3.2 shows an example of such a letter in The Bee. While 
clearly meant as a joke, it highlights the focus on performance rather than control.
Figure 3.2: Extract from The Bee: Suggested Weekly Letter from a TGM 652
 BTC A 89/33 - Role of the Territorial General Managers651
 The Bee, March 1928.652
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Based on the entries in the logs on the personnel files of the store managers, 
directors and senior managers also visited each branch at least three times a year 
in the 1920’s.  John Boot claimed to have visited more than 500 stores over just 653
a few months in 1922.  During the annual ‘October Cup’ store competition, a 654
director could visit more than 100 stores in the month.  While these visits may 655
have appeared relatively infrequent from a store manager perspective, when 
replicated across 1,000 shops, they represented a significant investment in 
understanding performance. The personnel records suggest fewer store visits by 
senior managers to each store in the 1930’s and 1940’s (although there were a lot 
more stores) and there are few references to store visits by senior management in 
the post war sources. 
The insights from these visits represented a considerable body of qualitative 
knowledge on the performance of the store, the manager and the employees. An 
article written by a TGM in March 1936 highlighted the breadth of knowledge. He 
provided a list of 37 factors grouped into five categories which helped store 
managers determine whether they operated a ‘five star’ branch. Of these factors, 
less than five could be measured quantitatively (e.g. sales growth). The remainder 
were subjective and had to be observed - evaluating the quality of the staff 
("seniors are training juniors"), the level of service ("every customer receives a 
sympathetic enquiry of needs") and the store environment ("the branch is always 
clean from front door to back entrance").   656
Three features stand out from how Boots evaluated performance. Firstly, 
performance evaluation of the business was a central part of the role of each of 
the directors. It encouraged a holistic evaluation of performance rather than a 
narrower functional view where directors and managers just focused on the their 
areas of responsibility. Secondly, each of the directors were expected to have a 
 BTC 298.653
 The Bee, December 1922.654
 The Bee, December 1922.655
 The Bee, March 1936.656
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deep understanding of the performance at a store level. This was achieved 
through insights provided by TGM's attendance at the Executive and the weekly 
letters supplied by each TGM to the Executive on the shops they had visited that 
week. Thirdly, informal and unstructured evaluation was a core element in 
understanding performance. TGM's and directors invested considerable time 
visiting stores to observe performance first hand. Visiting stores allowed them to 
not only evaluate whether stores were achieving each of the drivers of 
performance but also helped them understand the complex relationships between 
the external context, the different drivers of performance and the customer 
reaction to the overall experience. Unlike modern PMM systems, each member of 
the Executive was expected to have a deep understanding of how performance 
was being delivered and they were expected to get this understanding by 
observing it in practice rather than rely on consolidated reports passed to them.
Motivation
This section will examine the formal and informal processes used to motivate 
performance and includes both an assessment of how employees were rewarded 
financially but also of non-financial methods. PMM literature would anticipate that 
the reward mechanisms would support behaviours which aligned with the 
objectives. However, there are relatively few sources relating to salaries and 
wages in the archives and any information which shows salary information of a 
named individual is closed to access. What can be determined, however, are 
broad principles relating to how they financially rewarded employees and also 
some indication of the other techniques used to motivate performance.
According to Greenwood, for Executives and senior managers, the American 
policy was to pay a moderate salary and a profit based bonus.  Accounting 657
records support the view and show that TGM's received a share of the profits of 
the overall business (rather than their territory). It was based on a % of company 
pre-tax profits above a minimum profit  threshold and, from the available sources, 
 Greenwood, Cap.657
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operated at least from 1937 to the end of the period (the % changed but was 
typically between 7% and 9%).658
For store managers, reward was based on a basic salary supplemented by a 
monthly bonus. Unlike Head Office managers and TGM's, it was based on the 
sales of the store they managed. The first bonus scheme introduced for managers 
after the American acquisition was announced in February 1921. A memo 
explained that it “is certainly more liberal in its scope and possess greater 
possibilities than any scheme we have heard of in the Retail trade in this 
country.”  Managers earned a percentage of their salary equivalent to the 659
percentage year on year increase in their store’s sales in the month - a store 
manager who achieved a 10% increase in their month's sales compared to the 
same month in the previous year earned an additional 10% of their monthly 
salary.  Worried that this may lead to over ordering stocks, a second bonus was 660
introduced in July 1921. This increased the sales bonus by 25% if stock was kept 
within the stock standard set by Head Office.  There were further changes in 661
1930 when an 'own-goods' bonus was added. However, both these additional 
bonuses were contingent on sales growth being achieved and thereby 
emphasised the importance of sales over all other measures of performance.  By 662
the 1960’s, the store manager’s bonus included an element relating to the profit of 
their store but it is not clear what, if anything, this replaced from the 1930’s 
scheme.663
Sales assistants also received a variable element of pay but it was based on a % 
of the sales they made (commission rather than a bonus). In 1936, it was replaced 
 In 1937 it was 8.5%, 1939 it was 7.3%. From 1955 it was 8.5% (BTC 1167 - Final 658
Accounts).
 BTC A 129/ 2 - Various memos to TGM’s and Branch Mgrs.659
 Capped at 25%. BTC A 96/ 9 Various letters from HO to Mr Hodgkin.660
 BTC A 129/ 2 - Various memos to TGM’s and Branch Mgrs. I661
 BTC A 129/7 - Various Memo’s TGM’s.662
 BTC A 49/4 Shaping Up for the Future - Boots New Management Organization 1966.663
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by a bonus based on their sections increased sales.  The bonus scheme was 664
changed again in 1955 with the addition of a ‘Profit Earnings Bonus’ which was still 
operating in 1970.  It paid 8.5% of the annual profits of the business and was 665
available for all employees who had been with the business more than a year.
Beyond financial rewards, Boots used a range of techniques to motivate 
performance. John Boot wrote a letter every month to managers awarded a bonus. 
It was personalised and demonstrated Head Office's understanding of each store; 
he congratulated them on the award but could also, for example, praise their 
‘nicely dressed windows’ or chastise them on their own-goods sales compared to 
other local stores.  To the store manager, the gap between his store's 666
performance and the directors must have seemed narrow.
A review of The Bee emphasises its importance as a tool to motivate performance 
but also reveals the range of symbolic incentives the firm used to motivate 
performance. The Bee highlighted examples of individual sales successes, 
published Honour Rolls (e.g. the "Salesmanship Roll of Honour") and comparative 
lists of Territorial performances on various sales metrics.  It was also the conduit 667
for promoting the sales tournaments and competitions introduced soon after the 
American take over. These ranged from small scale inter-store tournaments 
through to national and international events. Store managers challenged each 
other: ‘Mr. GA Lloyd, on behalf of his branch, 289, Tredegar, wishes to compete 
with any branch of similar size in the sale of household soaps.’  Larger events 668
were coordinated by Head Office, including three ‘Test Matches’ where the British 
stores competed with the American stores on the sales of ‘Regefrice.’  Rewards 669
varied and included one week’s extra salary, a trip to Paris or an annual 
 BTC 780/5 - Sales and Increased Sales Bonus Scheme (1 March 1936).664
 Initially introduced in 1955, the bonus became permanent in 1958 (BTC 455/29 Profit 665
Earnings Bonus): Bonus leaflet, 1971 (BTC 455/29).
 BTC A 129/ 2 - Various memos (Burton store February, August 1921).666
 Volume, average transaction value, sales of promoted line.667
 The Bee, March 1922.668
 The Bee, September 1922. There were three “Test Matches” in total. Honours were 669
shared with each country winning one and sharing the third.
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subscription to a magazine. Often, there was no tangible reward at all other than 
recognition in The Bee and the financial cost to the business was relatively small 
at only £4,853 in 1937 (0.3% of salaries).  While the competitions continued into 670
the 1930’s, they received less prominence in The Bee and largely ended in 1939.
The range of incentives used by Boots emphasises the breadth of methods firms 
can employ to motivate performance. Some are formal and offer tangible rewards 
such as bonuses or prizes. Others are more informal and intangible such as 
recognition though personal feedback or in the pages of magazines. However, in 
the stores, all of them were based on the same objective - to promote sales growth 
and the drivers of sales growth (customer service, 'own brand' sales, increased 
basket size, trading up to higher value products). Therefore, they remained 
consistent with the overall objective of the firm.
The competitions and other techniques also helped promote behaviours. In the 
early 1920's, they were used to create a sales culture in the stores where staff 
were praised as "not mere clerks or shop assistants but Salespeople."  They 671
also brought the shops and Head Office closer together, promoting informal ties. In 
the annual ‘October Cup’, first run in 1921, each director took charge of three 
territories and competed on who could grow sales the most. The Directors visited 
every one of their stores and The Bee reported their plans, celebrated the winners 
and interviewed managers about their successful strategies. 
Curiously, the symbolic incentives became less important by the end of the 1920's 
and rarely mentioned in The Bee thereafter. It is not clear why. No explanation was 
provided in The Bee and there are no references in memos. It may have reflected 
an attempt by John Boot to shift away from salesmanship towards customer 
service as the principal driver of sales growth.  John Boot published his Service 672
Letter No. 1 in 1925 and in 1928, the firm used a 'Casual Customer' to visit stores. 
He reported directly to the directors and wrote articles in The Bee on the quality of 
 BTC 461 - Statistical Book 1937.670
 The Bee, September 1922.671
 The importance of "salesmanship" did not disappear from The Bee. In 1935, the Sales 672
Director continued to promote its importance (The Bee, June 1935).
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service received - effectively a shift away from incentives to feedback to drive 
sales.  The reports in The Bee from the 'Casual Customer' continued until the 673
1950's. The first post-war edition of The Bee in 1948 also acknowledged that there 
had been shifts of emphasis between service and salesmanship and called for 
increased focus on salesmanship going forward.  However, the competitions 674
were not reintroduced. These shifts help demonstrate one advantage of 
maintaining a broad rather than specific objective - 'sales growth' accommodated 
changes in emphasis over time (for example between customer service and 
salesmanship) without needing to change the overall objective.
Measures
This section will consider how important measures were in managing the overall 
performance of the business. It will examine both the financial and non-financial 
measures the firm used. In particular, it will consider whether there was a key 
performance measures or a wide suite of measures and how these changed.
Greenwood stated that before 1920, Boot had been concerned about the time it 
took to generate the statistical records and did not know the profitability of 
individual stores.   As noted above, there was a restructuring in the early 1920's 675
and this also led to improvements in the statistical information. By 1922, the 
business was generating a wide range of statistics covering sales, stocks, 
expenses and profit.  However, despite the range, in the performance reports, 676
correspondence with stores and articles in The Bee, one measure stood out - 
sales. Or, to be more accurate, sales and the various drivers of sales - customer 
transactions, customer spend per transaction, sales of 'own-good' products.
Table 3.5 shows the measures that were recorded on the front page of the 
Statistical Book in various years. Forming the summary of performance, they 
 The Bee, July 1925 and July 1928.673
 The Bee, Summer 1948.674
 Greenwood, Cap.675
 The Bee, March 1922.676
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provide an insight into the key performance measures of the business. The book 
was first published in 1925 and subsequently every year until 1969. Based on the 
circulation list, it was distributed to the Executive and may have been circulated 
more widely. It highlights the importance of sales measures over other measures 
and the lack of change in the core measures.677
Table 3.5:  Measures on Summary page of Statistical Book
Measure (current and prior year) 1925 1930 1969
Sales (£) ✔ ✔ ✔
Expenses (£) - ✔ ✔
Salaries (£) - ✔ ✔
Number of employees ✔ ✔ ✔
Customer transactions (no.) ✔ ✔ ✔
Average value per customer transaction (£) ✔ ✔ ✔
One penny per customer (£) b ✔ ✔ ✔
Number of branches ✔ ✔ ✔
Number of branches opened in the year ✔ ✔ ✔
Number of branches closed in the year ✔ ✔ ✔
Greatest number of branches open at any one time - - ✔
Comparative shops c 
Retail sales (£) ✔ ✔ -
Customer transactions (no.) ✔ ✔ -
Average value per customer transaction (£) ✔ - -
Total number of NHS items - - ✔
Average value of NHS items (£) - - ✔
Average value per customer transaction (including 
NHS) (£)
- - ✔
b Potential increase in total sales for each penny increase in the average transaction value
c Open two complete years
Source: BTC 461 and 462 - Statistical Books
 Comparative shops remained a measure until 1962 but Boots extended their stores in 677
the 1960's without adding many new shops which made the measure less useful. 
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The detailed schedules which followed the summary page were similarly 
dominated by sales data. In 1939, the book contained 13 sales schedules. 
However, it included only two schedules relating to stock, four to expenses and 
one to margins. There was more balance in the more specialist reports produced 
by the Expense and Accounting Departments. In particular, summary reports 
produced by the Management Accounting Department from the middle of 1930's to 
the early 1950's analysed gross margins in more detail with particular emphasis on 
'own-brand' sales and margins.  However, this was in addition to rather than 678
instead of sales - the Expense Report produced in 1930 and 1932 had as many 
pages devoted to sales as to expenses.  Table 3.6 lists all of the sales schedules 679
included in the 1939 Statistical Book. It demonstrates that directors received 
information on the total sales of the business but also the sales performance of 
individual stores and emphasises, as already explained in the section on 
'Evaluation' above, that directors were keen to understand performance at an 
individual store level.
The prioritisation of sales over other measures is echoed in other sources. Every 
copy of The Bee in the 1920's included tables showing relative performance of 
territories or stores against various sales measures. These were often included 
within articles providing advice on particular drivers of sales (volume, average 
value, customer service) or types of sales (product, 'own-brand). While there were 
references to expenses and stock, they were rare by comparison and rarely 
included statistics. The focus on these was managing to a ratio or quota. Similarly, 
within store, sales measures dominated. Stores were encouraged to post their 
daily sales on boards for all employees to see showing the performance of 
particular products or of their sales assistants. During competitions or sales 
promotions when a 'quota' might have been set, stores used barometers to show 
progress.  680
 BTC 1167 - Final Accounts678
 BTC 345/2 Expense Report 1932.679
 The Bee, April 1922; October 1922; September 1923.680
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After the 1920's, there was a notable decline in the reporting of sales statistics in 
The Bee as emphasis shifted in the articles towards customer service as a driver 
of sales. Performance was still reported but it was qualitative: an article in 1934 
reported how a TGM had ranked all of his stores on four aspects of customer 
service and found, for example, that in only two of the twenty-one stores did the 
transaction involve "a skilful and intelligent salesperson who can take advantage 
of opportunity to introduce and sell further products, particularly Boots.”  Awards 681
Table 3.6: Sales Schedules in Statistical Book (1939)
Explanation
Store Sales:
Comparative stores Total sales for comparative stores (open two complete years)
Territory sales Descending order based on % growth. Comparative stores only.
20 largest stores Annual sales and year-on-year growth of each of the 20 largest 
stores in descending order (12.4% of total retail sales)
20 smallest stores Annual sales and year-on-year growth of each of the 20 smallest 
stores in ascending order.
Stores with sales declining 
by 10% year on year
List of each store with more than a 10% year on year decrease
New stores (£) Lists of all new stores with average weekly takings (£)
Closed stores (£) Lists all stores excluded from ‘comparative’ sales due to closure/ 
alterations.
By month Total sales for each month of the year.
Product Sales   
By department Shown as supplies to stores. Separately shows ‘own-goods’ 
supplies.
Prescription sales Volume and value of prescription sales. Includes prior 10 years.
Drivers
Volume - no. of customers By Territory.
Value - avg. value of each 
transaction
By Territory and by quarter.
Value - one penny per 
customer
Potential increase in total sales for each penny increase in the 
average value.
Source: BTC 461 - Statistical Book (1939)
 The Bee, November-December 1934. The other aspects were: "a person of pleasing 681
personality, a person clearly possessing the spirit of true service to consider my needs, a 
person who, when possible, readily produces a choice of articles for my inspection and is 
capable of giving expert advice as to the best for my purpose."
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were also given for good service and winners were named in the The Bee but 
criteria were again qualitative.  In 1936, an article identified five broad questions 682
which could be asked to assess the performance of a store: Is the branch well 
managed? Is the branch making progress? Are the displays good? Is the staff 
good? Are customers well received and served? The author broke down each 
question into five to seven sub-questions but very few could be measured 
quantitatively (e.g. are more customers being served?).  The focus on a broad 683
range of qualitative measures continued after the war. The shift in focus in The 
Bee appears to be not a rejection of sales as an objective but rather a recognition 
that sales are generated by a range of drivers of which only a few are easily 
measurable.
Modern PMM systems advocate a broad set of measures which reflect the 
strategic initiatives of the organisation. These measures should be focused on 
vision and strategy and, unlike traditional measures, provide learning rather than 
control. Measures should also be dynamic, they should change as the strategy 
changes. The range of measures should include both output measures which 
record whether an objective has been met but also input measures which 
assesses drivers of future performance. Finally, they should be cascaded through 
the organisation.  There are several features on how Boots used measures in 684
their internal reports which stand out from the modern PMM systems. 
(1) Throughout the period, the business focused on a relatively narrow range of 
measures. Stores in particular focused on sales and the drivers of sales. While 
other measures were used, they were used differently. Expenses and stocks 
were measured but subject to standards and normally expressed as a ratio to 
sales. These measures received relatively little focus in reports and 
correspondence. It appears that at Boots there was a distinction between 
 The Bee, January-February 1935.682
 The Bee, March 1936. The article was written by a TGM aimed at store managers and 683
other TGM's.
 Summary from Kaplan and Norton, Balanced Scorecard. An example of an output 684
measure is 'sales growth'. An example of an input measure is 'hours of sales training' 
which should generate future sales.
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measures which drive performance and are under constant scrutiny and 
measures which need to be controlled and therefore managed by exception. 
(2) There was a distinction between the measures used in stores (sales) and 
Head Office (sales but also 'own-brand' performance, margin and expenses). 
This emphasis mirrored the different bonus schemes: the store manger's 
bonus was primarily based on sales growth while Head Office manager's 
bonus was based on company profit. This may have been linked to accounting 
issues as standard margins were used in stores rather than actual product 
margins making it harder for store managers to interpret margins. However, 
given the large number of stores, it could have reflected the simplicity created 
by communicating one consistent message to stores (more sales) rather than 
asking them to focus on several different areas of performance. 
(3) While the range of measures used was relatively narrow, reports measured 
performance from overall business down to Territory and Store. In the 
Statistical Book the Executive could therefore analyse the annual sales 
performance of the overall business (1939: £13.3 million) and of the smallest 
store (£1,507) within a couple of pages (see table 3.6). The focus on individual 
store performance emphasises that the store was the primary unit of analysis 
and the Executive were expected to understand performance at this level. This 
is consistent with the Executive visiting stores regularly and a structure which 
narrowed the gap between the Executive and the store. It differs, however, 
from PMM systems where the Executives focus primarily on the consolidated 
measures and is based upon a principal of aggregating and then analysing. 
The average becomes the proxy for performance but offers little indication on 
how the average was achieved. This principle will be considered in more detail 
in the overall conclusion as it reflects current concerns about the use of 
measures to assess performance. 
(4) There was very little change in the measures reported in the internal reports 
between 1925 and 1969. There were also no new non-financial measures 
introduced after 1925. The lack of new measures was despite investments 
made elsewhere by Boots in understanding sales and service - in 1929, they 
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employed J Walter Thomson to conduct market research on customers and 
from 1928 onwards they employed a ‘casual customer’ who visited shops 
anonymously and reported regularly in The Bee on the quality of service 
received and also sent a report of each visit to the Executive.  Similarly, while 685
employee numbers were included on the front page of the first Statistical Book 
through to the last, there was no development of the measure - peers were 
reporting vacancies, average length of service, reasons for leaving from the 
1930’s onwards.  There were also no new measures added even when they 686
were used elsewhere in the business. The Expenses Department calculated 
profitability by store from the 1940’s and sales per square foot was used in ad 
hoc exercises from at least 1963 but neither were incorporated into the 
Statistical Books or other management reports.  Perhaps not surprisingly, 687
Peat Marwick were critical of the statistical data produced when they conduced 
their review in 1966.  Given the focus on developing measures in the early 688
1920's, the failure to develop them subsequently is curious but not unique - it is 
also reported in the literature on current PMM systems.  Part of the reason 689
may be due to institutional factors and the company were slow to develop their 
management structures generally in the post-war period as the Peat Marwick 
report showed. However, current literature suggests firms may choose to retain 
broad general measures as they allow greater flexibility over time.  In Boots, 690
as evidenced in articles in The Bee in the 1930's, there was a recognition that 
sales growth was a response to several drivers - customer service, 
salesmanship, store environment, etc. The use of a general measure such as 
'sales' conveyed the core objective to the organisation while also allowing the 
 BTC A 48/1; The Bee, November 1928 and frequently thereafter. The Casual Customer 685
was still operating after the War (The Bee, July 1949).
 For example, in Marks & Spencer and the John Lewis Partnership (Cox, Spedan's 686
Partnership).
 Store profitability per Greenwood, Cap;  Sales per square foot were used in the review 687
of London operations  (BTC 784/ 4 The London Study 1964) Both measures would have 
been helpful in the 1960’s given the heavy investment in increasing store trading space.
 BTC 314/3 - Peat Marwick Mitchell Report Part I.688
 Melnyk et al, Fit for the future, describe the paradox where managers don't change 689
measures despite recognising changes in the environment and company strategy.
 Melnyk et al. Fit for the future.690
 179
store manager the flexibility to focus on those drivers most suitable to their 
local environment.   
Linking the system
This section will examine how the separate elements described above were 
connected and the strength of the links. The analysis should help our 
understanding of the strength of the overall system - whether the whole was 
greater than the sum of the parts. Included in this section will be consideration of 
not only tangible but also the intangible elements such as cultural factors which 
helped bind the overall system together.
Even a cursory review of the structure, processes and measures highlights the 
alignment between them and the overall objectives of the organisation which were 
expressed simply in the first edition of The Bee - “More Sales.”  This was 691
particularly the case in the 1920’s  and 1930's when the organisational structures 
were still relatively new following the acquisition by Liggett's but still evident in the 
1960’s although, by then, the overall ‘system’ was operating less effectively. 
The simplicity of the objective and its consistency over time made alignment 
across structures simpler. However, communications between Head Office and 
stores played an important role. Aside from daily and weekly operational 
newsletters issued to stores, The Beacon and The Bee were important conduits 
for communicating to stores. While the two magazines, especially The Bee, 
conveyed guidance and instruction, they were also an important tool in bringing 
employees together. The first edition of The Beacon in 1919 explained its purpose:
"The Beacon shall be a magazine for ALL. It shall ignore no class and injure 
no individual, but serving all interests which bind us together as members of 
one FIRM, shall itself become one of the strongest of these bonds."692
 The Bee, November 1921.691
 The Beacon, September 1919.692
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The Beacon reported the activities of the sporting clubs, societies and various 
social gatherings which Boots operated throughout the period. It also ran human 
interest stores linking the current employees with their past. In 1933, for example, 
it included a series of articles from G. Elliott who described what it had been like 
working alongside Jesse Boot in the 1880's.  The Bee, particularly in early 693
editions, promoted the key objectives of the business and, in reporting 
performances, describing processes and sharing ideas, it demonstrated how the 
different elements of the business fitted together. Like The Beacon, however, it 
also had a strong social element and this increased over time. Sharing stories 
about the firm and its employees and highlighting the social activities that Boots 
provided for its employees all helped create bonds of loyalty between employees, 
directors and firm.694
 
Communication and consistency of message was also helped by the narrow 
reporting lines. As George Gales explained in 1920, the TGM structure was 
created, “in order to bring about closer co-operation and co-ordination and a more 
harmonious and sympathetic understanding of the various problems incident to 
our business."  The TGM's visited stores regularly throughout the period and 695
could ensure alignment between the actions of the Head Office and the Stores. 
There were also regular TGM conferences that took place from the 1920's through 
to the end of the 1960's which helped ensure alignment between each other.  696
However, personal visits and conferences also established relationships between 
Head Office and branch employees and could reinforce the cultural messages that 
the business sought to convey.  
 The Beacon, January 1933 to January 1934.693
 The use of company magazines to promote the culture of companies is well 694
documented in the literature - see Heller, Company Magazines; Griffiths, Give my 
Regards.
 Memo to Branch Managers 5 August 1920. BTC A 361/3 Memo’s re TGM’s695
 There are regular references to TGM conferences throughout the period in the 696
sources. For example - The Bee, December 1922, February 1923; TGM Conference 
Booklet, 1960 (BTC A 129/ 6 Cut Your Losses - an Action booklet for managers and 
various other); Cockfield speech at TGM conference, 1967 (BTC A 129/8 - Briefings to 
Senior Managers).
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Alignment was also helped by the regular visits by the Executive to stores. The 
Bee reported in 1922, after the October Cup, that the director responsible for their 
territories during the competition had visited every one of the stores and 
highlighted a TGM's view of the benefit of this:
"All realise that the members of the Executive are human beings with an 
intimate knowledge of the difficulties that arise day to day in the branches 
and not simply individuals who formulate policies without any thought for 
the people who have to carry them out."697
While visiting stores therefore helped the Executive understand performance, it 
also built informal relations and helped break down the distance between director 
and employee.
Evidence from The Bee, Liggett Leader and personal performance evaluations 
also show that in nurturing relationships between Head Office and stores, the firm 
deliberately sought to promote loyalty and embed it within the culture of the 
organisation. Gales, in a speech to employees, highlighted its importance - "the 
key-note of the whole organisation is LOYALTY, the biggest thing in life.”  The 698
Bee reproduced an article from the Liggett Leader, the American company 
magazine, which showed that loyalty was similarly important for them:
“Loyalty is the only foundation, and no other foundation can any man lay, for 
a business such as ours - loyalty to the Company we represent, loyalty to 
its high ideals and policies, loyalty to its exacting selling standards."  699
Similar sentiments were echoed by directors, TGM's and store managers in The 
Bee. One director commented that the success of one of his stores in the 'October 
Cup' was due to loyalty and that "every day he becomes more convinced that if 
there is one mutual asset more valuable than any other between two individuals or 
 The Bee, December 1922.697
 From a speech given by George Gales to staff and reproduced in The Bee, April 1924.698
 The Bee, March 1928.699
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two parties (in this case the firm and the employee), that asset is loyalty."  700
Loyalty was more than just rhetoric, however, and employees were graded on their 
loyalty as part of their annual performance review.  TGM's were also encouraged 701
to assess the loyalty of their managers during store visits.  The sources show 702
that the firm was also an early investor in welfare which helped to promote loyalty 
towards the firm. They appointed their first welfare officer in 1911 and, of the 60 
welfare officers employed in British companies in 1913, four were employed at 
Boots.  Culture and, more specifically, loyalty helped bind all parts of the 703
business towards the aims of the organisation and consequently helped link the 
various elements of the performance management system. 
In modern PMM systems, it is measures which are credited with linking the 
separate elements. In Boots  this was true in only the crudest sense. Sales growth 
may have been a measure which sales assistants through to directors focused on 
and it remained the primary measure throughout the period but the firm actually 
used many ‘sales’ measures - customers, average sale, one penny per customer 
and the various disaggregation of these measures across product and place. 
Instead, the objective of ‘sales growth’ acted as the unifying force. More important 
than measures, therefore, were a clear, simple objective, a structure which 
developed close working relations between Head Office and stores and the 
development of a common culture.
Conclusion
The case of Boots differs from the other case studies because it introduced a new 
set of PMM structures and practices in the early 1920's and then retained these, 
largely unchanged, until 1970. Moreover, the practices were, at the least, heavily 
 The Bee, February 1926. Also referred to in the 1930's in articles written by stores 700
managers. One manager argued that employees needed to champion the business in 
their own homes (June 1932) and another argued the it was as important as customer 
service in improving performance (January 1938).
 Performance evaluation of Mr Steer, 1941. BTC 298 - Personnel file of Mr Steer.701
 Internal memo to TGM's. BTC A 89/33 - Role of the Territorial General Managers.702
 BTC 2979/ 21 Personnel Various. 703
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influenced by the practices of its new American owner.  As explained in the 704
opening chapter, American retail practices were considered ahead of those in 
Britain at the time. The case of Boots therefore contrasts with the case of WHS 
which clung to their historical PMM structures and practises until the 1950's.
The evidence suggests that the business in the 1920's and 1930's had a strong 
focus on PMM and had structures, processes and measures which were aligned to 
the objectives of the firm. They also show, however, that Boots subsequently lost 
this focus and by the 1960's their structures and processes were not operating as 
effectively as they had in the early period. The evidence suggests this was largely 
due to organisational issues. Based on the reminiscences of Greenwood and the 
testimony of the other employees that contributed to Chapman's books, the 
weaknesses appear to reflect divisions within the Executive and at least partly 
attributable to John Boot's style of management. These are not explored further in 
the conclusion as they are beyond the scope of the thesis. Instead, the conclusion 
draws together specific points raised at the end of each of the above sections to 
identify a number of principles which underpinned Boots' approach to PMM.  As 
might be expected, all are closely linked.
Firstly, directors were expected to have a broad and deep understanding of 
performance. Understanding transcended functional responsibilities - in the 
1920's, the Director of Accounting, for example, visited stores, commented on the 
capabilities of the manager and competed against fellow directors in the 'October 
Cup'.  The knowledge also had to be deep. As directors, they were expected to 705
understand performance at a consolidated level but also at an individual store 
level - statistical packs showed the performance of individual stores from the 
largest to the smallest and they all visited stores regularly. The organisational 
structure facilitated the breadth and depth of understanding by creating close links 
between directors and stores. TGM's reported directly into the Executive and 
 It is difficult to assess how much Boots' new structures and processes were a direct 704
copy of those in Liggett's or were adapted. However, organisational structures including 
terminology (Executive Committee structure and TGM's), bonus schemes (store manager 
sales bonus), promotional competitions (October Challenge Cup) and even the style of the 
in-house magazines were the same. 
 His team won the challenge in 1922. The Bee, December 1922.705
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completed a weekly performance report which went directly to the Chairman. This 
structure lasted throughout the period but its persistence was due to more than 
inertia - Cockfield's defence of the role in 1967 despite his desire to change other 
aspects of the Boots organisation shows the importance that he placed on being 
close to store performance. The role of the directors in understanding performance 
reminds us that PMM systems are primarily about feedback and learning as 
documented in much of the literature and discussed in the introduction.  706
However, where Boots differs from the PMM literature is the depth of 
understanding expected of the directors. While modern scorecards and 
frameworks provide a broad range of aggregated measures which allow directors 
to assess whether the strategy is on target, the systems at Boots helped directors 
understand and analyse performance in detail, before aggregation. It is consistent 
with the practices of directors at M&S but also with recent literature on the 
performance evaluation of both businesses and individuals, not widely cited in the 
PMM literature, and will be explored in more depth in the overall conclusion.
Secondly, and closely linked to the first point, the primary focus of performance 
management was the store - the best way to maximise the performance of the 
business as a whole was to maximise the performance of each of the stores.  707
The focus on individual performance reflected the belief that each store faced its 
own local challenges/ opportunities and performance needed to be be managed 
accordingly - finding the right fit between environment and individual. Guidance to 
TGM's in the 1930's, reminded them to challenge store managers on their 
knowledge of the local market and store managers had the freedom to tailor their 
product offer to local conditions by choosing which Head Office products they 
wanted to stock.  In 1967, Cockfield was still reminding TGM's of the need for 708
 The importance of 'learning' is emphasised in Ferreira and Otley's definition of a PMM 706
system as discussed in the introduction. As noted there, however, it is not a view held 
universally with some arguing that the principal role of a PMM system is control.
 The focus is therefore on the range of performance rather than the average 707
performance of stores. It is illustrated by information within their own corporate reports - in 
1939, sales grew by 1.0% but the largest 20 stores grew by 2.75% and even this average 
masked a range of between +25.2% and -8.6%. Only 7 of the 20 were within 1.0pp of the 
average (BTC 461 Statistical Books).
 The questions were part of a memo sent to TGM’s titled “TGM Duties”. BTC A 89/33 - 708
Role of the Territorial General Managers
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local planning to reflect the local environment.  The case therefore helps 709
illustrate PMM issues in wider debates on centralisation/ decentralisation. Boots' 
approach to performance management was to create formal structures which 
narrowed the gap between head office and stores and to measure and evaluate 
the performance of the overall business alongside the performance of individual 
units within the business. This contrasts with the more hierarchical PMM structures 
advocated in frameworks such as the balanced scorecard which cascade down 
through the business.
However, even at this level, the practices at Boots suggest that evaluation needs 
to go further. In Boots, much of the performance evaluation took place in store 
through informal processes. At this level, quantifiable performance measures 
provide only a limited insight into performance. In Boots, TGM's and store 
mangers were advised to analyse a range of activities to understand the 
performance of the store - store cleanliness, customer service, store layout as well 
as conventional measures such as sales growth.  Each contributed to 710
performance but they were also interdependent. Few of them were quantifiable 
and there is no evidence that Boots even attempted to quantify them. The case 
highlights the difficulty in understanding performance by using a small number of 
aggregated key performance indicators evaluated in formal review processes. It 
may explain why Boots, after developing a wide range of measure in the early 
1920's, did not continue to develop them subsequently. This raises the question 
about whether 'measures' can ever be the central part of a PMM system - can they 
replace observation and expertise in assessing many of the drivers of performance 
and the complex links between those drivers? The case also emphasises the 
importance of informal evaluation and the weaknesses inherent in formal 
measures. It also provides some clues about how these informal evaluation 
processes can be nurtured. The Bee emphasised the importance of visiting stores 
through articles, running competitions and reproducing speeches of directors. This 
meant that every store was regularly visited by somebody from Head Office - a 
 Speech at TGM conference 22 February 1967. BTC A 129/8 - Briefings to Senior 709
Managers
 The Bee, March 1936; BTC A 89/33 - Role of the Territorial General Managers.710
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contrast with the pre-1920's Boots.  The techniques used highlight that informal 711
processes can be created rather than left to evolve. While the importance of 
informal evaluation is recognised in the literature, it is not widely researched and 
presents opportunities for further research.712
Thirdly, Boots' objectives and principal measures (sales growth) were broad and 
applied across the period. This contrasts with modern PMM systems where 
measures are specific and change in response to the strategy and external 
environment. One of the advantages of having a broad based measure such as 
'sales growth' was that it gave store managers the flexibility to tailor their 
approaches to their local environments. They could, therefore focus on promoting 
volume by selling more products to each customer or promote the average value 
of a sale by encouraging customers to purchase higher priced alternatives. 
Similarly, head office managers could encourage them to sell more 'own label' 
products or shift focus to customer service from salesmanship. The Bee provided 
advice and ran competitions which encouraged all of these activities. However, 
there was a clear hierarchy - any specific actions they took had to achieve overall 
sales growth. This was built into the store manager reward scheme - while the 
bonus rewarded sales growth, stock management and 'own brand' sales, the latter 
two were only payable if the former was achieved. Melnyk et al., based on studies 
of current PMM systems, make a similar point although they argue that it is volatile 
environments changing over time rather than the differences between 
environments which encourages firms to maintain their existing set of 
measures.  These findings highlight that in certain cases, retaining a general set 713
of measures over long periods outweighs the advantages of changing them. 
However, our understanding of where these cases arise is still weak. Further 
research will allow us to add to these examples. Firms which operate across 
several different complex environments such as multi-national corporations or 
 Greenwood, Cap.711
 Ferreria and Otley, Framework, refer to informal evaluation but in the context of how 712
senior management communicate to employees on what is important. Johnson, Lean, has 
documented his observations at Toyota but his work is not widely referenced in PMM 
literature.
 Melnyk et al. Fit.713
 187
firms which delegate much of the decision making to their operating units may be 
particularly fruitful areas for research.
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Chapter 4: WH Smith and Sons
Introduction
The chapter presents the case of the British retailer WH Smith (WHS). They have 
a number of similarities with the other firms in the thesis. Like the other two firms, it 
was a multiple retailer which operated throughout the whole period and still trades 
today. While not a direct competitor, it operated in similar locations and faced the 
same operational pressures that all large multiple retailers faced with a large 
number of shops dispersed geographically across the country. However, it is the 
differences which provide a potentially alternative perspective on how multiple 
firms managed their performance. Firstly, it was much older than either M&S or 
Boots. Founded in 1792, by 1880, before Boots opened its second shop, WHS 
already operated 450 bookstalls.  Secondly, it was a wholesale distributor before 714
it was a retailer and unlike either Boots or M&S, did not develop its own 
manufacturing capability or network. Thirdly, it retained its original ownership 
model longer than the other two. It was a partnership until 1929, a fully owned 
private company until 1949 and a public company thereafter although still under 
the control of the founding family. It was not until 1972, with the retirement of David 
Smith as Chairman, that the firm was managed by a non-family member for the 
first time. Finally, as will become clearer, WHS was also slow to adopt the 
innovative performance management practices adopted by Boots and M&S and 
therefore provides insights into an older form of performance management and 
measurement.
As in the other case studies, the principal sources were the company archives, 
supplemented by existing academic studies.  There are few restrictions on 715
access to the archive records. Only personnel records and Board minutes for 
meetings held within the last fifty years are restricted. The principal sources used 
 Wilson, First, 182.714
 The only corporate history was Wilson's First with the News which was published in 715
1985. Otherwise, WHS has only appeared as part of broader histories on retail and 
publishing.
 189
were Board minutes, consulting reports, oral and written reminiscences, 
accounting records and the internal company magazines, Newsbasket and Talking 
Shop. However, the whole catalogue was reviewed to identify any other potential 
relevant sources based on the descriptions (such as letters, copies of speeches, 
internal reports). Any gaps in the sources are identified in the main sections of this 
chapter. Newsbasket and the oral reminiscences were particularly important 
sources because they provided insights into the corporate culture, identity and 
behaviours which played a greater role in performance management in WHS than 
the other two case studies. Given their importance, they are discussed in more 
detail below.
Newsbasket was first published in January 1908 and produced monthly 
thereafter.  Although not clear in the sources, the timing may have reflected the 716
expansion of the store chain between 1905 and 1906 and the need to build better 
communication channels between Head Office and its dispersed workforce. 
Content and style were quite different from The Bee in Boots. The tone of the 
magazine was celebratory or, in times of change such as when the firm 
incorporated, reassuring. Business topics were rarely featured and most of the 
content related to reporting social matters - dinners, outings and the activities of 
their sporting teams and clubs. This was supplemented by human interest stories 
such as biographies of long serving employees or profiles of specific stores and 
their staff. It also communicated company wide news such as the creation of new 
departments or changes in responsibilities of senior managers. 
It is difficult to assess the extent to which the partners/ directors influenced the 
content. Little is known about the editors and there were no bylines. However, both 
partners and senior managers used the magazine as a platform to express their 
views through articles or interviews. The magazine also routinely reproduced 
speeches made by the partners. Given the uncritical support given by the 
magazine to the firm's decisions, partners probably exerted considerable 
influence, perhaps indirectly, over the direction of the magazine. Editorially, the 
themes and messages communicated through the magazine were also consistent 
 All of the copies of Newsbasket are available in the archives.716
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with other sources such as Board minutes, at least until the 1950's when the 
business was changing its structures and when the partners themselves were less 
sure about the future direction of the business. Even then, however, the magazine 
was not explicitly critical of them nor the business more generally.
Newsbasket's value as a source is two-fold. First, it chronicled many events that 
took place. We discover, for example, what was celebrated, who attended the 
celebrations, who gave speeches and what they spoke about (sometimes verbatim 
including the pauses for laughter or applause). It provides the dates of key 
appointments, retirements and organisational changes. Secondly, it provides an 
insight into how the firm was projected to its employees, most of whom had no 
direct contact with Head Office. The editors chose what stories to report (and what 
to omit), they wrote the headlines, they summarised the speeches, they selected 
the photographs and the language used to describe events. Newsbasket therefore 
helps us to understand what was important to the partners and what they wanted 
their employees to hear.
Another important source was the oral reminiscences recorded between 1977 and 
1986. It is not clear why they were recorded and although the recordings may 
have been linked to Wilson's history of the company, published in 1985, the 
interviews were not conducted by Wilson and the last were recorded after his book 
was published.  The interviews were unstructured and there was little probing of 717
the interviewee's testimony. Rather, they reflect a celebration of the firm and of the 
individual's role within the firm. As a historical source, their primary value lies not in 
providing the facts but revealing how employees made sense of the firm's 
development. As such, they provide important insights into the cultures and 
behaviours within the the firm. The interviewees can be grouped into three broad 
categories. The first group includes Lady Hambleden, whose husband controlled 
the business between 1928 and 1948, and partners who managed the business 
through most of the period  - Michael Hornby, AW Acland and James Smith. 
Although they worked in the business from the 1920's to the 1960's, their links with 
the firm stretched back further - their fathers had also been partners in the 
 WHS Q series. Wilson does not refer to the recordings although he did interview some 717
of the same employees (Wilson, First, Preface).
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business. The second group includes directors who joined after 1950 and were 
instrumental in driving through organisational change. They include Peter Bennett 
who became a director in 1951, a non-Executive Director (HN Saunders) who 
joined in 1956 and H van Straubenzee who joined the firm in 1956 and became 
Personnel Director. All had experience of working in other businesses before 
joining WHS. Also included in this group is Lady Helen Smith whose husband 
(David Smith) was the Chairman between 1948 and 1969. The final group includes 
several employees who joined the firm in the 1920's and early 1930's in junior 
roles in the shops, wholesale houses or head office departments and continued to 
work into the 1970's.
While all of the Board minutes, consulting reports, finance reports and copies of 
Talking Shop were reviewed, some sampling was done for Newsbasket. 
Newsbasket was published monthly from 1908 and had 15 to 25 pages per 
edition. In order to manage the volume of data, the review focused on the first two 
years (1908 to 1910), the first and last five years of the period studied (1920 to 
1925 and 1965 to 1970) and the five years between 1955 and 1960 when the firm 
started a restructuring process. In addition, magazines published around key 
periods in the firm's history were also reviewed - when the firm became a private 
limited company (1928 to 1930) and when it became a public limited company 
(1948 to 1950).
Wilson's corporate history was an important source, particularly in providing 
background information about the history of the firm in the 19th century. Wilson 
does not explain his motivation for writing the book but acknowledges the support 
of its directors. Unfortunately, he can be somewhat uncritical of the role of the 
partners/ directors and the actions they took. Although Wilson referenced his 
sources, the archive has been re-catalogued and therefore his book had only 
limited use as a basis for more detailed research.
The chapter follows the same format as the chapters on M&S and Boots. The first 
section is contextual and describes the historical development of the industry 
(newspaper, magazine, book and stationery trades) and identifies its core 
characteristics. The section is followed by a brief summary of the historical 
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development of WHS from 1792 through to 1970. The bulk of the chapter follows 
and documents how each of the separate elements of a PMM system operated in 
WHS using the framework from Chapter 1. The chapter finishes with a short 
conclusion which highlights the main findings of the case study.
Background and Context
The newspaper, magazine, book and stationery trades
The market for newspapers, magazines and books was gradually transformed 
over the 19th century through changes in taxation, improving literacy rates, 
growing wealth and innovation. Most of these improvements stemmed from the 
middle of the century. In the 1850's and early 1860's, the so-called taxes on 
knowledge which had hampered growth in the first half of the century were 
abolished (advertising tax, 1853; newspaper stamp duty, 1855; paper duty, 
1861).  Literacy rates also received a boost in the second half of the century 718
following the introduction of universal education in 1880. From a technology 
perspective, the expansion of the railway network increased the speed that 
newspapers and magazines could be distributed from London. There were also 
advances in production with linotype and the letterpress towards the end of the 
century reducing costs but also increasing production speeds.  719
In newspaper and magazine publishing, publishing firms increasingly took 
advantage of the opportunities these improvements provided. Early attempts to 
create a mass market appeal had met with mixed success. Periodicals such as the 
Penny Magazine launched in the 1830's and the Penny Dreadful genre in the 
1840's had been popular but financial success had not always followed.  In the 720
1890's, a new type of proprietor emerged. Led by Harmsworth (later Lord 
Northcliffe), they were determined to aggressively grow the market by driving 
volume. Harmsworth launched the Daily Mail in 1896 which achieved a circulation 
 Cox and Mowatt, Grub Street, 14.718
 Jefferys, Retail Trading, 282.719
 Cox and Mowatt, Grub Street.720
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of 1 million by 1900. Pearson launched the Daily Express in 1900 and the Daily 
Mirror was launched in 1903.  A volume led strategy dominated the market over 721
the next fifty years. Between 1930 and 1950 the number of newspapers taken per 
household practically doubled, and individual titles continued to dominate the 
market; in 1920, only two of the national dailies sold more than a million copies, by 
1930 there were five and by 1939, two of these sold more than 2 million copies a 
day.  Between 1900 and 1950, despite some periods of stagnation, newspaper 722
and magazine sales grew faster than the population and retail sales.  723
The book trade followed a different trajectory. By 1890 it was in a precarious 
situation. Attempts to control prices had failed in 1852 after the Campbell 
Committee reported against fixed prices. The ensuing price competition meant that 
booksellers chose to stock only the fastest selling lines and publishers struggled to 
find outlets to sell their more serious publications. In 1890, MacMillan made a new 
proposal to control prices. While the process took ten years, by the turn of the 
century he had convinced retailers, authors and publisher to sell books at fixed or 
'net' retail price. The Net Book Agreement (NBA) came into force on 1 January 
1900. Publishers had the right to fix a price and, in return for a fixed discount, 
retailers were obliged to sell at that price. Retailers who refused would not be 
supplied with books by any publisher of 'net' books. The NBA was challenged in 
the first few years but there were only minor changes over the coming decades. 
Although the practice was reviewed as part of the investigation into resale price 
maintenance, it was excluded from the 1956 Restrictive Practices Act, a decision 
upheld in 1962 by the restrictive practices court.  It was finally repealed in 724
1997.725
 Jefferys, Retail Trading, 282.721
 Jefferys, Retail Trading, 284; Cox and Mowatt, Grub Street, 55.722
 Between 1900 and 1950, 'reading matter and stationery' grew from 2.4% of retail sales 723
to 3.8%. Derived from Jefferys, Retail Trading, 453.
 Feather, British Publishing, 148.724
 Utton, Books are not different.725
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The NBA improved the profitability of book publishing and led to a long period of 
stability in the industry with little innovation before 1970.  There was, however, 726
growth. Although statistics on the volume of books sold after the First World War 
are not available in money terms, Jefferys estimates that they kept pace with the 
growth in newspapers and magazines.  Post-war, growth was driven by a rapid 727
expansion in the number of books published; there were 10,000 books published 
in 1950 and 23,500 in 1970.728
Newspapers, magazines, books and stationery were sold through two main 
formats. Kiosks and bookstalls proliferated in busy high streets and transport hubs 
such as railway stations. The former was dominated by the independents but in 
the latter the railway companies preferred to contract the whole of their network 
with a single retailer. From the 1850's onwards, this market was dominated by 
three retailers: WHS, Wyman and Sons and John Menzies. WHS was comfortably 
the largest with 652 of the 977 stalls they ran between them in 1920.  The other 729
main format was the bookshop. While most remained specialists selling only 
books, the multiples typically stocked a broader range which included books, 
newspapers, magazines, stationery and 'fancy goods'. WHS also dominated the 
market with 223 shops in 1914 while the next largest retailer had less than 25.  730
As in other retail sectors, the multiples took an increasing share of the market. 
Table 4.1 shows the multiple share of the newspaper, magazines, books and 
stationery trade between 1910 and 1950. They are based on statistics prepared by 
Jefferys. While statistics are available for 1950 to 1970 based on the Census of 
Distribution returns, they include confectioners and tobacconists which are 
excluded from Jefferys calculations. However, the census data suggests that 
 Feather, British Publishing, 193. The only notable exception was the introduction of 726
paperbacks in the 1930's.
 Jefferys, Retail Trading, 285.727
 Feather, British Publishing, 219.728
 WHS bookstall numbers from WHS X 15 Aggregate statistics. Total of bookstalls 729
operated by multiples from Jefferys, Retail Trading, 287. Over the next 30 years, the 
number of bookstalls remained about the same but the volume of trade increased as 
footfall increased (Jefferys, Retail Trading, 287).
 WHS shops from WHS X 15 Aggregate Statistics. The next largest was W. Straker Ltd 730
(Jefferys, Retail Trading, 286)
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multiple share grew only 4.2pp between 1950 and 1970 (to 15.5%) implying much 
lower growth rates than in the retail sector as a whole.731
The newspaper, magazine, books and stationery retailers faced a particularly 
concentrated supplier base in terms of both location and product. Multiple retailing 
in the sector started in the mid-19th century when railway companies offered 
exclusive rights to retailers to operate bookstalls across their networks. This 
provided an important new revenue stream but it also made them dependent upon 
a relatively small number of railway companies. Typically, contracts were fixed for 
a duration of between five to ten years and rent was based upon a percentage of 
receipts or fixed.  The length of the contracts provided a level of secure income 732
as retailers invested in their distribution network but margins could be tight and 
estimates in the 1880's suggest that between a third and a quarter of railways 
Table 4.1: Multiple share of retail goods sold
1900 1910 1920 1930 1939 1950 1961 1970
Multiple share (%) of:a
All retail 
goods
















10 or more 
shops
n/a n/a 7 10 11 17 n/a n/a
a Multiple defined as 10 or more stores
Sources: 1900 to 1950 from Jefferys, Retail Trading, 290. Data for 'all retail goods' for 1950 to 
1970 from Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Discounts to Retailers, 80, Table 5, published 
31 May 1981 (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
235898/0311.pdf).
 Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Discounts to Retailers, 80, Table 5, published 731
31 May 1981 (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/235898/0311.pdf).
 Wilson, First, 147.732
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bookstalls were not profitable.  Contract renewal could be particularly difficult 733
and as railway revenues fell from the 1890's onwards, the railway companies 
looked to increase their income from bookstall rents.  For a firm like WHS, the 734
risk of losing a contract was significant - in 1905, bookstalls generated sales of 
£1.403 million compared to £0.932 million from their wholesale operations.  And, 735
while this represented a 17% increase in turnover compared to 10 years before, 
rents payable to the railway companies had increased by 29%.  The bookstall 736
revenue stream remained important to the multiple retailers throughout the period 
but there was further consolidation in the railway industry culminating in the 
nationalisation of the railways in 1948. WHS secured the 21 year contact with 
British Rail but it was at a fixed rent and unlikely to have generated significant 
profit.737
To publishers, the long-term bookstall contracts and the concentration of those 
contracts among only three retailers appeared more like a monopoly. Before 1890, 
newspaper and magazine publishing was controlled by self-funded, family owned 
firms. However, by 1900, it had been transformed into a capital intensive industry 
dominated by only three publishing houses - Harmsworth, Pearson and 
Newnes.  They in turn owned a small number of high circulation publications 738
(such as the Daily Mail) which provided leverage on the retailers. They soon took 
the retailers on. In 1898, Harmsworth launched a new magazine, the Harmsworth 
 Wilson, First, 149. Wilson's source was the Smith family private papers but there may 733
well have been some exaggeration. While Smith complained about the profitability, when 
he died in 1893, he left nearly £2 million in his will (Wilson, First, 204).
 The growth in railway net revenues slowed in first decade of the 20th century despite 734
the attempts to increase income: net receipts in 1899 were £40 million compared to £44 
million in 1913. (Jefferys, First, 202).
 Wilson, First, Appendix 3.735
 Rent payable from Wilson, First, Table VII.5, 183. Turnover from Appendix 3.736
 WHS' accounting records did not allocate gross profits to Bookstalls. While they may 737
have conducted their own calculations of the profitability of the rail contract, they have not 
been retained. However, based on operating costs of 20.8% of sales for Bookstalls and an 
average gross margin for the business of 29.2%, Bookstalls contributed about 8.4% to 
Head Office costs in 1948 compared to 11.3% for the shops (WHS X 169 - Audited 
Balance sheet; WHS X 15 Aggregate statistics A and B shops and stalls 1904 - 1959).
 Cox and Mowatt, Grub Street, 35.738
 197
Magazine, priced at 3d, half the price of competitor magazines. WHS argued that 
they could not make a profit at those prices and refused to sell it. Using his own 
publications, Harmsworth accused WHS of operating a monopoly and drew 
support from other publishers. He also threatened to bypass WHS and sell through 
alternative channels. Harmsworth eventually backed down, raising the price to 
3.5d.  However, the altercations continued sporadically over the next 70 years 739
although they took different forms - sometimes there were circulation wars where 
newspapers fought for share or other times the publishers colluded by increasing 
prices to the retailers.  Both threatened retailer margins.740
By the end of World War 1, the principal characteristics of the newspaper and 
magazine industry were set and, aside from further consolidation, remained the 
same for the next 50 years. The industry was dominated by a small number of 
large firms. By 1919, Harmsworth's companies were among the 20 largest 
corporations in Britain.  The influence of these firms was further enhanced by the 741
prominent positions held by their proprietors in public life, several of whom were 
ennobled (Northcliffe, Beaverbrook, Rothermere, Camrose, Burnham).  There 742
was further consolidation over the period and despite a Royal Commission in 1947 
and calls for another one in 1961, the formation of the IPC in 1963 created a 
virtual monopoly in magazine publishing.   743
The market environment faced by WHS was therefore quite different from both 
M&S and Boots. The prices at which they could both buy and sell their main 
products were fixed to a much greater extent than even Boots, where only some of 
their products were influenced by RPM. The NBA covered nearly all books and the 
powerful publishing firms could dictate the prices of newspapers and magazines. 
These factors may explain why multiple retailers took a relatively smaller share of 
 Wilson, First, 196.739
 In 1904, The Times, cut its prices and challenged the NBA (Feather, British Publishing, 740
184). In 1929 there was a circulation war and in the following year the Newspaper 
Proprietors Association imposed price increases on retailers (Wilson, First, 323).
 Cox and Mowatt, Grub Street, 37.741
 Cox and Mowatt, Grub Street, 62, 64.742
 Cox and Mowatt, Grub Street, 77, 90.743
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the market than in other retail sectors. And, with the exception of WHS, the small 
number of branches they controlled - in 1950, the 16 other multiple firms owned an 
average of only 19 stores each (see Table 4.1).  However, the multiples did have 744
some opportunities to grow their share of the market:  745
(1) They could expand the range of products sold to those not covered by price 
restrictions. The largest multiples expanded into stationery and also 
experimented with gramophone records and small leather goods. Table 4.2 
shows the mix of sales in WHS' bookshops and bookstalls in 1920 and 1958. 
The table shows how WHS expanded its non-core product ranges into its 
smaller formats over the period.  
(2) They could, alternatively, narrow their product range and become specialists, 
offering a deeper range and a better customer service. Apart from WHS, 
Wymans and Menzies who all operated bookstalls, the other multiples were 
specialist bookstores.   746
(3) They could integrate backwards into publishing. Opportunities were, however, 
limited given the strength of the publishing houses. 
(4) They could acquire competitors or open shops in prime locations to compete 
with the existing news kiosks. This was less attractive for those firms (such as 
WHS) who also had wholesale operations as they risked cannibalising some of 
their own sales.
 Excludes bookstalls. WHS had 363 stores by comparison (see Table 4.3).744
 Scott and Walker, Retailing, highlight opportunities for large scale retailers to grow 745
despite constraints from RPM.
 Jefferys, Retail Trading, 287.746
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As will be become evident, WHS tried all of these tactics but only to a limited 
extent and they prioritised stability over growth. 
WH Smiths: Background 1792 to 1970
WHS was founded in 1792 when the family opened a shop in London. It focused 
on bookselling and binding before expanding into selling newspapers and 
stationery. However, rapid expansion of the business only occurred after 1829 
when William Henry Smith took sole charge of the business and grew the 
newspaper distribution operations. By using the morning coaches and 
subsequently the railways, WHS could distribute newspapers from London to the 
regions half a day earlier than the Post Office. Although initially supplied from their 
premises on the Strand in London, they subsequently set up a series of wholesale 
'houses’ across the country with the first opening in Birmingham in 1853. By 1920, 
there were 36 wholesale houses contributing about 25% of the operating profit of 
Table 4.2: Mix of WHS products by store format
Large Shopsa Small Shops Bookstalls
1920 1958 1920 1958 1920 1958
% % % % % %
Books n/a 44 27 27 14 12
Newspapers and Magazines n/a 17 42 27 82 73
Stationery and other products n/a 39 31 46 4 15
Total n/a 100 100 100 100 100
a Based on sales. Small stores and bookstall based on supplies. No data available for large 
stores before 1939 when the comparative shares were 30%, 31% and 39%. For definitions of 
large and small stores see section on Organisational Structure below.
Source: WHS X 15 Aggregate Statistics. 1958 was the last date that the firm recorded the mix in 
these formats. Analysis done by Peat Marwick showed that News, Magazines and Books still 
accounted for 55% of gross profit in 1968 but they did not break the split by type of format. WHS 
554/9a Report (Peat Marwick): Internal Performances 1960/61-1967/68; 29 Nov 1968.
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the business.  Wholesale remained a core part of the business throughout the 747
period and contributed 34% to net operating profit in 1968.748
Expansion of the retail side of the business started in 1848 when WHS secured a 
contract with the London and North Western Railway to operate bookstalls on 
station concourses. The success of the venture led to further contracts with the 
other railway lines. By 1920, they had 652 bookstalls selling newspapers, 
magazines, books and a small amount of stationery (see Table 4.2). WHS 
continued to operate bookstalls although the numbers decreased and by 1970, 
they only had 189. The reduction reflected the poor profitability of Bookstalls in 
secondary locations and they closed many of these in the 1960's.749
WHS only started to expand their chain of stores in 1904 when they opened 9 
branches primarily in holiday destinations.  However, the firm lost two railway 750
contracts in 1905 and, to maintain the business, they rapidly increased the rate of 
store openings. By the end of 1906, they had opened a further 188 shops close to 
the stations where they had lost contracts.  By 1920, they had 224 shops 751
generating just under half the sales of the bookstalls. Over the next 50 years there 
was a gradual increase in the number of shops to 329 in 1970.  The product 752
range was broader than the bookstalls (see Table 4.2) and they also operated a 
lending library until 1959.  753
 The actual contribution of the Wholesale Houses to the overall profit may have been 747
higher as the Houses used HO merchandise departments to source some of their 
supplies. WHS X 141 Balance Sheet & A/Cs: W.H.Smith & Son 1920.
 Based upon analysis completed by Peat Marwick. The figure is not directly comparable 748
to the quoted 1920 share of 25% due to changes in allocations and accounting 
conventions in the intervening years. WHS 554.
 From the late 1950's the Board reviewed profitability of stores routinely and store 749
closures were presented to the Board: 5 June, 1959, (WHS Y 173 - Minute Book), 19 April 
1962 (WHS 816: Minutes: Holdings Executive))
 List of stores and their opening dates published in Newsbasket, November 1955.750
 Newsbasket, November 1955.751
 Published Annual Accounts, 1970.752
 WHS Y 173 - Minute Book 1956/60.753
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Table 4.3 shows some key statistics relating to the business over the period of this 
study. As noted in previous chapters, the statistics are presented as context only 
and are not indicative of the success or otherwise of the firm's performance 
management practices. They should also not be used to compare the performance 
of WHS with Boots or M&S. As will become clearer in the sections below, WHS 
had different objectives to the other firms.
Table 4.3: Key statistics




Number of Stores Number of 
Employeesb
£'000 £'000 Largec Smallc Bookstalls
1920 3,831 436 22 202 652 11,772
1925 4,349 460 28 232 617 n/a
1930 4,457 419 35 266 605 n/a
1935 4,390 287 33 295 638 14,273
1940 4,875 272 28 333 638 14,554
1945 7,859 295 32 312 573 12,270
1950 12,564 662 27 336 602 16,814
1955 16,492 776 24 351 526 18,104
1961d 21,707 850 n/a n/a n/a 18,574
1965 27,073 1,202 n/a 353 n/a 19,177
1970 42,039 2,115 n/a 329 189 18,523
a Includes Wholesale House profits. Generating a 'retail' profit which is comparable over the 
period would be misleading due to changes in the way that WHS allocated head office costs. 
Alternatively, WHS could not generate consolidated sales before 1960.
b Includes Wholesale employees. Not all data is available and the numbers for 1910, 1915 and 
1920 actually relate to 1911, 1917 and 1921 respectively. There is no split between retail and 
wholesale in the sources.
c WHS classified their stores as large ('A' stores) and small ('B' stores) but did not define what 
constituted an 'A' store. The classification affected how they were run (see 'Structures' below).  
d As the firm changed their accounting year end in 1960, 1961 has been reported to ensure that a 
full year's results are included.
Sources: Retail sales and store numbers to 1955 from X15, thereafter from Wilson, First. WHS 
no longer distinguished between large and small stores after 1960. Profit from audited accounts 
to 1949 and published accounts thereafter (X 141 to X 170). Employee numbers from Wilson, 
First, Appendix 2.
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Legally, the business operated as a partnership until 1929 when if became a 
private limited company and 1949 when it became a public limited company. Both 
times the change was triggered by the death of the head of the family and the 
need to fund death duties. Before 1929, all of the capital had been provided by the 
Smith family and they retained ownership of all of the shares after incorporation. 
They did, however, sell preference shares to the other partners to raise funds. 
External shareholders were introduced in 1949 but the family retained 34% of the 
shares and a further 18% were held by other members of staff.  A member of the 754
Smith family (David Smith) also remained Chairman until 1972. The Smith family 
were paid a fixed return on the capital they had invested until 1929 when the firm 
was incorporated and a dividend thereafter.755
How the Smith family managed the business between 1920 and 1970 is explored 
in detail in subsequent sections of the chapter. The practices, however, changed 
significantly over the fifty years. Between 1920 and the late 1940's, there was 
stability and little change to management processes. The subsequent period to 
1970 was more turbulent as the firm went through a significant reorganisation 
which lasted more than 20 years.
Table 4.4 summarises the key dates in WHS' history and is for contextual 
purposes only.
 Wilson, First, 351.754
 Wilson, First.755
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Performance Management and Measurement
As discussed in Chapter 1, and following the same format as the chapters on M&S 
and Boots, the following sections will describe how each of the main elements of a 
PMM framework operated in WHS. While much of it is descriptive, to allow an 
assessment of the system as a whole, more detailed discussion and analysis is 
presented in each section on those areas which are specifically relevant to the 
research questions raised in Chapter 1. A conclusion at the end draws together the 
main findings.
Table 4.4: WHS expansion - key dates
Year
1792 Firm founded when HW Smith opened a news shop in London.
1829 WH Smith takes sole charge of the business and expands wholesale operations. 
All supplied from their London premises.
1848 The firm won their first contract to manage bookstalls on station concourses with 
London and North Western Railway.
1853 First regional wholesale house opened in Birmingham.
1891 WH Smith dies and replaced by W. Frederick Smith (Lord Hambleden). He 
persuades a close friend, CH StJ Hornby, to join the firm in 1893. Hornby 
remained with the firm until his death in 1946 and was the most influential partner 
from the early 1900's. 
1905 Lose railway contract with LNWR and GWR. Expansion of retail stores.
1929 Firm becomes a private limited company after the death of WF Smith in 1928. All 
shares retained by the Smith family. WH Smith becomes Chairman.
1948 Appointment of Charles Troughton to the Board. Peter Bennett joined in 1951. 
They were the first non-family appointments to the partnership/ Board since 1894.
1949 Firm becomes a public limited company after the death of WH Smith in 1948. 
Majority of shares controlled by the Smith family and employees. David Smith, 
youngest brother of WH Smith, becomes Chairman.
1956 Start a major review of the businesses organisational structures, processes and 
measures. Reorganisation was a consistent feature of the next 15 years.
1960 New corporate structure announced to the firm.
1969 David Smith resigns as Managing Director of WHS but remains Chairman until 
1972 when he is is replaced by Charles Troughton.
Sources: Wilson, First.
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Objectives of the Organisation
In the literature, all of the separate elements of a PMM system should be aligned 
to deliver the objectives of the organisation. This section will consider what the 
objectives of WHS were and whether they changed over the period. It will also 
consider how these objectives influenced the running of the business. Later 
sections explore alignment between objectives, structures and processes.
Before 1970 and the publication of its first corporate plan, the firm did not explicitly 
state its objectives. However, based upon the sources, the business appears to 
have been guided by three principle objectives. Firstly, ensuring the continuing 
viability of the family firm and a consistent return on their capital (especially before 
1949). Secondly, supporting both employees and local communities (throughout 
the period) and, thirdly, and only latterly, growth (primarily after 1950).
The first two objectives were strongly influenced by the personal objectives of the 
Smith family. A 1936 memo to the partners by the solicitors of WH Smith (Lord 
Hambleden) described his principal objectives:
“1. that he shall be in the position at his death of passing on the business 
and its control in as nearly as may be the same condition as that in which 
he inherited it and;
2. that future of the present Managing Directors of the Company shall be 
assured (so far as is reasonably possible) in the event of his dying before 
them.”756
The objectives appear unambitious but highlight a dynastic determination to 
maintain a family business which was already 144 years old and the sense of 
responsibility he had towards those it employed. His father had expressed similar 
views in a speech to over 1,000 employees at a celebratory dinner in 1920 where 
he made repeated references to maintaining the family business, to the 
importance of maintaining the traditions of the business and to the importance of 
 The memo outlined options to limit death duties and was presented to the directors by 756
Bircham & Co. WHS 912/ 7 (8 October 1936).
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maintaining the loyalty and trust that existed between the family and the 
employees.  David Smith, who was Chairman between 1948 and 1972, shared 757
similar views. He was described by a non-executive director as a “very fine man 
who believed himself to be the trustee of the whole business and not just of his 
families fortune but of every employee in it.”  This sense of trusteeship and 758
determination to preserve the stats-quo was particularly expressed during times of 
change. After the firm became a public limited company in 1949, David Smith 
reassured employees that there would be little change.  Similar comments had 759
been made when it was incorporated in 1929 and WH Smith reassured his staff 
that the firm would continue much as it had: “though legally speaking, the Firm will 
in future be a company and heads of it Directors, I hope that to the staff we shall 
continue to be ‘The Firm’ and ‘The Partners’ as heretofore.”  And they were, for 760
the next 30 years.761
The sources suggest, however, that trusteeship of the firm went beyond the Smith 
family. Partners and employees were repeatedly reminded that they too had a 
responsibility to maintain the traditions of the firm. When a dinner was held in 1922 
for the recently appointed partners, Newsbasket reported that “one feels confident 
that they have started well and will equip themselves for the great work they are 
undertaking - the carrying on of the traditions of WH Smith & Son.”  One of the 762
other partners (Hornby) also reminded the employees of their own responsibility to 
the firm in a 1920 speech: 
“And this brings me to my last word of all, which is that we are all of us 
servants of the Firm, which is the true and living entity, which outlasts the 
 Newsbasket, October, 1920. 757
 WHS Q 14 Reminiscences: H N Saunders (1910-87), (Non-executive Director 758
1956-78); 4 Jun 1979.
 WHS Q 31 Reminiscences: P W Bennett (1917-96); May 1982. Bennett argued that it 759
conversely had a profound impact on the employees.
 Newsbasket, March 1929.760
 The term 'partners' was still used to describe the directors in 1960 but less evident in 761
the sources thereafter (Newsbasket, July 1960).
 Newsbasket,  February 1922.762
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span of our short lives, whose high traditions it is our bounden duty to hand 
on untarnished to those who come after us.”   763
The sources suggest that the focus on stability was matched by a conservative 
approach to managing the business. The priority was ensuring a return on capital 
ahead of longer term growth and investment was constrained. Despite the rapid 
expansion in multiple retailing in other sectors, four times between 1923 and 1931, 
the partners wrote to senior management forbidding further capital expenditure.  764
Correspondence between the accounts department and store managers focused 
more on management of stock, cash and expenses than on sales.  In the 765
minutes, the few discussions on performance focused on balance sheets.  The 766
partners themselves managed the main bank account in the 1920’s and 1930’s. 
One partner later recalled why: “I used to be terrified of having to do the 
reconciliation at the end of the week… it did at least tell everyone whether we 
were solvent or not, and now I know only once a month when Mr Alfred tells 
me.”  The concerns may have been exaggerated, WHS never made a loss in the 767
period and only three times resorted to an overdraft at the end of the year.768
The second objective suggested by the sources, and linked to the first, was the 
responsibility the firm felt for its employees. This was consistent throughput the 
period. In 1970, the first 5 year Plan started: “In origin, WH Smith & Son Limited is 
a corporate body made up of a variety of human beings, governed by a number of 
legal rules and guided by certain moral conventions” and went on to state that 
 Newsbasket,  October 1920. Ideas of family, tradition, loyalty and continuity were 763
repeated frequently in Newsbasket in the early 1920's and are discussed in more detail in 
the section 'Linking the System' which explores the culture within WHS.
 WHS 215 Partners Minute Book: 26/11/23, 24/09/25, 25/9/29; WHS Y 119: 7/7/31.764
 WHS X 3 Bournemouth Balance Sheets (1923 to 1958). Included an annual letter sent 765
by the accounts department commenting on performance.
 In one typical entry, a manager was told that “the seriousness of his excessive and 766
increased stock was pointed out and he was given a hint to the effect that other managers 
could be found to produce better profits with less capital.” WHS 215 Partners Minute 
Book. 3 July 1923.
 WHS Archives: WHS 285/11 Extract of speech given by M Hornby 1965.767
  Audited accounts. (WHS X141 to X160).768
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“finally and perhaps overriding all else, the continuing and increasing profit must 
provide a secure base for the development of the lives of the people who work for 
the Firm.”  The patriarchal responsibility was reflected in where the Smith family 769
focused their own attention - WH Smith personally championed and launched the 
new Welfare Department in 1943/44.  When directors were finally allocated 770
specific areas of responsibility within the firm in the late 1950's, David Smith 
managed the 'Staff Director.'771
The objective helped contribute to a sense of loyalty among employees towards 
the firm and reflected in unusually long lengths of service.  The term 'loyalty' is a 772
common feature in the sources from the 1920's and still evident at the end of the 
period. Loyalty and the culture of the organisation is discussed in more detail in 
the section on 'Linking the system' below as it helped align the objectives of 
employees and the organisation in the absence of structures and process.
The final objective of the organisation was growth. As the 1970 5 year plan stated 
in its introduction “The first economic task is to make a continuing and increasing 
profit.”  It was not until the 1950's that the directors regularly referred to growth. 773
Although there were occasional references to sales and profit before the war in 
minutes and Newsbasket articles, they tended to relate to specific shops or 
products. A Wholesale employee later recalled that they never really knew how 
much profit they made and did not really think about the future.  From the 774
mid-1950's, internal speeches made by David Smith more explicitly referred to 
 From the opening paragraph of the first 5 Year Plan 1970 (WHS 650).769
 The new department “concerns, in particular, the mental, spiritual and physical well 770
being of the staff). From a copy of his 1943 speech presented around the country (WHS 
1570)
 WHS 816: Minutes: Holdings Executive; 1960-62. January 1962771
 In 1920, a senior manager argued that they had more long-serving employees than 772
any other firm in the British Empire (Newsbasket, October 1920). In 1979, Straubenzee 
refers to the unusually long length of service in the 1960's compared to firms such as 
Marks and Spencer (WHS Q 2 Reminiscences: H H van Straubenzee (1914-2002)
 WHS 650 Five-Year Plan: WHS (Holdings) Ltd; 1970/71-1974/75773
 WHS Q 10 Reminiscences: K A Jessup (1914-2002), H A Johnston (1907-81); W 774
Spicer (1909-81), C E Woodhurst (1910-88).
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profit and sales growth.  A new magazine was introduced in 1948, Talking Shop, 775
which was aimed at store managers and allowed them to share best practice in 
improving sales and more generally managing their stores.   776
In WHS, the evolution in the objectives of the organisation provides a contrast with 
the other two case studies where objectives were broadly maintained throughout 
the period and were based on growth rather than stability. WHS therefore provides 
some insights into how changes in objectives influence how performance is 
managed and the extent to which a performance management system can be 
dynamic (see Chapter 1). PMM literature, following Chandler, argues that 
structures change/ need to change following changes in objectives and strategy. 
And, in a feedback loop, the information which then flows from the revised PMM 
system in-turn can lead to further changes in objectives and strategy. The 
literature implies a relatively deterministic and linear relationship. As will become 
evident, the experience of WHS highlights just how messy and complex the 
changes can be in practice.
Organisational Structure 
This section will consider how WHS structured its organisation and the extent to 
which this influenced its performance management and measurement processes. 
It will also explain the roles and responsibilities of directors and employees within 
the structure. Given the changes in the firm's objectives, it will also describe how 
the structures changed over the period. It is split into two sections.
1920 to the late1940’s
The structure that existed in 1920 had evolved over the previous 75 years as WHS 
expanded its operations. When the business started opening stores in 1904 they 
simply copied the structures used to manage Wholesale Houses for the larger ('A') 
 Newsbasket, May 1955, November 1955, February 1956, May 1956.775
 Early editions included articles such as “Ten minute talks to ambitious assistants - Put 776
first things first,” “No such thing as an unimportant Customer,” “A better Business 
Chart” (February 1948).
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stores and Bookstalls for the the smaller stores ('B') Stores. The resulting structure 
was a curious mix of centralised and decentralised structures that lacked an 
obvious logic. It remained, however, largely unchanged until the 1950's.
Figure 4.1 shows how the business was organised in 1920. The organisation chart 
has been created from several sources none of which describe on their own the 
overall structure and there may be some smaller departments not included. It 
does, however, identify the primary departments in the organisation and shows the 
different reporting structures for the 'A' stores and Wholesale Houses from the 'B' 
stores and Bookstalls. It highlights the large number of departments/ wholesale 
houses/ 'A' stores reporting directly into the partners. Each element of the 
structure is described in more detail below.
The Partners/ Directors
The partners (who retained the title until 1960 despite becoming ‘directors’ in 
1929), principally comprised extended members of the Smith family. A few close 
family friends had been appointed in the 19th century, but between 1894 and 1948 
every appointment to the Partnership/ Board was a relative of an existing 
partner.  Numbers varied over the period but there was never more than seven.777
 CH Hornby, a close friend of WF Smith, was appointed in 1894. CHW Troughton, 777
another family friend, was appointed director in 1948. (WHS Y123 Minutes and WHS Q 15 
Reminiscences: Hon. J F A Smith (1906-80))
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Figure 4.1: WHS Organisation Chart in 1920
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Family members were invited to join the firm by Lord Hambleden almost 
immediately after University and had little or no business experience. Their two/ 
three year training programme involved working in all departments.  According to 778
an article in Newsbasket in 1920, it was a training programme which had changed 
little since the 1840’s.  A training programme for new partners in 1952 highlights 779
little further development between 1920 and 1950.  Having joined, partners 780
typically remained with the firm for the remainder of their working lives. Table 4.5 
shows the partners/ directors at selected dates, their length of service at the time 
and their relationship to the Smith family. It highlights the influence of the family 
and the length of service of some partners at any point in time.
Table 4.5: Managing partners/ directors at selected dates
1920 Appt 1931 Appt 1962a Appt
WF Smith (founding 
family)
1891 WH Smith 
(son of WF Smith)
1925 D Smith 
(brother of WH Smith)
1935
AD Acland (brother in 
law)
1885 CH StJ Hornby 
(friend of WF Smith)
1894 M Hornby
(son of CH Hornby)
1924
CH StJ Hornby 
(friend of WF Smith)
1894 AD Power (cousin) 1911 AW Acland 
(son  of AD Acland)
1924
AD Power (cousin) 1911 WHD Acland (brother 
in law)
1914 CW Troughton 




1914 E Seymour (brother 
in law)




(son of CH Hornby)
1924
AW Acland 
(son  of AD Acland)
1924
Avg. length of 
service
21 15 26
a Represents the members of the Holding Executive.
Source: Newsbasket (October 1920); Board Minutes 13 July 1931 (WHS Y 119); Holding 
Executive Minutes January 1962 (WHS 816). 
 Recalled by Michael Hornby in a speech given in 1965 (WHS 285/11).778
 Newsbasket October 1920.779
 WHS 588 Minutes/Papers: Directors' Informal Meetings; 1952-55. Training programme 780
for Alfred Acland and Julian Smith 1952 - 1954.
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Within the sources, there is no explanation of why they retained the structure. 
Literature suggests that family structures like WHS continued into the 1950's and 
1960's but is less clear on the relative merits of these structures and their impact 
on long term performance.  However, from a performance management 781
perspective in WHS, the persistence of the structure is consistent with a 
conservative and inward looking approach to management evident throughout the 
sources in the 1920's and 1930's and an objective which sought to preserve the 
family firm.
The partners sat together in one room and, until the late 1950’s, had no specific 
departmental responsibilities nor specific direct reports. Instead, they were 
expected to be knowledgeable of all parts of the business.  Their activities are 782
not explicitly listed in sources although at least part of them included relatively 
menial administrative tasks such as making out salary cheques and calculating 
interest payments.  At least during the 1920’s and 1930’s, some of the partners 783
recalled not being very busy and that the business largely ran itself.  This is 784
supported by a management philosophy which placed emphasis on the individual 
employee and their ability to deliver performance without significant intervention by 
the partners. CH Hornby wrote to a colleague during World War II that “I have 
always gone on the principle that it is best to let other people do the work and give 
them full responsibility as a free a hand as possible.”  It was later summarised by 785
another partner as a philosophy typified by the idea of the Newcastle Wholesale 
manager who was “given the money and told to report back at the end of the 
 Chandler, Scale and Scope and Gospel, Markets, are generally critical of the approach 781
arguing that family firms failed to invest in their businesses, failed to introduce managerial 
competencies and were content to prioritise a consistent return on capital rather than 
growth. The hypothesis, has been challenged with examples of family run firms which 
adopted modern management structures while retaining family control and invested 
heavily in the long-term growth of the business (Church, Family Firm, Foreman-Peck, 
Extreme divorce, Hannah, Divorce of ownership).
 WHS Q 3 Reminiscences: M C StJ Hornby (1899-1987).782
 Speech given by Michael Hornby in 1965 referring to his career in WHS. WHS 285: 783
Photo/ letters/ speeches M Hornby
 Q 15 Reminiscences: Hon. J F A Smith (1906-80); WHS Q 4 Reminiscences: A W 784
Acland (1897-1992)
 Letter from CH StJ Hornby to AD Power referred to in the written reminiscences of AD 785
Power: 50 Years in the Book trade.  (WHS PA 445)
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year.”  A consultant report in 1956 similarly referred to "the emphasis placed by 786
the Company on the initiative of the manager in running his branch."  It was also 787
evident in the minutes where the performance of business was rarely mentioned 
and even then erred against intervention. As a board minute stated in 1931: 
“Mr CH StJ Hornby spoke strongly against general Head Office interference 
with Wholesale House expenses. The Manager’s own self-interest should 
be considered sufficient inducement to him to keep expenses down as far 
as possible. This was generally agreed.”788
The structure and approach encouraged performance management by exception 
as partners left the on-going responsibility for the performance of the departments 
and stores to their senior managers. This approach would suggest a need for 
either sophisticated control mechanisms to monitor their performance or for the 
partners to have considerable trust in their managers. As will become clearer later, 
WHS preferred the latter - trust in their managers but in return they expected 
loyalty to their objectives.
Wholesale Houses and ‘A’ Stores
Until the late 1950’s, each of the Wholesale Houses and A’ Shops operated as 
separate, independent businesses with no intermediate structure between them 
and the partners. Effectively, the partners had up to 70 separate businesses 
reporting directly into them. Each manager was accountable for the profit of his 
own store and largely free to operate as he chose. An employee later recalled that 
“the A shop manger was the kingpin, he bought what he liked, he sold what he 
liked at what price he liked.”  The view is supported by statistical data which 789
 WHS Q 9: Reminiscences: Lady Helen Smith (1908-2003); WHS Q 31 Reminiscences: 786
P W Bennett (1917-96).
 WHS 798: Retail Practices Report 29/6/56, Report No. 3.787
 WHS Y 118: Minute Book, 29 June 1931. There are few references to performance in 788
subsequent years.
 WHS Q 17 Reminiscences: A J Watson (1916-82) & C G Baker (1916-2000) (Area 789
Managers to 1978/79) 15 Aug 1979.
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shows that they only purchased 34% of their range from a Head Office department 
in 1919.  Partners and the rest of Head Office were kept at arms length and 790
partners were not even invited to the Wholesale Houses annual conferences.791
These businesses were run by managers who were promoted from within. The 
records show that they rarely left the business, transferring between stores if they 
sought a change. For example, Mr Fox ran the Oxford Street 'A' store from 1931 to 
1940, Harrogate from 1941 to 1946 and then Manchester from 1947 to 1953. The 
Newbury store only had two managers between 1922 and 1958 and there were a 
number of other examples of store managers working in the same store for more 
than 15 years.  792
Buying Departments, Bookstalls and ‘B’ Shops
The remainder of the business operated through a series of Merchandise 
Departments run by experienced senior managers who were responsible for 
buying and supplying 'B' shops and Bookstalls. These Merchandise Departments, 
like ‘A’ shops and Wholesale Houses, had considerable autonomy and produced 
separate accounts. They reported individually into the partners. Merchandise 
directors, like all senior roles within the business were generally recruited from 
within the business but they were not necessarily specialists. The partners chose 
to rotate senior managers around departments prioritising the personal qualities of 
the individual over functional expertise. Therefore GW Goad was running the 
Library Department in 1922 but the Shops Department by 1930 and Spratling was 
the first head of the Personnel Department in 1949 having previously run the 
Library Department.793
 WHS 254 Accounts, publicity department, shops and stalls 1919 - 1922.790
 WHS Q 2 Reminiscences: H H van Straubenzee (1914-2002); 4 Aug 1977791
 Calculated from the accounting records (WHS X 16 Branch Summary Sheets: `A' 792
Shops; 1907/08-1957/58).
 WHS 215 Partners Minute Book 1911 - 1933, 1941 - 1946 (1 November 1922 and 15 793
September 1930); WHS Y 124 - Minute Book 1948/50 (4 April 1949).
 215
The ‘B’ shops and Bookstalls operated as distribution outlets. Unlike ‘A’ shops and 
Wholesale Houses, these shops were not profit accountable and their gross profits 
were accounted for within the buying departments. Store managers had to 
purchase through the Head Office department but could choose what they ordered 
and how frequently. There were a number of tiers of management between the 
store manager and the partners. Hierarchically, ‘B’ shops and Bookstalls were 
grouped into a series of districts run by a ‘Superintendent’. The Superintendents 
reported into a ‘Shops Manager’/ ‘Bookstalls Manager’ who was based in Head 
Office and was responsible for liaising with the Merchandise Departments, 
managing the performance of the stores (sales, expenses and stock) and of 
managing the store employees. They reported separately into the partners. 
The distinction between a ‘buying’ side and a ‘selling’ side of the business is 
typical of all retailers but in WHS they had both. In 'B' stores, the 'buying' side was 
dominant and it was the responsibility of the shops to sell what supply bought.  794
In 'A' stores, the 'buying' side had little direct influence. From the late 1950’s, the 
hierarchy was formally altered as the ‘selling’ side became the dominant party for 
all stores (see below).
Accounting Department
As in other retail organisations, business performance management was 
supported by the accounting departments. Their role before the 1950’s, however, 
was focused on administration and the generation of accurate numbers rather than 
the analysis and interpretation more closely associated with performance 
management. 
Accounting was performed by the 'Balance Department' (renamed the Accounts 
Department in December 1944).  Its role is not described in the sources until an 795
article they wrote for Talking Shop in 1951 which suggests little evolution in its role 
since the previous century: 
 Explicitly confirmed in the minutes 24 April 1952. WHS 588 Minutes/Papers.794
 WHS Y 123 - Minute Book 1944/48. December 4 1944. Even in the newly named 795
department there was still a ‘Balance’ section within the Accounts Department.
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“Here the branch balance ledgers and the statistical records are kept in 
much the same form as they were kept in the days of Mr. WH Smith and his 
son, his grandson and his great-grandsons… your weekly statements are 
checked, as they were checked in your grandfather’s time, against hand 
written entries in ledgers.”  796
The description, together with the name of the department, suggests a primary 
responsibility towards accuracy rather than analysis and interpretation. The view is 
supported by an examination of the letters they wrote annually to each 'A' store on 
submission of their annual results which provide little analysis of the drivers of 
performance.  This relatively passive role towards performance management by 797
the accounting department contrasts with the practices in both Boots and M&S. It 
may also not have been the preferred style of the Chief Accountant. In 1919 and 
new into his role he was admonished twice by the partners for directly interfering in 
the performance of individual stores and banned from writing to them directly.798
The weakness of the accounting department was specifically referred to in the oral 
reminiscences. Peter Bennett and a non-Executive Director both described how 
primitive accounting was when they joined the business in the 1950’s.  A 799
consultant report in 1956 similarly noted that “the accounting reports reflect the 
present organisational structure and are not considered to be adequate for 
effective control by Management” and “are more concerned with accounting 
finesses than with management control, requiring the detailed scrutiny and 
interpretation of a trained accountant.”  However, it is not clear that these 800
weaknesses account for the general weakness in performance management 
 Talking Shop. January 1951 in an article written by the Accounts department to explain 796
their structure and role.
 WHS X 3 Balance Sheets & A/Cs: 19 `A' Shops; various years 1920/21-1958/59 797
 Partnership minutes of meeting. WHS 215 Partners Minute Book: 1911 - 1933, 1941 - 798
1946. (1 May 1919 and 2 December 1921)
 WHS Q 31 Reminiscences: P W Bennett (1917-96) and WHS Q 14 Reminiscences: H 799
N Saunders (1910-87)
 WHS 799: Organisation and Accounting (10/9/56).800
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practices before the end of the 1950's. Accounting was not the only area where 
WHS failed to develop its processes. Rather, the lack of development was 
symptomatic of a more general reluctance (or inability) to modernise the business. 
Area Management
Within this structure the District Superintendent (later Area Manager) provided the 
link between Head Office and the 'B' stores and Bookstalls. However, in the 
sources it is not clear whether their role was about performance management or 
compliance/ inspection.
In 1931, when the sales performance generally was poor, the partners expressed 
some concern that the Superintendents were too focused on administrative tasks 
such as stock taking and not enough on promoting sales. There was even a 
suggestion that they should be replaced by a district sales manager and an 
accountant. The Superintendents disagreed and no changes were made.  801
During the early 1950’s the partners were still concerned that they were too 
preoccupied with administrative tasks and not operating effectively. A memo to the 
partners described their role (or lack of role): 
“At present he is a part-time salesman, part-time storekeeper, a part-time 
clerk, a part-time store manager, a very extensive traveller looking after a 
large number of widely separated branches. He had many masters - the 
Firm, the Shops and Bookstall Department mangers, and all the Supply 
Department Managers.”  802
A series of memos were circulated among the directors with Peter Bennett, 
recently appointed as director, proposing changes. The number of branches each 
one was responsible for was reduced to allow them to spend more direct time with 
store managers.  They were allocated a clerk to undertake the audit roles they 803
 Summary of conclusions of the Superintendent Conference on January 10 1932. WHS 801
588.
 Memo (2 May 1952) to the partners probably written by the Head of Shops. WHS 588.802
 Memo written by Peter Bennett to the partners (5/12/52). WHS 588.803
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had previously conducted and it was made clear that their primary responsibility 
was towards improving sales. It was also agreed that all information sent from 
Head Office to the stores would flow through them.  The revised responsibilities 804
created a clear responsibility towards managing performance and was a pre-
cursor to the wider changes that followed in the late 1950's. The role remained 
largely unchanged over the next 20 years although they were renamed 'Area 
Managers'. Interestingly, like in Boots, their role was challenged by an external 
consultant in the 1960's who questioned whether they should operate as 
inspectors rather than performance managers. As in Boots, the suggestion was 
rejected.805
1950’s onwards - all change
Not surprisingly, 1920 to 1949 was characterised by an extended period of 
organisational stability.  In contrast, the following 20 years marked a significant 806
change in the organisational structure of WHS as they centralised control and the 
directors assumed greater direct responsibility for the operational management of 
the business. There was no single cause for the change, no specific crisis. 
Externally, Britain in the post-war period experienced 30 years of rapid economic 
growth with rapid technical development, relatively full employment, increasingly 
influential unions and greater competition. These factors placed pressure on 
existing corporate structures, created opportunities for change and contributed to a 
general modernisation in management practices in the 1950's and 1960's.  807
These factors may have influenced change in WHS but the service sector more 
generally and retail specifically had been undertaking structural change since the 
 Memo (2 May 1952) to the partners probably written by the Head of Shops. WHS 588.804
 WHS 812: Report on Retailing and Wholesaling Emerson 1965.805
 The reasons for the long period of stability are not the subject of the thesis and 806




1920's - compared to them, WHS was an exception rather than following wider 
patterns in British industry.  808
The sources attribute the impetus to change in WHS to the Chairman. In the oral 
reminiscences three directors attributed the start of the change process to the 
Chairman who, they argued, recognised the firm had fallen behind other multiple 
retailers.  There is some support for the view in the actions of Smith. He took 809
responsibility for establishing a personnel department in 1943, already common in 
other multiple retailers.  He also recruited two external directors in the 1940's, 810
the first from outside the families since 1894. Both already had business 
experience; Troughton was a lawyer and Bennett a retailer. Smith also chose his 
more reform minded youngest brother (David) to succeed him as Chairman over 
the middle brother. Whether Smith realised the impact that these actions would 
take is not recorded. A further impetus for change was also created when he died 
in 1948 and the business had to become a public limited company. It forced what 
had been an inward looking organisation to consider their external shareholders 
and led to the appointment of several 'non-executive' directors.
The structure which emerged was more consistent with both Boots and M&S. 
Figure 4.2 shows how the organisation was structured in 1960. It is based on a 
description of the new structure in Newsbasket (July 1960) which showed 
membership of the Boards and from the Holdings Executive Minutes which 
described activities.
 Banking, for example, which shared similar traits to retailers such as high transaction 808
volumes and branches geographically spread, underwent substantial structural changes in 
the 1920's (see Wardley, Commercial banking Industry; Batiz-Lazo and Wardley, Banking 
on Change.)
 Bennett, Julian Smith and Saunders (WHS Q 31/ 15/ 14 reminiscences).809
 WHS 1570 Viscount Hambleden Speeches 16 June 1943. Boots, Marks and Spencer 810
and John Lewis all had personal departments before the war.
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Figure 4.2: WHS Organisation Chart in 1960
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The principal changes were as follows:
(i) There was alignment across the structure and the distinction between 'A' and 
'B' stores was ended. Accounting systems and reward systems were aligned 
between the two.811
(ii) A hierarchy was created which eliminated the large number of departments/ 
shops/ wholesale houses reporting directly to the directors. All stores reported 
into a Retail Management Group (1957) and all Wholesale Houses reported 
into a Wholesale Department (by 1960).  In 1962, a Central Buying Group 812
was established for buying departments.  A matrix still existed but according 813
to a memo written in 1963, the sellers were acknowledged as the dominant 
party and buyers had no authority over shops.814
(iii) Directors were given specific responsibilities with the largest areas managed 
by the newer directors. Bennett managed the stores and Troughton the buying 
and wholesale departments.
(iv) A new board structure was created. The existing executive board and its 
members were maintained (but renamed as the Holdings Executive). The 
purpose of the Executive was more performance oriented focusing on, as 
Newsbasket reported, "objectives, policies, plans and standards."  Based on 815
minutes of their meetings, they were also involved in evaluating 
performance.  Reporting into the Holdings Executive, the Board of Directors 816
of WH Smith and Son Ltd was essentially an operating board, responsible for 
implementing the policy decisions made by the Executive.  However, it also 817
created pathways for employees to become directors for the first time.
 WHS 1090: Review of Retail Managers Pay Structure811
 WHS Y 173 - Minute Book 1956/60: 15 October 1957.812
 WHS 816: Minutes: Holdings Executive; 1960-62: 1 August 1962.813
 WHS 816: Minutes: Holdings Executive; 1960-62. (24 January 1963).814
 Newsbasket, July 1960.815
 WHS 816: Minutes: Holdings Executive; 1960-62.816
 Newsbasket, July 1960.817
 222
The reorganisations, however, had a wider impact than just the organisation 
structure. Minutes, Newsbasket and consulting reports provided evidence of the 
extent of the changes. WHS introduced new management processes and even 
established a subsidiary which advised other companies on reorganisation.  818
Accounting systems were modernised and reward mechanisms overhauled.  819
They recruited externally for a number of senior positions and made redundant 
several long serving senior managers - unheard of before 1950.  They also 820
looked externally for advice. Saunders later commented:
“I think that one of the things which Troughton and Bennett realised was 
that the company was very much dependent, too dependent on its own 
knowledge and own experience and wasn’t outward looking or seeking 
outward assistance.”  821
In 1952, Deloitte's were employed to conduct a review of budgetary control.  In 822
1956, two separate reviews were started into ‘Retail Practices’ and ‘Organisation 
and Accounting’ which lasted over two years, generated more than 25 reports and 
led to the reorganisations that culminated in the announcement of the new 
structure in 1960.  Over the next 14 years, there were at least a further 11 823
reviews conducted by external consultants.824
 Newsbasket, April 1966. Research and Marketing Limited was established in 1959.818
 WHS 1090: Review of Retail Managers Pay Structure.819
 Henry Straubenzee was recruited in 1957 as managing director of a subsidiary 820
company before becoming Staff Director in 1960 (Newsbasket July 1960), Keith Oliver 
was recruited from Boots and became Merchandise Director in 1962 (WHS 816: Minutes: 
Holdings Executive; July 18 1962), Peter Bagnall and Malcolm Field, both of whom later 
became directors, were appointed in the early 1960’s (WHS Q 14 Reminiscences: H N 
Saunders); Minutes recorded several long-standing managers made redundant from 1957 
onwards.
 WHS Q 14 Reminiscences: H N Saunders (1910-87)821
 WHS 588 Minutes/Papers: Directors' Informal Meetings; 1952-55. (May 1952)822
 WHS 798: Retail Practices Report 29/6/56 and WHS 799: Organisation and Accounting 823
10/9/56 
 WHS 554/2: Papers (WKO/SMH): Merchandise Director's; 1962-73.824
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The changes largely brought WHS into line with practices in other multiple 
retailers and the structure had a more obvious performance orientation. For the 
purposes of this study, however, what is more noteworthy is not the structure that 
was created but the time taken and the opposition encountered in making the 
changes which is described below. They highlight the difficulty in changing 
processes, sometimes forgotten in PMM literature which advocates the importance 
of making systems dynamic. 
Minutes of what were described in the sources as 'Director's Informal Meetings' 
show that Bennett and Troughton were presenting proposals for change from the 
early 1950's and consultants were first employed to look at processes from 
1952.  They also show opposition from other directors and senior managers with 825
one manager arguing that change was 'impossible'.  By 1970, reorganisation 826
was still not complete with further revisions to the Board structure announced in 
Newsbasket at the end of 1969.  The sources do not directly refer to opposition 827
to change. A handwritten minute written by Troughton in 1957 referred to the need 
to introduce new directors implying opposition from the existing ones.  Speeches 828
of some of the older senior managers reported in Newsbasket suggest that they 
still looked to the past and the traditional way of doing things.  However, the 829
difficulties that the firm had in making change is reflected in the messiness of the 
process itself. Budgets were first proposed by external consultants in 1953 but not 
introduced until 1960.  The Directors agreed not to change the relationship 830
between buyers and sellers in 1952 as “it would be nearly impossible to sweep 
 WHS 588 Minutes/Papers. 26 June 1952.825
 WHS 588 Minutes/Papers. 24 April 1952. The same manager (Yates) became the first 826
internal person promoted to Director in 1956 suggesting he had some support from other 
directors.
 Newsbasket, September 1969.827
 All other minutes were typed highlighting the sensitivity of his proposals. WHS 588 828
Minutes/Papers: Directors' Informal Meetings, November 1957.
 While speeches by David Smith encouraged the firm to look forward and to the future, 829
others reported in Newsbasket urged the firm to look to the past and carry on the 
traditions of the firm. 
 WHS 588 Minutes/Papers. 26 June 1952 and WHS 808: Report (Peat Marwick): 830
Management Accounting; 5 Jan 1960.
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away the old established responsibilities” but reversed the decision in 1957.  A 831
new bonus scheme was introduced in 1958 but core elements of the old scheme 
were reintroduced in the early 1960’s.  A restructure of the shops division 832
created the Retail Management Group in 1957 but after failing to “introduce a 
more relaxed and enlightened senior management attitude” it was reorganised and 
renamed the Retail Directors Office in 1964.  The Holdings Executive was 833
created in 1960 but replaced by a Holdings Board in 1967.834
The organisational inertia before 1950 and the subsequent change process 
present interesting questions in their own right. However, within the context of this 
thesis, the two more pertinent issues arising from the examination of WHS' 
organisational structures were the apparent weakness of the pre-1950 structure 
and the difficulty they subsequently had in changing the structure.
The pre-1950 structure was not standardised and, with more than 60 departments/ 
wholesale houses/ stores reporting directly into the partners, made an active 
approach to performance management difficult. Hornby stressed that he preferred 
to delegate responsibility to senior individuals within the organisation and it 
appears that Wholesale Houses and 'A' stores had considerable freedom to run 
their own businesses. However, given the structure, he may have had little choice. 
The weak management structure that seemed to exist at WHS is consistent with 
Chandler's description of British family firms which were slow to professionalise 
their structures.  The partners might respond that there was no need to 835
'professionalise' given the business continued to meet its objectives. Perhaps a 
strong hierarchy is not always necessary to manage firms, even those with large 
numbers of branches spread far from the direct control of the owners. But, if not 
structure, how was control maintained? How did the firm ensure that it continued 
 WHS 588 Minutes/Papers, 24 April 1952. Decision overturned 29 April 1957 (WHS 831
799: Organisation and Accounting Reports).
 WHS 1090: Review of Retail Managers Pay Structure.832
 WHS 812. Report on Retailing and Wholesaling Emerson 1965, 4.833
 Newsbasket, September 1967.834
 Chandler, Scape and Scope.835
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to meet its objectives? It may have been that the external context made it easier 
for WHS to survive. Price competition was hampered by the NBA/ RPM and there 
were no other large multiple retailers in their sector. However, the independent 
news sector was strong and part of WHS' product range (stationery, small leather 
goods, gramophone records) faced competition from variety stores. At least part of 
the explanation for their failure to develop their organisational structures is 
therefore that there were other features in their structures and processes which 
compensated for the apparently flawed structure. These are explored in later 
sections
The second distinguishing feature of this section is the difficulty that the business 
had in implementing change in the 1950's and 1960's and, while they may have 
finally created what Saunders described as "a company which was structured from 
a management point of view and marketing point of view upon modern lines", the 
journey was difficult.  While the difficulties of organisational change are well 836
documented in the literature, the example of WHS helps illustrate the length of 
time that reorganisations take, especially those that touch all of the separate 
elements of a PMM system. Perhaps the creation of a 'dynamic' PMM system 
advocated in the current literature and which responds to changes in strategy and 
external environment is not achievable and, if it isn't does this undermine PMM 
systems as we currently understand them? This will be explored further in the 
overall conclusion to the thesis.
Processes 
The next sections review the performance management processes operated by 
WHS over the period. As in both Boots and M&S, three broad groups of processes 
are analysed: those that focus on future performance (planning, targeting, 
forecasting), those that focus on evaluation of performance and finally, those that 
focus on motivating and rewarding performance.
 WHS Q 14 Reminiscences: H N Saunders (1910-87) (Non-executive Director 836
1956-78).
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The sources (or lack thereof) suggest that pre-1950’s WHS was a ‘process lite’ 
organisation. A guide had been produced in 1908 (“Store Manager Guide”) which, 
at 127 pages, was comprehensive but it was guidelines rather than rules and 
almost entirely ignored processes.  There is nothing in the sources to suggest 837
that the guide was updated. There are copies of the 1915 and 1930 “Printed Rules 
to be Followed by Managers and Staff” but they were only one page long and, as 
the name suggests, were rules rather than description of processes.  It is 838
unlikely that other manuals existed - a 1956 consultants report noted the general 
lack of standardised processes and the reliance placed instead on the store 
manager’s initiative.  It was only in the latter half of the 1950's, that policy 839
manuals were introduced. For example, in 1958, a ‘Retail Manual of Policy and 
Practice’ was introduced by the newly formed Retail Management Group.840
Planning for the future: strategic planning, budgeting, forecasting and 
targeting
In PMM, the strategy and long-term planning help ensure the objectives of the 
organisation are translated into activities. This section will explore the processes 
that WHS used to plan for the future and consider how these were converted into 
measurable targets or budgets.
Before 1950, there is little evidence of formal planning. Although the business 
grew, expanded into new areas and the partners examined opportunities for 
potential future growth, initiatives were not part of a well defined process but 
appear to be a response to immediate crises/ opportunities or to ideas generated 
by individuals from inside or outside the business. In a speech, Hornby credited 
the opening of the Stationery Division at the start of the century to a suggestion by 
 WHS O 51 - Shop managers Guide 1908 p. 12837
 WHS 446 - Printed rules to be observed by managers and staff. 1915 and 1930838
 WHS 798: Retail Practices Report 29/6/56839
 WHS A 299 - Staff Development Programme840
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Lord Northcliffe.  Newsbasket explained the opening of shops in 1905 as a 841
response to losing two railway contracts: “if the  railway bookstall could no longer 
be the home and centre of their activities, some other place should be found.”  842
During the 1920’s and 1930’s, minutes show that a number of proposals were 
presented to the partners by employees including a mail order business, a cheap 
bookshop concept and a children's bookshop but these appear to have been ideas 
generated by the employees rather than the result of any process.  There were 843
no references in the pre-1950 minutes to planning future performance.
From the early 1950's, the minutes show that the directors increasingly considered 
the longer term and the board conducted meetings where they explicitly debated 
the future. The outputs, however, were general and did not lead to specific plans. 
The following comment after a discussion about the British economy in January 
1954 was typical:
“What should our policy be with regard to capital expenditure in England? 
The feeling was that it would have to be at a reduced rate this year and it 
might be wise to pause and to take stock on the shops’ side as to how and 
where we want to spend money in the future.”844
It was not until 1964 that they considered a more formal process. In that year 
Peter Bennett recalled attending a conference in Zurich on strategic planning. It 
took him, however, a further two years to persuade David Smith of the need for a 
long term plan.  The first five year plan (1970 to 1975) was finally presented at 845
 From 50th anniversary speech given by Hornby in 1943. WHS 587 Loose Papers: from 841
Partners' Room; 1919-54
 From a history of the firm presented as a supplement in Newsbasket October 1920 p. 842
10.
 WHS 156: Cheap Books Scheme; WHS Y 119 - Minute Book, 29 February 1932; WHS 843
Y 120 - Minute Book, 10 December 1934. 
 WHS 588 Minutes/Papers: Directors' Informal Meetings; 1952-55 (12 January 1954)844
 WHS Q 31 Reminiscences: P W Bennett (1917-96); May 1982845
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the end of the decade.  846
There are no mention in minutes or Newsbasket articles of formal processes for 
budgeting, forecasting or targeting before the end of the 1940’s. Reminiscences 
from Hugh Saunders confirm their absence.  In 1952, they commissioned 847
Deloitte’s to undertake an investigation into budgetary control but it was not until a 
further review in 1960 by Peat Marwick that a comprehensive budget process was 
introduced.  There were few references to the processes in the following years.848
There is some (limited) evidence that informal targeting and forecasting may have 
been more common at a District or shop level at a much earlier date. 
Correspondence between ‘A’ stores and the Balance Department in the 1920’s 
and 1930’s suggest that store managers were making estimates for the following 
year but not across all shops and not across all years.  In 1948, one shop 849
manager wrote a letter to “Talking Shop” in which he showed how he measured his 
performance against a weekly sales target but, given that his letter was to 
encourage other managers to do the same, it appears that it was driven by his 
own personal initiative.850
The evidence suggests that planning was not an integral part of WHS central 
processes before the 1960's and that even after initially considering it in the early 
1950's, they took a long time to create comprehensive processes. Instead, it was 
left to local managers to develop their own plans and targets (if at all). The findings 
are consistent with an organisation that prioritised stability over growth, delegated 
performance management to individuals in the organisation and struggled to 
develop processes quickly once they recognised the need.
 Five-Yr Plan: WHS (Holdings) Ltd; 1970/71-1974/75846
 WHS Q 14 Reminiscences: H N Saunders (1910-87)847
 WHS 588 Minutes/Papers: Directors' Informal Meetings; 26 June 1952 and 24 848
September 1953; WHS 808: Report (Peat Marwick): Management Accounting; 5 Jan 
1960.
 Commentaries attached to the annual balance sheet. For this store, the Balance 849
Department twice suggested what sales could be achieved the following year (1924 and 
1934). WHS X 3 Bournemouth Balance Sheets.
 Talking Shop February 1948.850
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Evaluation
This section considers the formal and informal processes the organisation used to 
evaluate their performance. It considers not only the evaluation of the financial 
performance but also the evaluation of employees.
Based on the minutes, memoirs and accounting schedules, there are no 
references to processes where the partners evaluated the consolidated 
performance of the business before the 1950's. This may be due to gaps in the 
sources but, it would have been difficult for the partners to do so anyway as the 
business could not generate a consolidated sales figure until 1964 and attempts to 
recreate earlier figures by their own accountants and by external consultants 
failed.  Even below the total business level, the sources are unusually silent on 851
the formal processes that existed to assess performance. There is evidence that 
the partners received financial reports. While only a short series of financial 
reports produced between 1919 and 1921 are available in the archives, both the 
Balance Department and consultants reports referred to performance reports 
distributed to the partners.  Unfortunately, the minutes make few references to 852
performance. It may have been that performance was discussed in separate 
meetings but there are no references to these meetings in the sources. And, the 
occasional reference to performance by partners in the minutes suggest that 
performance discussion were not outside the scope of the main board meetings. 
Sharing a room, the partners may have discussed the overall schedules and only 
brought specific issues to the board meetings by exception. 
While the evidence suggests a lack of regular, formal processes in place for 
partners to discuss performance collectively, there were processes to discuss 
 The sales figures in 10 Year Summaries in published accounts were left blank for all 851
years before 1964. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. had to limit sales comparisons with peer 
companies to post 1964 in a review despite access to the accounting records. (“WH Smith 
& Son Ltd. Study of Internal Performance Years 1960/61 to 1967/68” (29/11/68). WHS 554 
- Papers (WKO/SMH): Merchandise Director's; 1962-73) 
 WHS 254 Accounts, publicity department, shops and stalls 1919 - 1922; WHS 799: 852
Organisation and Accounting 10/9/56, Report 17; Talking Shop, January 1951..
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them at an individual level. MH Hornby later recalled that the partners separately 
met the District Superintendents once a month. The purpose was to keep "in close 
touch with the progress made by individual branches and [we] got regular 
assessments of the capabilities of managers and staff.”  On an annual basis, 853
they also met each of the Wholesale House managers to discuss their annual 
performance and again shared out the meetings between themselves.  The 854
process, appears, however to have been unstructured as a Wholesale manager 
later recalled: 
“You could either be in 2 minutes, 10 minutes or an hour depending upon 
how your year had turned out. In this particular year it was quite good and 
we were finished, it fact it never started, we watched the race on TV. Then 
we had tea together, Mr David and I, and then I think the balance sheet took 
about 3 minutes… we didn’t look at any figures at all.”  855
Directors continued to meet Wholesale House Managers individually until 1962 
and a similar process operated with the heads of the Merchandise Departments 
until 1964.  Hornby's comments suggest that the reviews were as much about 856
understanding the performance of the manager and his employees as it was about 
the drivers of performance in the store/ wholesale house.
While the pre-1950’s formal processes were relatively underdeveloped compared 
to peer companies, there were informal processes which appear to have been the 
primary mechanism that partners and senior managers used to understand and 
evaluate performance of the stores and, in particular, the individuals in the store. 
Personnel knowledge of the performance of each store and its employees was 
considered important and remained a constant feature of the business throughout 
the period. The sources show that direct contact between partners and the shops 
 M Hornby speech in 1965 - WHS 285: Photo/ letters/ speeches M Hornby853
  WHS 816: Minutes: Holdings Executive, 12 April 1962.854
 WHS Q 10 Reminiscences: K A Jessup (1914-2002), H A Johnston (1907-81); W 855
Spicer (1909-81), C E Woodhurst (1910-88); 14 Feb 1979.
 WHS 816: Minutes: Holdings Executive, 12 April 1962; WHS Y 174: W.H.Smith & Son 856
Ltd; 21 April 1964.
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was important throughout the period. AD Power was appointed in 1911, partly to 
ensure that there were enough partners to visit all stores regularly: “two partners 
and a third doubtful one would be tied to the office in London more that they ought 
to be if personal knowledge of the branches is to be maintained.”  David Smith 857
aimed to visit every shop within a three year period.  In 1952, the partners 858
agreed that they would each spend 2 weeks every year visiting branches.  In the 859
same year, the reason for expanding the number of Superintendents, despite the 
cost, was “to allow the Superintendents to have more frequent personal 
contact.”  In 1960, one of the reasons given for the reorganisation was explained 860
by the Chairman: “What I am hoping is that, because of the reorganisation, the 
partners will have a great deal more time to go out and visit branches than they 
have been having in the past few years.”  Peter Bennett may have been 861
responsible for introducing the processes which centralised performance 
management processes in Head Office in the 1950’s and 1960’s but he 
acknowledged the importance of visiting stores: “there is nothing like getting the 
smell of battle” and he went on to explain that one can get endless statistics but if 
you go out for half a day, you will learn more about what is really happening.  862
Based upon reminiscences of two members to the Smith family, these were not 
‘royal’ visits to ‘meet and greet’ staff who rarely had any contact with the partners 
but about performance. Visits tended to be unannounced and were about 
understanding how well the shop was run and the ability of the manager and their 
employees.863
 WHS 87/1 Letters on ADP partnership 1910 - 1911, 1923, 1928857
 WHS Q 17 Reminiscences: A J Watson (1916-82) & C G Baker (1916-2000) (Area 858
Managers to 1978/79); 15 Aug 1979
 WHS 588 Minutes/Papers: Directors' Informal Meetings; 1952-55 (8 January 1952)859
 Memo from Peter Bennett 5 December 1952 in WHS 588 Minutes/Papers: Directors' 860
Informal Meetings; 1952-55
 Newsbasket, July 1960861
 WHS Q 31 Reminiscences: P W Bennett (1917-96); May 1982862
 WHS Q 9: Reminiscences: Lady Helen Smith (1908-2003); 10 Jan 1979; WHS Q 8: 863
Reminiscences: Patricia Hambleden (1904-94); 26 Oct 1978.
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While informal processes were a constant feature throughout the period, from the 
1950’s onwards, there was an increasing shift towards more centralised 
processes. In 1952, the partners challenged whether they were getting sufficient 
information to make decisions.  They started to demand routinised data they had 864
not previously received.  In 1957, they commissioned a report by the Economics 865
Intelligence Unit into the firm’s performance compared to peer companies.  In 866
1959 they introduced new processes to evaluate the performance of store 
managers.  From the 1960’s onwards, the principal focus at Holdings Executives 867
was financial performance with the first agenda item specifically relating to 
financial issues. Every quarter, they conducted a review of results of each 
department. The WHS Limited Board also reviewed "Progress Reports" presented 
by each director.  Evaluation also extended beyond the purely financial with the 868
introduction of a 6 monthly “Staff Report” which included statistics on turnover 
including reasons for leaving.  869
The formal processes introduced during the 1950's and 1960's brought WHS in 
line with formal processes at peer companies. However, despite the introduction of 
formal processes, WHS directors continued to visit stores and observe the 
performance of their managers first-hand. This suggests that formal processes 
could not replace the informal processes - a finding consistent across all of the 
retailers studied as part of this thesis.
 “Expenditure on shops and stalls. Do we get sufficient details to help us to make up our 864
minds?” Minute on 8 January 1952. WHS 588 Minutes/Papers: Directors' Informal 
Meetings; 1952-55.
 WHS Y 172 - Minute Book, 8 February 1954 and 2 November 1954.865
 WHS 802 - Analytical and Comparative Studies in Company Performance and 866
Finance: Economics Intelligence Unit 1957.
 WHS 806: Retail Management Group Area Managers Conference January 1959.867
 WHS 816: Minutes: Holdings Executive, 16 July 1962; WHS Y 174 - Minute Book, 21 868
May 1963.
 WHS Y 174 - Minute Book, 22 October 1963.869
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Motivation
This section will examine the formal and informal processes used to motivate 
performance and includes both an assessment of how employees were rewarded 
financially but also of any non-financial mechanisms. PMM literature would 
anticipate that the reward mechanisms would promote the objectives of the 
organisation. One might therefore expect consistency across similar roles. As will 
become clearer, however, there were inconsistencies both between tiers of 
management where salaries ranged from 100% fixed to 100% variable and within 
the same role where some store managers were rewarded on the basis of profit 
and others on sales.
There are no descriptions in the sources of the salary structures operating at WHS 
other than for store staff.  The explanations for senior managers are therefore 870
based on some employment contracts, Board minutes and from the accounting 
records. The sources are partial and there are few sources covering the 1960's. 
Wilson's review of partners' contracts between 1890 and 1907 showed that the 
Smith family received a fixed return on capital (5% from 1905). The partners 
received a share of the post cost-of-capital profit of the firm.  The application of a 871
cost of capital charge differs from the other case studies but it is consistent with 
the objective of preserving capital before earning a profit. Contracts signed with 
new directors in 1949 followed a similar principle. The directors shared a 'salary 
pool' and received a 5% share of net profits over £500,000.  There may have 872
been further change to these arrangements but they are not referred to in the 
sources. 
 An internal review was completed sometime in the 1970's of the salary arrangements 870
for 'B' store and Bookstall managers and staff covering the period from 1920 to the 1970's 
(WHS 1090: Review of Retail Managers Pay Structure. DM Cook Staff and Training 
Division (not dated)
 Wilson, First, 263. Including Smith, there were 5 partners.871
 WHS 1268.  Contracts between WHS and Arthur Acland, Michael Hornby and Charles 872
Troughton on their appointments as Managing Directors, 25/08/1949.
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In 1930, senior Head Office managers were given a small fixed salary 
supplemented by a share of profits (10% of the department's post cost of capital 
profit).  It is not clear if this changed in the 1950’s. The minutes also show that 873
the fixed salaries differed considerably between the senior managers. While the 
Head of Shops received £2,500 in 1930, the Chief Accountant received only 
£1,000.  This, however, may have been as much due to who took the relative 874
roles - the new head of the shops had previously run one of the profit centres (the 
Library). In 1919, the head of the Shops had received only £1,000.  Pay 875
therefore was linked to the individual rather than the role.
There is a lack of evidence on District Superintendent salaries. Salary bands 
introduced after the Second World War suggest they only received a fixed 
salary.  Surprisingly, the maximum was below what some ‘A’ store managers 876
earned and this perhaps reflects the largely administrative nature of the District 
Superintendent role in 1951 as described above.  The lack of any profit or sales 877
related pay is inconsistent with other managers within the business but no 
explanation is offered in the sources.
Wholesale House and Store Managers were all paid on the basis of a low/ zero 
fixed element and a high variable element throughout the period.  Minutes and 878
the annual accounting returns from Wholesale Houses and ‘A’ stores show that 
managers received a small fixed salary and a share of the post cost of capital 
 Based on minutes and referring to two Department managers. There were no other 873
references. WHS 215 Partners Minute Book, 30 July 1930.
 WHS 215 Partners Minute Book, 15 September 1930 and 20 December 1929.874
 WHS 215 Partners Minute Book, 19 April 1919. While there were more stores, wages 875
had generally fallen in Britain between 1919 and 1930 (Gregory Clark, "What Were the 
British Earnings and Prices Then? (New Series)" MeasuringWorth, 2014 . URL: http://
www.measuringworth.com/ukearncpi)
 WHS Y 123 - Minute Book, 6 August 1946, 2 October 1951.876
 The Birmingham and Bournemouth store managers received £2,538 and £2,174 877
respectively in 1951 compared to a maximum of £2,000 for a Superintendent. WHS X 16 
Branch Summary Sheets: `A' Shops.
 Apart from between 1958 and the early 1960's when the basis was temporarily 878
changed.
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profit of their store (usually 20%).  By the 1950’s this variable element could 879
represent nearly 100% of their total remuneration.  For ‘B’ store and Bookstall 880
managers it was based upon a % of sales (between 2.5% and 5% of sales). The 
different bases for ‘A’ and ‘B’ shops was probably not a difference of principle but 
of practical necessity - the business could not calculate profit for ‘B’ shops and 
‘Bookstalls’ until 1960 when they too switched to profit as the basis of their 
variable pay.  Like ‘A’ stores, the variable element could represent a high 881
proportion of their pay - 100% for the largest ‘B’ stores in 1955.882
High levels of variable pay could imply a policy to drive profits in the individual 
units. However, WHS incentivised managers on the basis of their absolute profit 
(or sales) rather than their profit growth. Profit was also after making a charge for 
the cost of capital used. This provided some protection to firm profits - poor store 
profits reduced salaries. It also reminded managers that their first priority was to 
earn a return on the capital invested in their store. It may have also created more 
stable profits - like the Smith family, managers may have preferred a steady return 
rather than a potential higher return but higher risks.
There were few reward processes beyond salary and profit share. There is no 
evidence in the sources that WHS used competitions, prizes or other incentives to 
promote objectives. Newsbasket did not publish comparative results nor 
mentioned the performance of high performing individuals. While the regular visits 
of partners may have motivated performance, it was a personal and individualised 
form of motivation. 
It is also unclear what the basis for promotion was. There were no formal 
evaluation processes for employees until 1959.  In reminiscences, employees 883
 WHS 215 and WHS X 16 Branch Summary Sheets: `A' Shops; 1907/08-1957/58879
 The Birmingham and Bournemouth store managers received 96% and 97% of their 880
pay as a profit share respectively in 1957. WHS X 16.
 WHS 1090: Review of Retail Managers Pay Structure.881
 WHS 1090882
 WHS 806: Retail Management Group Area Managers Conference January 1959.883
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remembered promotion as being “dead man’s shoes” with few opportunities.  884
This partly reflected the slow expansion of the store network but a comment by 
Saunders suggests it may have also been because they placed loyalty ahead of 
competence - Saunders commented on the lack of talented senior managers as 
promotion reflected “a hierarchy up which faithful servants could go.”  885
Conversely, the business was reluctant to ‘penalise’ poor performance. During the 
1920’s, the minutes record a small number of times when managers were asked to 
explain the poor performance of their parts of the business to the partners. While 
the wording in the minutes suggested a tough approach, the repercussions rarely 
reflected the words. The case of C Manning is illustrative of the approach. In 
January 1921, he was warned about the high level of stocks in his Wholesale 
House and “it is to be noted that many previous warnings have been given to M 
and this is to be the last.” The following year, after deciding  to ask his father to 
monitor his performance, it was thought ‘advisable’ to give him another chance. 
Two years later, the partners met him again - “The seriousness of his excessive 
and increased stock was pointed out and he was given a hint to the effect that 
other managers could be found to produce better profits with less capital.”  There 886
were no other references to his performance until 1949, now managing the largest 
Wholesale House, when the Directors wrote to him concerned about poor stock 
control and a loan made to a third party. Manning asked to take early retirement 
soon afterwards.  The attitude did not just relate to senior managers. A 887
consultants report in the mid-1950’s noted how “the Superintendents’ authority is 
necessarily limited when it is the policy of the Company to allow a manager to 
remain in a branch as long as he chooses unless he is completely inefficient and 
when dismissal is on account of dishonesty only.”  By the late 1950’s, the 888
 WHS Q 10 Reminiscences: K A Jessup (1914-2002), H A Johnston (1907-81); W 884
Spicer (1909-81), C E Woodhurst (1910-88); 14 Feb 1979
 WHS Q 14 Reminiscences: H N Saunders (1910-87).885
 WHS 215 Partners Minute Book, 12 January 1921, 19 April 1921, 3 July 1923.886
 WHS 587 Loose Papers: from Partners' Room; 1919-54887
 WHS 798 Retail Practices Report No. 3, 29 May 1956.888
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minutes suggest a change in policy with several references to senior managers 
being made redundant.889
Although the reward practices within WHS appear inconsistent between roles and 
underwent few changes during the period, they also reflected the objectives of the 
organisation. A focus on absolute profit/ sales and ensuring that a profit share was 
only payable once a return on capital had been delivered was consistent with a 
firm which placed capital maintenance ahead of growth. Their reluctance to 
dismiss people based on poor performance was consistent with the paternalistic 
attitude to employees and suggests that performance may not have been as 
important as other factors such as loyalty (see 'Linking the System' below). 
Promotion for long-standing employees (or 'faithful' ones as Saunders described in 
the earlier quote) was also consistent with rewarding loyalty to the family and firm. 
Although the objectives changed gradually during the 1950's with an increasing 
focus on growth, it is not clear whether the variable pay structures changed as 
well. Accounting improvements allowed a switch from a sales to a profit basis for 
'B' store managers in 1960 but this only brought them in line with large stores.  890
There are few other references in the sources and this could reflect that there 
were few other changes to reward or simply gaps in the sources. 
Measures
This section will consider how important measures were in managing the 
performance of the business. It will examine both financial and non-financial 
measures and in particular, will consider whether there was a dominant measure 
or a wide suite of measures and how these changed over the period.
Analysis, however, is hampered by the lack of statistical records within the 
archives. Compared to the other case studies, there are fewer statistical reports 
and those that exist include little detailed analysis or commentary. References 
elsewhere in the archives suggest that the firm did produce reports regularly 
 WHS Y173, 30/12/58; WHS Y 174: 20/2/61, 20/5/61, 7/11/61, 28/12/61.889
 WHS 1090, 1 February 1960.890
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although questioned their usefulness.  The few which are available are 891
discussed in more detail below.
A Statistical Book summarised a limited range of measures between 1910 and 
1958. Table 4.6 shows all of the measures recorded in the book and the date that 
the measure was first recorded. The book was updated annually and did not 
include any further analysis or commentary. The table highlights the lack of 
development in statistics used to monitor the business and the inconsistency 
between measures for 'A' stores and the rest. The latter was due to accounting 
issues but what is curious is that no attempt was made to correct the issues until a 
1958 consulting report recommended changes - the accounting issues were 
subsequently resolved within two years.892
Table 4.6: Statistics Book to 1957
First year measure recorded
A’ Stores B’ Stores Bookstalls
Annual sales (£ and % growth versus prior year) 1914 1914 1910
£ Sales split by merchandise group (at cost price) 1938 Never Never
£ Sales split by merchandise group (at selling 
price)
Never 1914 1910
% Gross margin 1914 Never Never
£ expenses by type of expense 1914 1914 1910
% expenses to sales (total) 1914 1914 1910
Net profit (£ and %) 1914 Never Never
Stock turnover Never 1929 1929
Debt by age (on credit sales) Never 1929 1929
Cash deficiencies and overpayments Never 1914 1910
Source: WHS X 15 Aggregate statistics A and B shops and stalls 1910 - 1959.
 Talking Shop, Jan. 1951;  WHS 254; WHS 799: Organisation and Accounting, No. 17891
 WHS 799: Organisation and Accounting, No. 17.892
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The limited range of statistics is supported by copies of quarterly reports produced 
between 1919 and 1922.  All the data are from accounting records with no 893
volume, customer, employee or selling space information used. Interpretation 
would have been difficult. No adjustments were made for stores opened in the 
period or closed since the last period although evidence from the other records 
show several changes.  No explanation is given in the commentary for reasons 894
why the sales performance was so poor. Instead, the commentary focuses on the 
salary savings required to maintain the same salary to sales ratio as the previous 
year. Although no further examples of the report exist, consulting reports produced 
between 1956 and 1958 refer to similar reports but also suggest that there had 
been no development in the measures generated and highlighted how difficult they 
were to interpret.895
Evidence of key measures is also provided by the annual accounting returns of the 
'A' stores (1920 to 1958).  Along with a balance sheet and profit and loss 896
account, they included several statistical measures. As might be expected in a 
business which focused on capital maintenance, there were more measures on 
stock (number of stock lines, aged stock, stock turnover, stock depreciation) than 
on either sales or expenses. The measures were also unchanged between 1920 
and 1958, the last year the stores completed the returns. 
The descriptions provided above suggest a very limited use of measures (also 
perhaps suggesting a limited use for measures) with a heavy focus on stock. They 
also indicate almost no development in the measures between 1920 and 1958. 
The conclusion is supported by the consulting reports produced between 1956 and 
1958.  The reports were also highly critical of the range of measures, how they 897
 There was no analysis of stock as it was only counted in store annually. 893
 1 ‘A’ shop and 6 ‘B’ shops were opened in 1921 and 30 Bookstalls were closed (net). 894
WHS X 15 Aggregate statistics.
 WHS 799: Organisation and Accounting (Report 14 listed the new measures which 895
would be produced and therefore highlight what had previously been missing).
 WHS X 3 Balance sheets and accounts: 19 A shops (1920 to 1958).896
 WHS 799: Organisation and Accounting (Report 14 and 17)897
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were presented and the difficulty in interpreting them.  Although consultant 898
reports can exaggerate weaknesses, the reminiscences of Hugh Saunders and 
Peter Bennett, both of whom had worked in other large businesses, also describe 
weaknesses in the accounting systems.  The criticisms would not have come as 899
a surprise to the partners. Superintendents in the 1930’s had complained about 
the lack of store profit information available to them.  When the statistical 900
department of the Bank of England wrote to WHS in 1931 requesting certain 
statistical data to be published in the Board of Trade Journal, the partners decided 
to “decline politely the request owing to the difficulty of providing information that 
would be accurate.”  The minutes do not record any concern expressed by the 901
partners that their own statistics may be inadequate or lead to any additional 
statistics generated in the future which might imply satisfaction with the measures 
they used.
In contrast to Boots' The Bee, Newsbasket rarely referred to financial 
performance. The only statistic regularly reported was a non-financial one. From 
the 1920's through to the 1970's, Newsbasket reported the length of service of 
employees whether in articles about a store/ department or in descriptions of a 
dinner held to honour their longevity (for example, in January 1922 the editorial 
described a dinner for the Counting House where the average length of service of 
the 65 invited guests was 24 years. In 1966, an article on Gloucester Wholesale 
House provided the length of service of every employee mentioned in the 
article).  Unfortunately, while WHS must have collected the statistics, there are 902
no copies in the archives. As a measure, length of service was an effective way of 
communicating the loyalty of staff and this is discussed in the next section in more 
detail.
 WHS 799: Organisation and Accounting, Report No. 14.898
 WHS Q 14 Reminiscences: H N Saunders; WHS Q 31 Reminiscences: P W Bennett. 899
 Memo to partners from Superintendent Conference January 1932. WHS 588.900
 WHS Y 119 - Minute Book 1931/32 (14 December 1931).901
 Newsbasket January 1922 and January 1966.902
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The failure to develop measures between 1920 and before the late 1950's is 
curious. Peer retailers were using a wide range of financial and non-financial 
measures from the early 1920's. The deterioration in the financial performance of 
the firm in the 1930's might also have acted as a prompt to generate more and 
better measures (see table 4.3). The failure to develop measures is, however, 
consistent with the apparent lack of focus on performance management evidenced 
in the lack of process development described in the sections above. Measures are 
also less relevant where responsibility for performance is delegated and the 
partners/ directors manage performance by exception. Indeed, it could be argued 
that too many measures dilutes the responsibility for local managers to take their 
own initiative in driving performance. However, this is speculation and there is no 
evidence to support the view. What is clearer is that measures were not a central 
part of how the partners managed performance between 1920 and the early 
1950's.
From 1956 there was a change in approach. Statistical data collection was 
improved and there were changes in how it was reported. Consulting reports, 
accounting records and Board minutes show the extent of the changes. 
Accounting deficiencies were resolved.  This enabled quarterly branch profit 903
statements and analysis of the relative profitability of stores or departments within 
stores. New measures were introduced. From 1959, performance of new lines was 
reported, in 1960 supply chain volume information was added and by 1962, like-
for-like sales analysis and weekly and monthly trading results against budget were 
used.  Non-financial performance measures were also introduced including the 904
analysis of vacancies, staff turnover and the reasons for employees leaving.  905
There was also increased focus on external measures to understand relative 
performance and retail trading results were reported against Board of Trade 
Statistics.906
 WHS 799: Organisation and Accounting Report No. 14.903
 WHS 808: Report (Peat Marwick): Management Accounting; 5 Jan 1960; WHS X 19 - 904
Branch Summary sheets; WHS 816: Minutes: Holdings Executive,10 October 1962. 
 WHS Y 174 - Minute Book 22 October 1963.905
 WHS 816: Minutes: Holdings Executive, 10 October 1962; WHS X 19 - Branch 906
Summary sheets.
 242
Not surprisingly, Board minutes show directors using the data almost immediately 
to take decisions on long standing issues: from 1959, the Board were presented 
with data to support closing existing stores, the appropriateness of internal transfer 
prices in determining store viability and opportunities to open stores.  The new 907
measures were also used in the monthly performance meetings referred to in the 
'Evaluation' section above. While previously the measures had focused on sales 
and stock, there was a much broader range of measures now used. Sales 
measures increased in prominence, consistent with increased focus on growth but 
they were also supported by a range of other measures including external and 
employee data.908
The new measures introduced in the late 1950's were themselves just bringing 
WHS in line with other retailers. However, of more interest from a PMM 
perspective is that WHS managed its performance for so long with a set of 
relatively (compared to peer retailers) poor measures and used them sparingly. 
PMM literature places measures at the centre of the system; its importance lies in 
aligning the business to the objectives and providing the information which 
assesses the firm's progress towards those objectives. Measures, like structures, 
are expected to change as the external environment and internal strategy change. 
However, there is an implicit assumption that measurement is de facto a 
necessary and important aspect of performance management. The example of 
WHS before 1950 questions whether measures need to take a central role. 
However, if they do not, what alternative mechanisms were in place to align the 
business and ensure employees continued to meet the firm's objectives. As noted 
above, there did not appear to be (with the exception of the reward systems) 
compensating processes. The next section, however, will consider communication 
systems and in particular, the cultural and behavioural factors which influenced 
performance management in WHS.
 WHS Y 173 - Minute Book. (3 June 1959, 9 June 1959); WHS 816: Minutes: Holdings 907
Executive (19 April 1962); WHS 817 - Minutes: Holdings Executive; 1963 (18 July 1963).
 WHS 816: Minutes: Holdings Executive; 10 October 1962; WHS Y 174 - Minute Book 908
K: W.H.Smith & Son Ltd, October 1963.
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Linking the System
This purpose of this section is to examine how the separate elements described 
above were connected and the strength of the links. The analysis should help our 
understanding of the strength of the overall system - whether the whole was 
greater than the sum of the parts. However, even a cursory review of the 
performance management structures, processes and measures in WHS as 
described in the previous sections suggest little alignment and little cohesion - the 
separate elements having evolved along their own paths before a restructure in 
the 1950's and 1960's. And yet, paradoxically, WHS continued to meet its 
objectives. Despite the economic depression in the 1930's, WHS paid a dividend 
to the Smith family, maintained its market share between 1935 and 1950 and 
profits actually started to grow before the reorganisation (see table 4.3).  The 909
Smith family also maintained ownership of the firm and didn't resort to external 
funding. Although death duties in 1949 required the sale of shares, they still had 
effective control through their own retained shares and those of other employees. 
It was also only in 1972 that David Smith resigned as Chairman. From an 
employee perspective, there continued to be a strong bond between the Smith 
family, firm and employees whether judged on length of service or on the affection 
that the staff retained for the family as referred to repeatedly in reminiscences 
recorded at the end of the 1970's.  910
The outcomes suggest greater cohesion than might otherwise be expected. Was 
there a ‘system’, however loosely defined, which was more effective in managing 
the performance than simply the sum of the individual parts? Literature highlights 
the important role that organisational behaviour, social interactions and 
relationships play in PMM systems.   These act as a unifying force which 911
 Market share of 6.2% in 1935 and 1950. Market share based on WHS retail sales in 909
1935 and 1950 compared to the total market for newspaper, magazines, books and 
stationery. WHS retail sales from accounting records (WHS X 15) and market data from 
Jefferys, Retail Trading, 453.
 In their reminiscences, both Saunders and Bennett refer to the affection and loyalty 910
that employees continued to have towards the Smith family (WHS Q2 and Q31).
 Bititici et al, Challenges for tomorrow.911
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strengthens the links between structures and systems or can substitute for them in 
times of crisis.  The Boots and M&S case studies showed their importance in 912
strengthening the existing links. In WHS, did they take on a more important role 
and compensate for the otherwise apparently dysfunctional PMM structures and 
systems? Did WHS actively cultivate these factors to achieve their performance 
objectives? 
Identifying evidence of cultural and behavioural factors can be difficult. Company 
magazines have proven to be an important source for business historians as they 
illustrate how a firm projects itself to its employees.  They have an added 913
importance in multiple retail where the geographical spread of the branches meant 
they were the only regular source of information about what was happening in the 
firm. A close analysis of Newsbasket confirms their importance as a source. It also 
suggests that not only were cultural and behavioural factors important in shaping 
PMM but that the partners understood this and actively developed these factors to 
manage performance. 
In October 1920, Newsbasket reported verbatim a speech given by Hornby where 
he referred to what made WHS special and what had contributed to its success. 
The speech was given to celebrate (erroneously) the 100th anniversary of the firm 
in front of more than 1,000 employees.  In defining the success of the business, 914
Hornby did not talk about its financial success, indeed, he did not mention a single 
financial statistic. He did not mention the size of the business - by number of 
shops it was one of the largest in the country.  His focus was on what made WH 915
Smith special and he described:
 Euske et al, Performance Management.912
 Heller, Company Magazines; Griffiths, Give my Regards.913
 Rowlinson and Hassard, Invention, already identified how firms invent anniversaries to 914
promote culture. There is nothing in the sources to suggest the partners deliberately 
changed the date of their anniversary but only a year later they disclosed that the firm was 
nearer to 130 years old (Newsbasket, October 1921).
 Jeffreys, Retail Trading, 25.915
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“a certain innate quality and inherent strength of our business: It is just that 
‘intangible thing” which it is so difficult to talk about, but which has been 
created during a long period of years by generations of Smith’s men, and 
which is being created to-day by yourselves and ourselves and the initial 
credit for it is largely due to the founders of our business, the first WH Smith 
and his more distinguished son.” 
He went on to say - “I venture to say that their influence has permeated deeply into 
the inner life of our business, affecting unconsciously perhaps but still affecting, 
the daily business lives of almost every one of us.”  916
As Hornby recognised, defining the 'intangible thing' is difficult but in both his and 
WFD Smith's speech at the same event, three themes were repeated. The first 
was 'family' and loyalty to the family. There were repeated references to the role of 
the Smith family in building the firm and to ensuring the firm remained a family 
firm. Hornby also equated the firm and its employees to the 'family'. He referred to 
the event as a 'family party' and he made several references to long-serving loyal 
employees. He also reminded employees that they, like Lord Hambleden, had a 
responsibility to serve and "do our duty by the firm." The sense of belonging to the 
'family' was reinforced by the invitation list with, symbolically, only those with more 
than 21 years service attending (about 10% of the total workforce).  The second 917
theme was about tradition and the past. Both Hambleden and Hornby equated the 
success of the business to its traditions and the need to pass these on: "to uphold 
the old tradition", the "high tradition of long service" and the importance of 
"personal traditions." Similarly, Hornby reminded attendees about the importance 
of the past in shaping the firm and pointed out that of those who "have added to 
the greatness of its future they have also borrowed from the greatness of its past." 
Finally, both Hornby and Smith referred to the contributions that individual 
employees had made to the growth of the business, emphasising their loyalty, 
praising them by name and highlighting their qualities - "tackling their problems 
 Newsbasket, October 1920.916
 The tradition of inviting only those with 21 years service had been started at the 917
celebration of WF Smiths 21st birthday in 1890. Symbolically, 21 was the age one attained 
adulthood in Britain and took on family responsibilities.
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with foresight and courage, making good in the teeth of opposition, building up 
great businesses, facing and mastering difficulties with a cheerful optimism."918
The sources show the themes remained prevalent in WHS over much of the 
period, repeated in Newsbasket but also in other sources. They also show the 
range of tools employed to reinforce the themes including narratives, rituals, 
traditions and artefacts. In 1921, Newsbasket printed a family tree to show how the 
recently appointed new partners were related to the first WH Smith.  A portrait of 919
WFD Smith’s son was on the front cover to commemorate his 21st birthday in 
1924 and family events were periodically depicted on the cover through the whole 
period including the marriages of Lord Hambleden (1955), Julian Smith (1966) and 
the birth of Lord Hambleden’s fourth child (1960).  Employees continued the 920
tradition of giving gifts to the family to commemorate these events, much as they 
had done at the turn of the century.  Long serving employees were also invited to 921
the family estate to celebrate the 21st birthdays of the heirs in 1924 and 1951.  922
There were also repeated references in the sources to loyalty, particularly in the 
early 1920's but regularly through to the oral reminiscences recorded at the end of 
the 1970's. In 1922, Newsbasket reported a speech given by Hornby to store 
managers:
“Referring to the loyal service of the staff, Mr Hornby said he believed that 
this was not entirely due to self-interest, but because they realised that the 
honour of the Firm was so largely in their hands. The loyalty was largely 
 Newsbasket, October 1920.918
 Newsbasket, December 1921.919
 Newsbasket July 1924, March 1955, November 1960, February 1966.920
 Wedding gifts from employees shown in Newsbasket May 1966. JFA Smith 921
remembered that his older brother had been given a model bookstall at his birth in 1903 
(WHS Archives: WHS Q 15)
 Newsbasket, July 1924 describes 1,600 employees invited to the party; the 1951 party 922
was described by an ex-store manager. WHS Q 17 Reminiscences: A J Watson (1916-82) 
& C G Baker (1916-2000)
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personal to the Partners themselves; this was again due to the business 
being a family one.”923
Store managers and District Superintendents similarly pledged their loyalty. 
Newsbasket reported that in giving the traditional ‘toast to the firm’ at the District 
No. 5 Outing:
“Mr Turnbull said that he felt it an honour to propose this toast to the men of 
the north for he knew that they were all loyal to the Firm, and that the Firm 
were loyal to the men. Loyalty counted a lot in the life of WH Smith men.”  924
At the No. 9 District Outing, a partner noted how “there was no more loyal section 
of the staff than the managers and assistants of the Bookstalls.”  Loyalty was still 925
a strong feature at the end of the period. In the oral reminiscences recorded in the 
1970's, the loyalty of staff was referred to by both those who had worked in the 
firm all of their working lives but also by those directors who had joined in the 
1950's. Saunders noted, for example, “one of the interesting things that one found, 
what impressed one, was the immense loyalty to the family of the company."  926
Themes of family and loyalty was reinforced by those it employed (including the 
partners) and for how long - the narrative suggests that once they joined, few left 
before retirement.  Between 1894 and 1948, every partner appointment was a 
relative of an existing partner (see Table 4.5). Elsewhere, there was a tradition of 
hiring family members. In his written reminiscences from the 1950's, one partner 
recalled:
“one cannot help being struck by the family connections among the 
staff…..I believe there is more than one instance of four generations in 
direct succession if not five….in the Newspaper Dispatch Department there 
 Newsbasket, November 1922.923
 Newsbasket, October 1921. The tradition of the first toast always being to 'the firm' was 924
documented in Newsbasket from 1920 to 1970. 
 Newsbasket, November 1921.925
 WHS Q 14 Reminiscences: H N Saunders.926
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can hardly be a man who is not related in one way or another by blood or 
by marriage, to someone else in the same or another department.”  927
WHS also retained managers for life apparently preferring the loyalty of employees 
over competency. A Wholesale Manager later recalled how a resignation in 
Sheffield Wholesale House in 1938 was so unusual that it was talked about by the 
rest of the staff.  In Newsbasket, articles highlighted the importance of longevity: 928
a short history of the firm included a section describing a lunch hosted by the 
partners in 1912 where the average length of service of the 30 attendees was 
more than 39 years and provided a list of the 12 current employees with more than 
50 years service.  Photographs of employees or departments with long service 929
were often reproduced in Newsbasket and, even by the late 1960’s, it was 
common practice to state how long a person had served in the organisation when 
they were mentioned in the magazine.  The rewards for long service had been 930
made clear in the 1920 speech - “practically all those holding positions of any 
importance in the Firm, from Manager of a shop or stall upwards, are men who 
have grown up in the Firms’ service.”931
In the sources, tradition and the past were frequently referenced although less 
prominent in the 1960's as the business became more oriented to the future. In 
1920, Newsbasket described District meetings where partners referred back to the 
firm's long history and, on two occasions, brought artefacts (bookstall contracts 
from 1847 and 1852) to illustrate their point.  Newsbasket continued to print 932
 WHS  PA 445 50 Years in the Book trade. Reminiscences of AD Power. Undated but 927
probably sometime in the 1950’s
 WHS Q 10 Reminiscences: K A Jessup (1914-2002), H A Johnston (1907-81); W 928
Spicer (1909-81), C E Woodhurst (1910-88); 14 Feb 1979
 Newsbasket October 1920.929
 For example, in January 1922 the editorial notes a recent dinner for the Counting 930
House where the average length of service of the 65 invited guests was 24 years, a photo 
in a May 1922 edition showed the 25 members of staff in one department with an average 
length of service of 46 years; Newsbasket January 1966. Commemoration of the 
Gloucester Wholesale House.
 Newsbasket, October 1920.931
 Newsbasket, December 1921 and July 1922.932
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biographies of important individuals in the firm’s past and reproduced their 
speeches.  In these speeches, the debt owed to the past was explicit. A 1919 933
speech by the Head of the Shops was reproduced in 1955: "To understand the 
present or forecast the future, you must look backward."  A speech by a store 934
manager at a celebratory dinner in the same month reminded them that "to-day’s 
staff were inheritors of a tradition that they should pass on."  Notably, the 935
narrative had to change when the firm started to modernise and examining 
speeches by David Smith from the mid-1950's show how he was now dismissive 
of the past and urged the firm to look forwards. At the 1955 anniversary dinner of 
the opening of the first shops in 1905, Smith told employees that “looking back on 
history doesn’t do much harm” but “I believe the firm has a tremendous future and 
I hope you feel so too, for unless we have faith, and unless we see the prospect of 
going further we shall stay where we are.”  During the late 1950's and 1960's 936
both his internal and external speeches emphasised the importance of looking 
forward. The messages were both general (“No business, if it is to be successful, 
can dwell on past or present”) and specific (“We have made a tremendous amount 
of progress in the past 10 to 15 years and we intend to go on making 
progress”).  They were repeated externally as well as internally. After he 937
presented the annual results to investors in 1960, Newsbasket reproduced 
selective headlines from the newspapers which included “This family moves with 
the times”, “WH Smith progress” and “Modernisation Plans.”  When he 938
announced his retirement after nearly 40 years in the firm, he did not reflect on the 
past but remained focused on the future: “Finally I should like to thank you all for 
your loyalty and your efforts over the past years and re-affirm my conviction that 
 Newsbasket: October 1955 reproduced Hornby's 50th anniversary speech from 1943; 933
November 1955 reproduced George Tyler's retirement speech from 1919; January 1960 
and the following months they provided biographies of the prominent senior managers of 
the pre-war years.
 Newsbasket, November 1955.934
 Newsbasket, November 1955.935
 Newsbasket, January 1956.936
 Newsbasket, May 1960; May/June 1967.937
 Newsbasket, May 1960. The headlines were not attributed. 938
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the future of the Firm is a rosy one.”  939
The repeated references in the sources to traditions and the past (pre-1950), 
family and loyalty and the role of individuals in the firm suggests an attempt by the 
partners to influence the culture and behaviours of the employees. It also helped 
support a focus on stability and encouraged a conservative approach to 
performance.
The focus on traditions and the past were consistent with a business which 
encouraged stability and was risk averse. Employees who replicated how things 
had always been done needed less close monitoring. Establishing strong bonds of 
loyalty between the Smith family, the firm and employees helped align everybody 
behind the objectives of the organisation. Highlighting the achievements and 
importance of individuals pushed responsibility for safeguarding the firm on to 
each employee. It helped develop a system where partners entrusted 
management to manage themselves, with only a high level overview of the final 
results. In return they expected complete loyalty towards the aims of the business. 
When WFD Smith died in 1928, Hornby succinctly described Smith's approach to 
managing the business: “To those who worked with him and for him he gave the 
fullest measure of trust, and he was repaid by such loyal service as few employers 
can boast of.”940
The extended analysis in this section reflects the importance of both cultural and 
behavioural influences in WHS and the wider debate of their influence on how 
firms manage performance. The importance WHS placed on developing their 
desired culture and behaviours suggests an alternative way to consider 
performance management and the constituent elements of a PMM system. Rather 
than focus on organisational structures and fixed processes held together by an 
integrated set of measures, performance can be managed through relationships 
and behaviours. At WHS, it was reflected in a system in which the Partners prided 
themselves on their relationships gained through store visits and personal contact 
 Newsbasket, July/ August 1969.939
 Newsbasket, July 1928.940
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but in which they otherwise entrusted management to manage themselves. In 
return they expected complete loyalty towards the aims of the business. 
Viewed in this way, the practices at WHS appear more consistent and integrated 
than suggested in the opening sentences of this section. Practices which 
reinforced those behaviours were more developed - reward policies which aligned 
the objectives of managers and partners, recruitment practices which favoured 
family members, encouragement of long service and a focus on performance by 
exception. Conversely, those practices which did little to support the behaviours 
(or potentially undermined them) were less developed - formal and prescriptive 
company-wide processes, collective review of collective performance, 
comprehensive measurement systems.
Conclusion
The following chapter draws on all of the case studies to answer the research 
questions raised in the introduction. In WHS, the two areas of particular interest 
are the performance management systems which operated before the 1950's, 
which provide insights into an older form of performance management, and the 
length of time it took for WHS to change these practices. Three aspects are 
particularly relevant to the research questions.
Firstly, promoting a particular culture, influencing organisational behaviours and 
reinforcing an organisational identity were an important part in managing the 
performance of the business. This is not a new finding from a PMM perspective. In 
1993, Euske et al. identified organisational culture as a unifying force in 
performance management systems and the most important factor in times of 
crisis.  However, since then the organisational influences on performance 941
management have been under researched.  And, sometimes assumed to be an 942
 Euske et al., Performance Management.941
 Bititci et al, Challenges for tomorrow; Franco-Santos et al. Contemporary performance 942
measurement.
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external factor beyond the control of the organisation.  The example of WHS, 943
however, emphasises that cultures, behaviours and identities can all be shaped by 
the organisation through the stories they tell about themselves, traditions, artefacts 
and the behaviours they reward. WHS, however also highlights that a firm's culture 
and identity is made of up of several elements which can work harmoniously 
together or in conflict (backward looking conservatism, family and loyalty). When 
WHS did decide to change, its previous conservative focus on the past and 
looking backwards was incompatible with a business which wanted to modernise 
its performance management processes. It was the family, through David Smith's 
speeches which led the attack on 'the past'. Those who sought change used the 
loyalty the firm had for the family to lead this change. While Bennett and Troughton 
were the architects of change, they were relatively anonymous in the pages of 
Newsbasket and it was was David Smith who was the public face of change.
Secondly, the lack of sophistication in the measures of performance they used and 
the reluctance to introduce new measures despite known weaknesses appears 
curious given not only their importance in modern PMM systems but also the role 
of measures in the other case studies. The evaluations of performance in the 
limited evidence that is available, however, suggests partners and directors 
managed performance by exception with a review of a few output measures - how 
managers met them was less relevant. They also appeared to be as focused on 
the quality of their individual managers as the results they delivered. This was 
evaluated in the personal meetings rather than quantitative measures. One might 
argue therefore, that the lack of measures was less due to incompetence (which 
the consulting reports of the 1950's imply) or inertia (which the oral reminiscences 
imply) but rather was consistent with their overall view about how performance 
should be managed. In WHS performance measures were only one source for 
managing performance and not the most important. This is discussed in more 
detail in the conclusion.
Finally, modern PMM systems are expected to be dynamic, responding to changes 
in strategy and the external environment. The evolution of WHS's structures and 
 Ferreira and Otley, Design.943
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processes before the 1950's were far from dynamic. However, given their 
objectives, there was little need for WHS to abandon the structures and processes 
which had provided relative stability over more than 100 years. They also operated 
in an industry where there was little external pressure to change. Both factors 
created stability. These reasons are consistent with the extensive literature on 
organisational inertia. When the business did start to focus more on growth, there 
was also a change in the rest of its structures and processes - also as one might 
expect from the literature. What is more interesting from a PMM perspective, 
however, is the length of time it subsequently took WHS to change. Troughton and 
Bennett, the architects of the change, had already been directors for 11 and 9 
years respectively when the restructure was announced in Newsbasket in 1960 
suggesting difficulties in initiating change.  The process of change had also still 944
not been completed by then end of the 1960's. The case of WHS highlights just 
how difficult it can be to implement change. WHS may be an extreme case. Given 
its age and the number of long serving employees, ways of doing things may have 
been more embedded than in other organisations. However, PMM literature has 
also highlighted that firms struggle to change and adapt their PMM systems. It 
raises the question about whether PMM systems can be dynamic, and if they 
cannot, does this undermine how PMM systems are currently expected to operate.
 Also reflected in the minutes of meetings in the 1950's where there was considerable 944
opposition to changing how things had been done in the past.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Introduction
What conclusions can be drawn from the cases of M&S, Boots and WHS? 
Generalising from only a small number of case studies is not convincing unless the 
results are truly exceptional or truly representative.  Historical case studies raise 945
even more questions given the passage of time. For historians, as described in the 
methodology, their findings are bound by context and cannot be understood apart 
from their moment in time. And yet, paradoxically, the best historians have a 
passion for the present and in providing an understanding of the past they improve 
our understanding of the present.  History, after all, is not so different from the 946
present that we cannot take some understanding from it. The three case studies, 
therefore cannot generate a new theory or even refute an existing one. However, 
what they can do is show that "it does not need to be this way."  It allows us to 947
not only raise questions about how things are done now but also to point 
academics and practitioners to where they may find answers to their questions.
The conclusion is set out as follows. It starts with a summary of the key 
conclusions reached in the separate case studies. It is followed by some general 
conclusions about how the firms managed performance during the period. The 
main body of the conclusion then examines the three objectives raised in the 
introduction:
(1) "How did the PMM structures, processes and measures change as the 
strategy and external environment changed?" 
(2) "How did the firms use measures to understand performance?"
 Sigglekow, Persuasion.945
 Bloch, Historians Craft; Gaddis, Landscape; Evans, Defence.946
 Fear, Mining.947
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(3) "What role did cultural factors play in how performance was managed within 
the firms?"
Both the general conclusion and the specific objectives will focus on the 
similarities in how each firm managed and measured performance. As explained in 
the introduction, while all three firms were multiple retailers operating in similar 
locations, they sold different products, faced different competitive pressures, had 
different ownership structures and had different histories and cultures. Similarities 
therefore help establish some core principles in how they managed and measured 
performance.
Marks and Spencer - summary findings
The case of M&S provides perhaps the closest approximation to a PMM 'system' 
as currently described in the literature: organisational structures, processes and 
measures which were aligned with the objectives of the organisation. However, 
informal processes played a more important part than the formal processes 
suggested by the frameworks and models in modern PMM systems. Three 
features in particular helped establish alignment between objectives, structures 
and processes. Firstly, the firm had clear objectives which they repeated 
consistently throughout the period. Secondly, they were run by a small cadre of 
directors who, in their own words, had been "educated in its philosophy and bred 
in its traditions."  Thirdly, they focused on developing relationships and 948
promoting a common culture/ identity which bound and aligned all employees to 
the objectives of the firm. Like in the other cases, these emerged and evolved from 
the firm's own history and the case reminds us of the importance of understanding 
firm specific historical context when assessing a PMM system. Furthermore, these 
three features contributed to a 'stable' system for managing performance - there 
were few changes to structures, processes or measures during the period and this 
contrasts with the 'dynamic' systems advocated in PMM literature where the PMM 
system is adjusted to reflect changes in strategy and the external environment.
 "Marks & Spencer Ltd." Financial Times [London, England] 5 June 1969: 26. Financial 948
Times. Web.
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M&S also reminds us that the most important feature of a PMM system is learning. 
PMM systems can provide an element of control but the focus of store visits, 
'probing' and the weekly performance meeting was about understanding 
performance which helped all employees take appropriate actions. The emphasis 
in memos and speeches by Simon Marks, Israel Sieff and Marcus Sieff on 
'probing' also shows that they believed learning could be embedded and become 
part of the operating routines of the business. The emphasis in these memos and 
speeches emphasised the personal responsibility that employees had to learning 
and therefore managing performance. Both Simon Marks and Marcus Sieff 
referred to the 'unseeing eye'. Israel Sieff was similarly critical: "The robot mind 
merely records. It has no perception, no understanding, and it cannot take 
initiative."  Therefore, informal processes and the encouragement of a 'way of 949
thinking' about performance were more important than the formal processes. The 
focus on learning is consistent with PMM literature but although the importance of 
informal processes are recognised, they are still relatively under researched in 
both the PMM literature and the related management control literature.  This 950
represents an opportunity for further research as discussed in more detail below.
The case of M&S also challenges current practitioners, particularly Executive and 
senior managers, on the breadth and depth of the understanding required to 
manage performance. At M&S all directors were expected to understand all 
aspects of the business - to be an expert in 'M&S' as a Harvard researcher 
explained it.  This was helped by ensuring that directors worked in several 951
functions during their careers and by promoting from within as well as creating a 
performance oriented 'way of thinking' as described above. Breadth helped 
directors take a holistic view of performance - to understand not only the individual 
drivers of performance but also the complex interplay of those drivers. It also 
helped them avoid a narrow functional view on performance - a criticism of modern 
 “A Definition of Probing” Memo written by Israel Sieff. (M&S CR/C/2/80 Collated 949
Business Reports 1950 - 1984).
 Boland, Interpretive Act, is still widely referenced but nearly 25 years old. Berry et al, 950
Emerging Themes, describe the gap between theory and practice. 
 M&S A04/117 I Harvard Business School Case Study 1975, 33.951
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organisations.  This way of managing performance, however, was reliant on the 952
capability of the senior managers to understand the interdependencies rather than 
rely on reports and measures. Management capability in PMM systems, whether 
to interpret the outcomes of PMM systems or to replace the need for a formal 
PMM system, is an area which is still under researched.  953
However, in addition to a broad view of performance, directors were expected to 
have a deep understanding of performance. Directors examined individual 
garments, took food ranges home to try at the week-end and were presented with 
detailed information about dyeings and cloth types used in their products. The 
deep knowledge this created is perhaps one of the reasons why M&S was 
sceptical of the value that measures could provide and why they were the most 
vocal of all of the case studies in condemning the value of performance measures. 
As Marcus Sieff said in 1969 of the weaker employees: "Where they depend upon 
statistics, it means, in effect, a lack of knowledge of what is really happening in the 
stores."  The challenge that Sieff makes of his staff is also a challenge which can 954
be levelled at modern measurement systems - are they capable of providing 
sufficient knowledge about the performance of the business. This is considered in 
more detail below in the section on measurement.
Boots - summary findings
The case of Boots provides an example of a firm which adopted new ways of 
managing its performance at the very start of the period but then kept them 
relatively unchanged until the late 1960's. The structures and systems they 
introduced in the early 1920's were influenced by (or perhaps copied from) their 
American owners and represented something very different from how Jesse Boot 
had managed the business up to that date. Based on the evidence, what we find in 
broad terms, is a performance management system which aligned structures, 
 See Tett, Silo Effect, on the dangers inherent in focusing too narrowly within an 952
organisation.
 Franco-Santos et al., Contemporary.953
 Memo from Marcus Sieff to the Executive Board, 26 February 1969 (CR/B/2/2 Israel 954
Moses Sieff: Business Papers)
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processes and measures behind the objectives of the firm. Certain features, 
however, stand out.
Like M&S, the case of Boots reiterates that performance management is primarily 
about learning rather than control. At Boots, learning primarily took place at the 
stores where the interaction with customers took place. Structures and reports 
therefore sought to narrow the gap between Head Office and the stores. 
Consequently, there was only one tier of management between the Chairman and 
a store manager - the TGM. The Chairman also received a report every week from 
every TGM on the performance of the stores he had visited. This continued 
throughout the period despite the growth in the size of the business. Statistical 
reports also closed the gap by reporting not only the aggregate performance of the 
business but also by including several tables which reported the sales of individual 
stores. However, the business also encouraged informal contact to promote 
learning; speeches, articles in The Bee and competitions encouraged directors 
and senior managers to spend time in stores and engage with store managers and 
employees. The principle that directors and senior managers should engage in 
PMM at both an aggregated but also local level is consistent with the other 
retailers in the case study. It differs, however, from PMM frameworks such as the 
Balanced Scorecard which advocate a hierarchy with objectives and measures 
cascaded down through the accountable managers.955
The case of Boots also illustrates the importance of understanding performance by 
observing the interdependency of the drivers of performance rather then separate 
measures - a holistic rather than an analytical approach to understanding. 
Examples in The Bee and memos to TGM's show that sales resulted from a 
complex set of interdependencies including service, product environment and, 
although less so because of RPM, price.  Many of these were not quantifiable or 956
Boots chose not to measure them. Instead, directors and managers were 
encouraged to observe them operating in store. Consequently, like in M&S and 
 Kaplan and Norton, Mastering, Using; Ittner and Larcker, Coming up short.955
 Each of these were broken down further - see section on "Evaluation" in Chapter 3 956
(Boots)
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WHS, directors were expected to have both a deep and broad understanding of 
performance.
Another feature of how Boots managed performance was its preference for a 
primary, broad measure of performance (sales growth) which it retained through 
the period rather than a larger number of specific measures which were frequently 
updated. It offered greater flexibility but also created a simpler system. This helped 
store managers respond to local competition without affecting how they were 
measured (e.g. they could choose to focus on high value products or promote a 
specific product as long as they increased sales). A broad measure could also 
accommodate changing priorities in Head Office. Hence, the firm could promote 
customer service as part of sales without having to change the overall 
performance measure. PMM systems have advocated specific measures which 
are updated regularly to reflect changes to strategy and the environment.  The 957
case of Boots demonstrates that there are also advantages to maintaining a broad 
measure over time. This is explored further in the section on change below.
Finally, like the other case studies, the firm emphasised the importance of 
developing a culture, a shared identity and in particular, loyalty. The Bee reported 
speeches from directors where they emphasised the importance of loyalty. The 
firm was also an early investor in welfare and TGM's were encouraged to look 
after the welfare of their employees which helped to promote a loyal workforce. 
Loyalty was also built into the processes. The loyalty of store managers was 
formally assessed in annual performance reviews. The importance of culture in 
general and loyalty in particular is under researched in PMM literature and is 
discussed in more detail in the section on culture below.
WH Smith - summary findings
The case of WHS showed a very different way of managing the performance of 
the business from M&S, Boots or, indeed, modern PMM systems. The differences 
reflected the specific objectives of the firm, its external context and also its own 
 Melnyk et al, Fit for the Future.957
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historical development. While these differences make it difficult to argue that WHS 
operated a PMM 'system' as we might describe it now, the firm still managed to 
deliver its objectives throughout the period. The case reminds us that PMM 
systems are firm specific and reflective of both the external context in which the 
firm operates and its own historical development. The specificity was one of the 
reasons why Lebas argued that defining PMM was so difficult - every PMM system 
is different.  It also helps to explain why modern firms have struggled to 958
implement generic PMM systems and is consistent with Ittner and Larcker's 
criticism of businesses which apply "boiler plate solutions partly out of laziness 
and thoughtlessness.”  Three feature of how WHS managed performance over 959
the period stand out.
Firstly, the firm's culture and identity were important elements in ensuring that the 
objectives of employees and partners were aligned. Partners could trust 
employees to deliver performance without extensive (and expensive) control 
mechanisms. This was particularly important in multiple retail where employees 
are distant from Head Office control and where local employees need to respond 
to the local market. The partners also recognised that culture and identity were 
endogenous factors that can be used to influence behaviours. This was 
demonstrated in the speeches made at the firm's celebration of its 100th 
anniversary in 1920 and in their subsequent use of narratives, artefacts, and the 
establishment of traditions described in Newsbasket and in the oral 
reminiscences.  When the firm decided to change, they also used the firm's 960
focus on family and loyalty to drive the change. David Smith was the public face of 
change and his message was simple - the firm needed to stop looking backwards 
and replicate how they had done things in the past but instead look to the future. 
While the recognition that organisational culture is an endogenous factor has long 
 Lebas, Performance Measurement.958
 Ittner and Larcker, Coming up short, 89.959
 It is not clear whether the partners knew that the firm was actually much older but 960
manipulation of anniversaries to influence culture has been identified in cultural literature 
from the late 1920's (Rowlinson and Hassard, Invention).
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been recognised in both history and literature on culture and identity, it has been 
largely ignored in the PMM literature.961
Secondly, in evaluating performance, the partners appeared to place relatively little 
reliance on aggregated performance measures and instead relied on personal 
contact with those responsible for delivering performance. There was almost no 
development in their already limited set of performance measures before the end 
of the 1950's despite known weaknesses. This may have been due to 
organisational capability issues not clear in the sources but when they decided to 
update their measures at the end of the 1950's, it took them only two years to do 
so. Prior to that, evaluation focused more on personal meetings between partners, 
superintendents and managers whether in Head Office or in the stores. From the 
limited evidence in the sources, these meetings appear to be as much about 
assessing the qualities of the superintendent/ manager and their staff as 
understanding the financial performance of the store. It is consistent with a firm 
which placed reliance on the qualities of those who had to deliver performance 
rather than the performance itself. 
Thirdly, when the firm decided to modernise in the 1950's as it became more 
focused on profit, it went through a process of changing every element of its PMM 
system. Change was slow, lasting more than 20 years, and new processes 
evolved as ideas were tried, adjusted or rejected and new ideas tried again. A 
consultant reporting in 1965 had despaired at the process  - “we have come to the 
conclusion that progress by trial and error experiment seems to have become 
institutionalised, to the point that progress can be very slow indeed.”  The 962
experience of WHS highlights how difficult change can be. While, WHS' 
experience is consistent with the evolutionary processes described by Nelson and 
Winter, it contrasts with the deterministic perspective in PMM literature.  WHS 963
 Hobsbawm, Invented; Rowlinson and Hassard, Invention; Giorgi et al., Many Faces; 961
Weber and Dacin, Cultural Construction; Suddaby et al. Rhetorical History; Anteby and 
Molnar, Collective Memory.
 WHS 812, Report on retailing by Emerson, 1965, 4.962
 Nelson, Firms Differ; Becker et al., Organisational Routines. Melnyk et al., Fit for the 963
Future.
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may be unusual, given its age and how embedded existing processes were, but its 
difficulties at least challenge the idea that a modern PMM system can really be 
dynamic. This is discussed further in the section on change below.
General Conclusions
The conclusions described above offer challenges to how we understand modern 
PMM systems. Indeed, the way that the firms used (or did not use) performance 
measures and the importance of socio-cultural factors raises important questions 
about the theoretical bases on which PMM systems are founded. These are 
explored in more detail in answering the specific research questions in the next 
sections. Before examining the individual areas, however, a few general 
conclusions are offered.
In the introduction, it was explained that the primary aim of the thesis was to 
understand how multiple retailers managed and measured their performance 
during the period 1920 to 1970. In doing so, the thesis reviewed all of the 
constituents of a PMM system to understand not only how each of the parts 
contributed to how the firm managed performance, but also whether the parts 
were linked. The study found that all of the firms used a combination of structures, 
processes and measures which helped deliver the objectives of the business. In 
M&S and Boots, the alignment between formal structures and processes was 
particularly evident while in WHS, it was less clear. However, in all three firms 
socio-cultural factors and informal processes supplemented the formal ones. Did 
these operate like modern PMM systems as currently defined? Perhaps not - 
modern systems rely on formal strategic processes and require a broad suite of 
performance measures which these firms did not have. However, all three firms 
relied on the interdependency of structures, processes, measures and 
organisational culture and identity to deliver the objectives of the firm. In this broad 
sense, they operated PMM systems.
However, examining each firm in detail shows that they each managed 
performance differently, albeit with strong similarities in underlying principles. As 
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explained in the individual sections, how the firms managed performance was 
strongly influenced by both their own history but also the external context in which 
they operated. For example, the slow development of WHS' PMM practices 
reflected not only their age and the extent to which existing ways of working were 
embedded in their routines but also the highly price regulated market in which they 
operated which limited the opportunities for competitors. The examples also 
showed that when they decided to change their structures and processes, it was a 
complex, messy and slow process - in M&S it took 15 years, in WHS it took nearly 
20 years.  This may have reflected just how interconnected all of the separate 964
parts were. Modern firms, as noted in Chapter 1, have struggled to implement 
PMM systems. Many of these systems are based on generic frameworks or 
models. However, these models do not accommodate the specific history of the 
firm nor the specific context in which the firm operates. Firms should therefore 
tailor the frameworks but have not always done so and most implementations 
fail.  The case studies therefore offer a challenge to current PMM researchers - 965
how can they build the firm's own history and the external context into their models 
and frameworks?
The case study also offers a challenge to the traditional view of the development 
of PMM systems, which is summarised in Brudan's comment that "analysing the 
history of performance management illustrates that its evolution for most of the 
20th century was driven by command and control and mechanistic thinking."  966
These case studies, in addition to the contemporary American literature on retail 
practices described in Chapter 1, suggest that this was not the case for multiple 
retailers. WHS had few formal processes and gave local managers freedom to 
manage themselves and deliver the objectives of the organisation. M&S and 
Boots, however, introduced new structures, processes and clear hierarchies in the 
1920's and 1930's; well before the 1950's/1960's which, according to both 
Chandler and Gospel, was when British firms started to modernise their 
 In Chandler's, Scale and Scope,  Sears, his retail case study, took 15 years to 964
introduce a new structure.
 Ittner and Larcker, Coming up short; Franco-Santos and Bourne, Examination.965
 Brudan, Rediscovering, 115. Also repeated in Bourne, Handbook; Eccles, Manifesto; 966
Bititci et al., Challenges. 
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structures.  In addition, both firms gave considerable freedom to store managers 967
and employees to manage performance and tailor it to the local environment. 
Structures and processes were designed to bring stores and Head Office closer 
together and to help information to flow between the two. The insight is important 
because it challenges the deterministic, contingent view of PMM change that 
dominates much of the literature. If the firms did operate effective PMM systems in 
the 1920's to the 1970's, do they still do so now?  Further research, tracing what 968
happened to the three firm's PMM 'systems' after 1970, could provide interesting 
insights. More work also needs to be completed to identify other firms which 
contradict the conventional narrative offered by Chandler. Retail banking, for 
example, another service business with operating units spread far from Head 
Offices, could be a rich source for further analysis. Research already shows that 
they were early adopters of new structures in the 1920's and research could be 
completed on all of their PMM practices.969
The following sections consider the three specific questions raised in the 
introduction:
(1) "How did the PMM structures, processes and measures change as the 
strategy and external environment changed?" 
(2) "How did the firms use measures to understand performance?" 




In the introduction, one of the on-going issues concerns whether PMM system are 
dynamic - changing to reflect changes in the strategy and the external 
 Chandler, Scale and Scope; Gospel, Markets.967
 The financial performance of M&S and WHS in particular suggest not.968
 Wardley, Commercial Banking; Bátiz-Lazo and Wardley, Banking on change.969
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environment. There was concern that while firms understand the need to keep 
their PMM system up to date, they often fail to adjust them in practice. One of the 
objectives of the research, therefore was identified as :
"How did the PMM structures, processes and measures change as the 
strategy and external environment changed?"
What is not clear from the literature is how much change is required to make a 
system dynamic. In terms of large scale change, for each of the case studies, 
periods of change were preceded and followed by longer periods of stability. The 
periods of apparent stability outlasted periods of change. Hence, M&S reorganised 
and introduced new structures in the 1930's and 1940's but the formal structure 
which emerged after the war remained largely the same throughout the rest of the 
period.  In Boots, there was an initial period of reorganisation after the American 970
acquisition. New organisation structures were created, new processes were 
introduced and new measures reported. However, there were few significant 
changes to these subsequently. At WHS, the situation was reversed, a long period 
of stability was followed by extensive changes over the 1950's and 1960's. In 
terms of large scale change, therefore, the simple answer to the question raised is 
that the PMM processes and measures did not change to reflect changes in the 
strategy and external environment.
The difference between the expectations presented in the PMM literature of a 
responsive and dynamic PMM and the evidence in these case studies is reflective 
of debates in the closely related field of management control. The more traditional 
perspective mirrors the view expressed in much of the PMM literature. It is 
reflective of a rational, contingent, view where accounting is changed as the 
environment changes.  It is a view now strongly contested. Business historians 971
have shown that accounting change is rarely as smooth as imagined. John 
criticised Chandler, for example, for ignoring the "booming, buzzing confusion of 
 They did introduce a Management Committee in 1964 and formalised some review 970
processes but the overall structure remained largely the same. See Chapter 2.1 and the 
section on Organisation Structure.
 Luft, Historical theorizing; Modell, Accounting Change; Napier,  Accounts of Change.971
 266
everyday life."  Hopwood showed how difficult accounting change is even when 972
the case is clear and emphasised the social and organisational factors influencing 
change.  The views are supported by organisational scientists who have 973
highlighted that change is multifaceted and involves historical, political, cultural, 
structural and social factors as well as rational choice.  These make 974
organisational change difficult. The cases of WHS and M&S in particular show the 
complexity and indicate why firms are reluctant to drive change. In both firms the 
process was slow, messy, experienced reversals and seemed to reflect an 
approach based on trial and error rather than a planned change programme. Once 
started, the changes also expanded to include all of the structures, processes and 
measures associated with a PMM system.975
These examples suggest that the failure of firms to constantly change their 
structures and processes as the environment changed is not surprising - not 
necessarily a case of inertia but more a recognition that PMM structures and 
processes are so embedded in the organisation and so interlinked that change is 
hard to do. Does this mean that PMM systems cannot be dynamic? Exploring 
some specific examples from the case studies suggests that by focusing on 
behaviours and having broad objectives, loosely defined processes and broad 
measures, the firms were able to retain dynamism without resorting to continuous 
organisational change.
At Boots in the late 1920's and early 1930's, there was a change in strategic focus 
(but not in objectives). Investment in manufacturing facilities between 1928 and 
1933 increased the output of own-goods products and this presented an 
opportunity to increase gross margin. At the same time, the firm shifted from a 
focus on 'salesmanship' to a focus on 'customer service' to grow sales.  976
 John, Elaborations, 99.972
 Hopwood, Archaeology.973
 Pettigrew, Field research on change; Stinchcombe, Social Structures; Hannan and 974
Freeman, Organizational Ecology.
 Kelly and Amburgey, Organisational inertia, also noted that firms tend towards inertia 975
but that once started, change can create its own momentum.
 See section on Motivation in Chapter 3 (Boots).976
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However, they achieved the changes within the existing PMM framework. To 
promote own-goods, the firm retained its focus on sales rather than change to 
margin-based measures. They emphasised the importance of own-goods sales in 
The Bee. They also introduced a new bonus in 1930 which rewarded store 
managers for sales of own-goods products. However, this did not replace the 
existing sales bonus, rather the new bonus was subsumed within the existing 
bonus and was only payable if the store achieved overall sales growth. The 
primary objective for store managers remained unchanged as did the primary way 
of rewarding them. In order to promote customer service, the firm changed the 
focus through communication in The Bee. The sales competitions and symbolic 
incentives of the early 1920's were scaled back. Instead, John Boot launched his 
'Service Letter No. 1' in 1925 and customer service was emphasised increasingly 
in articles. In 1928, a 'casual customer' was introduced to tour stores and write 
articles about the good and bad practice experienced. The overall objective for 
store managers remained the same - more sales. They were also still encouraged 
to tailor their approach to suit the local environment. However, the firm hoped to 
change emphasis and behaviours through communication without changing 
objectives or introducing new measures. 
At M&S, the firm shifted from an emphasis on statistics, formal measures and 
processes to understand performance in the 1930's to evaluation which prioritised 
personal 'probing' from the 1950's. It represented a shift towards an 'informal' 
process for learning about the performance of the business. It was achieved not 
through the creation of new structures, processes or measures. Indeed, through 
Operation Simplification, procedure manuals were removed and significant 
amounts of data were no longer collected. Perhaps more importantly, however, 
Simon Marks, Israel Sieff and the other directors emphasised repeatedly the 
importance of probing and the responsibility for all employees to understand 
performance.  The emphasis was still prevalent when the Harvard researchers 977
undertook their analysis in the 1970's. 
 See section on Evaluation in Chapter 2 (M&S)977
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The examples suggest an alternative way of achieving the dynamism considered 
an essential part of modern PMM systems. Rather than relying on formal, 
prescriptive processes and specific measures which need to evolve as the 
strategy and environment change, firms should consider using broader objectives 
and general measures which can accommodate change. These should be 
underpinned by emphasis of the expected behaviours. It is a point which has only 
recently been recognised in the PMM literature. As Melnyk et al. highlight, it is 
difficult to identify specific measures when the outcome is uncertain.  978
The findings, however, can be broadened to consider not only change in the 
environment over time but also the different environments encountered by firms 
with large numbers of operating units. In the case studies, each of the firms 
recognised the diverse range of environments in which their stores operated - a 
small store in an affluent town in Oxfordshire faced different challenges from a 
large store in inner-city Manchester.  Broad measures and loosely defined 979
processes provided the flexibility for managers to tailor their approaches to the 
local environment. They also provided assurance to Head Office that all shops 
were aligned behind the core objectives of the firm. Beyond retail, few firms have 
similar numbers of operating units, the environments in which they operate may 
however be more diverse. Manufacturers, whether operating units spread across 
countries or working within networks, operate in environments with different 
histories and cultures. This is recognised in recent PMM literature as an area in 
need of additional research, whether focused on international organisations or on 
collaborative networks.  The case studies support the view. What may be 980
particularly interesting would be international retail firms - there are examples of 
retailers who have succeed overseas (Ikea, H&M, Zara) but many have struggled 
(Wal-Mart in Germany, Tesco in the United States, Marks & Spencer in nearly all 
overseas locations). Understanding their different approaches to PMM could 
provide important insights.
 Melnyk et al., Fit for the future.978
 As reflected in the focus of individual store performance in the statistical packs of both 979
M&S and Boots.
 Franco-Santos et al. Contemporary; Bititci et al. Challenges.980
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Measurement in a PMM system
The introduction explained that performance measurement has been the central 
theme of the PMM literature over the last 25 years. While it has been argued that 
performance measurement cannot be separated from performance management 
and there have been calls for more focus on measurement within management, 
articles exclusively on performance measurement continue to outnumber those on 
performance management.  The introduction identified, however, some specific 981
issues with performance measurement which challenge their central role in a 
PMM system:
(1) Not all drivers of performance can be easily measured. Proxies may help 
communicate intent but lack validity, reliability or both. There have been 
particular problems with input measures and those that try to measure 
capability. 
(2) Firms have struggled to link the different measures in a PMM system and don't 
understand the interdependencies between measures. 
(3) Even when an individual measure is analysed, it may not provide the level of 
understanding required to manage performance. Measures, such as averages, 
provide only a partial understanding of performance and require interpretation. 
Interpretation requires capability. 
Given the widespread concerns in the literature, a second objective for the case 
studies was identified:
"How did the firms use measures to understand performance?" 
The findings from each of the case studies support the views expressed in some 
recent research which argues that measures are "just indicators of performance 
 See Chapter 1 - Introduction.981
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and not real performance."  Indeed, one could go further, how the three firms 982
used measures suggests that measures may not even be good indicators of 
performance. Each of the firms had compensating mechanisms in place to provide 
the level of understanding required to manage performance. 
In the case of WHS, the paucity of measures before the 1950's and the apparent 
limited use made of them could relate to accounting weaknesses, a management 
system which delegated responsibility for performance down the hierarchy and an 
objective which prioritised a steady return over growth. The cases of M&S and 
Boots, however, suggest something more relevant for modern PMM systems. Both 
firms developed sophisticated measurement systems in the 1920's (Boots) and 
1930's (M&S). Performance reports showed the range of measures employed and 
management commentaries demonstrated detailed analysis of the measures. 
However, in the case of Boots, there was little development in the measures 
generated after 1930 with statistical packs and reports relying on the same 
measures in 1970 as 1930. Quantitative performance measures, reported widely 
in The Bee in the 1920's, were hardly reported at all in the magazine from the 
1930's. By the 1950's, management reports were increasingly focused on just 
financial measures and ignored operational drivers of performance.  M&S went 983
further. Management reports in the 1930's to the mid-1950's demonstrated a 
capability to report and interpret a broad range of financial and non-financial 
measures. However, from the 1950's onwards, M&S became vocal critics of over 
reliance on measures and the criticism continued throughout the period under 
examination. Through 'Operation Simplification', they even stopped collecting data 
which had been used to measure performance in the 1930's.  984
The specific criticisms of measures and the ways that the firm used them echo 
concerns raised in the current literature and highlighted in the three points above.
 Bourne et al. Emerging.982
 This is consistent with the findings of Johnson and Kaplan, Relevance Lost.983
 Employee turnover and absence data. See section on "Measures" in Chapter 2 (M&S)984
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Firstly, the firms recognised that performance is driven by many factors and not all 
are measurable. In the case of Boots, the example from The Bee, also reflected in 
guidance for TGM's, showed the range of factors which contributed to a high 
performing store. Of the 37 factors identified, however, less than five could be 
measured quantitatively and the remainder were subjective.  Boots did not even 985
try to create quantitative measures for the subjective factors - when they increased 
their focus on customer service in the late 1920's, they used a 'Casual Customer' 
who toured stores anonymously and reported his experience directly to the 
directors and wrote articles for The Bee.  In M&S, the focus was more on the 986
product than the store. However, many of the factors that were important to 
understand performance were subjective and difficult to measures. A director for 
example, pointed out that Checking Lists concealed the detail of "fast sellers, slow 
sellers, good colours, bad colours, correct and incorrect size ratios, good quality, 
poor quality."  Both examples also illustrate a focus on input measures - 987
understanding the drivers of future performance. Modern PMM systems identify 
the need for input measures but practitioners have reported that they are hard to 
quantify and therefore use.988
Secondly, the examples illustrate that performance is driven by several factors. 
They can be examined separately (e.g. store cleanliness/ quality of material) but 
they also need to be examined in relation to other factors (holistically). For 
example, whether the store environment promotes sales reflects store cleanliness 
but also product layout, the customer greeting, etc. The saleability of a dress 
reflects the quality of the material but also the colour, shape of the cut, etc. This 
suggests two levels of analysis - at an individual level but also at a holistic level 
where the individual elements come together in what the customer sees or 
experiences.
 Such as store cleanliness, levels of service, quality of staff, the greeting customers 985
receive. See section on "Evaluation" in Chapter 3 (Boots).
 See "Evaluation" section in Chapter 3 (Boots).986
 GD Sacher, “Probing in the Seventies”, 25 June 1969 M&S E7/19 Corporate 987
Governance Management Committee 1968 - 1972.
 Melnyk et al, Fit for the future.988
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Thirdly, they recognised that statistics do not always provide sufficient detail to 
understand the variance in performance. In performance reports, both firms 
reported overall sales (i.e. the average) but also the sales of individual stores 
(largest stores, smallest stores, fastest growing, etc.) In M&S, directors also 
looked at individual product performance in detail receiving copies of Checking 
Lists throughout the period. Actual results from the 1939 Boots statistical pack help 
to illustrate why directors focused on the individual performance and not just the 
aggregated performance - of the 20 largest stores, only 7 were within 1 
percentage point of the average of 2.7% year on year sales growth. The range 
was from +25.1% down to -8.6%.  The best performers highlighted opportunities 989
to improve the rest, the worst could indicate risks which might affect other stores.
The examples challenge whether performance measures alone can provide the 
level of understanding required to manage performance, particularly where 
reliance is placed on aggregated measures reported in a framework such as the 
Balanced Scorecard. The examples also suggest that the answer lies not in better 
measures but rather a reconsideration of how directors and senior mangers 
located in distant Head Offices can understand the performance of their business. 
In all three firms, there was an expectation that employees had both a deep 
understanding of performance but also a broad understanding which transcended 
their own areas of functional responsibility. This was achieved by narrowing the 
gap between Head Office and the stores. This aim was evident in the case studies 
at both the start and end of the period. The firms achieved this by encouraging 
Head Office staff to visit stores, attend regional conferences, and examine and try 
products. Structures and formal reporting processes were created to narrow the 
gap but the informal processes and behaviours were more important.
The examples reflect a challenge to how current performance measurement and 
management systems are described in the PMM literature. Here, the focus of 
directors is on strategy and the PMM system ensures that they obtain the 
information needed to manage strategy delivery through monitoring 
 Their analysis excluded non-comparable stores which, for example, were being 989
extended or refurbished. Boots (BTC 461 Statistical Pack)
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dashboards.  This is some way from how the three firms managed performance. 990
One might dismiss the difference as particular to these three firms and the period 
in which they operated. Firms, one might argue, are more strategically focused 
now and the role of directors is to manage the long term strategy rather than 
immerse themselves in the detail. Technology now allows for faster and cheaper 
data processing and process development has improved the capability of firms to 
analyse the data. Evidence presented in the introduction, however, suggests that 
despite these advances, the measures used in PMM systems are failing to deliver 
the knowledge required to manage performance.  There is also a growing body 991
of evidence presented in recent literature, but not widely referenced in PMM 
literature, that the approach of M&S, Boots and WH Smith is not as 'old-fashioned' 
as one might think. 
Rose has highlighted the fallacy of using aggregated data to understand 
performance, in his case in relation to educational achievement, and highlights the 
importance of understanding individual performance to understand the whole - to 
analyse and then aggregate rather than the other way around.  Johnson 992
describes practices at Toyota where senior managers immerse themselves in the 
detail by observing performance first hand. As he argues, their approach reflects a 
view that "results (and problems) ultimately emanate from and are explained by 
complex processes and concrete relationships, not by abstract quantitative 
relationships that describe results in simple linear, additive terms.  Mintzberg has 993
consistently argued that directors and managers need to spend more time with 
employees "on the ground" and observe first-hand how the business is 
 Kaplan and Norton, Mastering.990
 Bourne et al., Emerging, argue that if PMM systems were effective, why did the 991
banking crisis come as such a surprise to firms. It is an interesting reflection given that 
PMM systems are supposed to be about learning but a major criticism of the bank's 
directors was that they did not understand the risks that their businesses faced. The 
economist John Kay of the Financial Times argued that accounting practices which give 
"an appearance of precision" were partly to blame ("Don't always believe a Balance 
Sheet", Financial Times on-line, 17 February 2016, (https://www.ft.com/content/95895178-
d49c-11e5-829b-8564e7528e54)
 Rose, End of Average.992
 Johnson, Lean, 8.993
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operating.  The views link with what has been described as a "profound shift" in 994
how firms now 'try to learn' in a business. While previously the focus was on 
analytical thinking (dealing with independent variables), it is now about holistic 
thinking (understanding interdependent sets of variables).  995
These examples seem to describe the historical practices at M&S, Boots and 
WHS more than the descriptions of current PMM systems in the PMM literature. 
They suggest that the practices at the three firms cannot be dismissed as 
historical anomalies. They support the view that we need to reconsider the way 
modern firms use measurement to understand performance.  They also suggest 996
a way that further research can be done - by observing the informal practices 
directors and managers use to understand performance. This implies observing 
practices in store or on production lines. It requires understanding how managers 
and directors interpret what they observe and how the learning they gain from 
these visits is translated in Head Offices into actions - both strategic and 
operational. This represents an opportunity for further research albeit difficult to 
undertake. This form of research is resource intensive and time consuming. It also 
requires a researcher to have a deep understanding of the industry they are 
observing. It echoes a call by Berry et al. in the related field of management 
control where they call for more research on "real control systems" in order to 
narrow the gap between theory and practice.997
PMM and Culture
As the introduction explained, the impact of socio-cultural factors have not been 
adequately researched in PMM systems. While there is a recognition that they are 
 Quoted in "Some half-truths of management", 22 March 2017 (http://994
www.mintzberg.org/blog/half-truths-management) However, he has been a long term 
advocate of managers and directors immersing themselves in the detail. Mintzberg, 
Musings; Managing; on management.
 Gharajedaghi, Systems Thinking.995
 Bourne et al, Emerging; Gray et al., Measurement Madness.996
 Berry et al., Emerging Themes.997
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important, it is not clear in what way. The objective raised in Chapter 1 specifically 
focused on how culture is used by firms to influence PMM systems:
"What role did cultural factors play in how performance was managed within 
the firms?"
The findings from all three case studies suggest that cultural factors were the most 
important factor in shaping how performance was managed. Specifically, all three 
firms sought to nurture a culture which generated loyalty among employees. At 
M&S, Simon Marks said that loyalty and the devotion of the management and staff 
was one of the firms great assets.  At WHS, one of the non-executive directors 998
reflecting back on the firm noted that, "one of the interesting things that one found, 
what impressed one, was the immense loyalty to the family of the company."  At 999
Boots, the Chairman reported that "the key-note of the whole organisation is 
LOYALTY, the biggest thing in life.”  The three examples were not isolated 1000
references but repeated throughout the period.1001
Based on the sources, the firms used a number of tools to promote their culture, 
identity and loyalty to manage performance.
Firstly, all three firms used their history. WHS stressed its heritage, links with the 
family and traditional way of doing things to promote its conservative approach to 
performance. They achieved this through celebrations of anniversaries, use of 
artefacts, rituals and narratives.  M&S also referred to its traditions and the debt 1002
it owed to its past in both internal and external speeches. Simon Marks, in 
particular, was keen to anchor the firm's development in the actions of his 
 Simon Marks: Thinking about the Business. 1954. M&S CR/C/2/80 Collated Business 998
Reports 1950 - 1984.
 WHS Q 14 Reminiscences: H N Saunders.999
 From a speech given by George Gales to staff and reproduced in The Bee, April 1924.1000
 See "Linking the System" section in each of the case study chapters. While there 1001
were references to loyalty in M&S and WHS throughout the period, it was only heavily 
referenced in Boots in the 1920's. It is not clear whether this reflects gaps in the sources 
or a change in view.
 See section on "Linking the System" in Chapter 4 (WHS).1002
 276
father.  In Boots, although there is less evidence, both The Bee and The 1003
Beacon included stories about the firm's past and reproduced interviews with older 
employers who recalled the firm's origins.  Training material in the 1960's also 1004
highlighted the firm's origins and the role of Jesse Boot.  A particular feature in 1005
the narratives and rituals was linking the firms' histories to the founding 'family' but 
extending the 'family' to include all members of the firm. Notably, in WHS, all 
employees with more than 21 years service were invited to the coming of age 
party for each succeeding generation of the Smith family.1006
Secondly, the firm's repeatedly reminded employees of the importance of loyalty. 
At WHS, the first toast at company celebrations was always to "The Firm" in 1920 
through to 1970. It was an opportunity for employees to reaffirm their loyalty to the 
firm. As one of them said in a toast, "loyalty counted for a lot in the life of WH 
Smith men."  At Boots, the importance of loyalty was stressed in The Bee by 1007
directors including George Gales. Guidance to TGM's also reminded them to 
assess the loyalty of their managers on store visits.  At M&S the importance of a 1008
loyal workforce was highlighted in AGM's as well as internal speeches.
Thirdly, each of the firms built 'loyalty' into their processes. At Boots, loyalty was 
one of the specific attributes employees were assessed on in their annual 
performance evaluation. WHS appeared to prioritise recruitment in favour of the 
family of existing employees - not just as director level but also in departments and 
stores.  At M&S, only members of the Marks/Sieff families or long-serving 1009
employees were appointed executive directors. The store structure in M&S, with a 
store manager and store manageress, as Harvard researchers pointed out, was 
created to mirror a family structure in store. 
 See the "Introduction" in Chapter 2 (M&S).1003
 The Beacon, January 1933 to January 1934.1004
 BTC 450/10 - Training Notes of Miss M Waterhouse (early 1960’s).1005
 See section on "Linking the System" in Chapter 4 (WHS).1006
 WHS Newsbasket, October 1921.1007
 BTC A 89/33 - Role of the Territorial General Managers1008
 See section on "Linking the System" in Chapter 4 (WHS).1009
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Fourthly, each of the firms were early investors in welfare. There may have been 
altruistic reasons but M&S in particular argued in external speeches that it 
promoted loyalty.  Welfare services extended beyond medical and pension 1010
provision. Each of the firms created sports teams and social clubs where 
employees could compete equally alongside employees from all levels in the firm.
Finally, each of the firms had company magazines which they used to share 
stories about themselves. Although The Bee, Talking Shop and the Bulletin were 
more business oriented, the others were socially oriented reporting on marriages, 
births and celebrations. They reported the activities of sports and social clubs. 
They also reproduced the speeches of directors at various company social events 
ensuring messages were spread across the entire store network. Retailers were 
not alone in using sports clubs and company magazines to promote cultural values 
but the benefit was more pronounced in firms where employees were spread 
across the country, far from the direct influence of Head Office.1011
If the firms sought to cultivate certain cultural drivers, what was the relevance from 
a PMM perspective? Promotion of a common culture and identity, particularly one 
associated with loyalty, helped bind the employees to the objectives of the 
directors and their principles. This was particularly important given the operational 
problems faced by multiple retailers; Head Offices were far from stores, store 
managers and customers. Store managers were responsible for safeguarding the 
relationship with the customer but also the largest assets (property, stock, cash) 
and for managing the largest operating expense (salaries). However, promotion of 
loyalty went beyond controlling the actions of managers. Each of the firms 
recognised the store as the primary unit of performance. They recognised that 
each store faced its own local competition and had to respond to the local 
environment. Managers therefore needed to have the flexibility to respond to the 
local context. Directors had to be confident that managers would do this for the 
best interests of the firm without constraining their actions. 
 See section on the Objectives of the Organisation in Chapter 2 (M&S).1010
 Heller, Company Magazines.1011
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The firms' use of culture to align employees behind the objectives of the firm 
shows an alternative to the command and control structures and processes 
assumed to exist at the time in PMM literature.  It also shows an alternative to 1012
the formal frameworks and models of modern PMM systems where targets and 
measures bind employees to the the firm's objectives. It supports the view that 
PMM systems are social systems. As such, the cases bear some resemblance to 
the purposeful socio-cultural systems described as part of third generation 
systems thinking.  Such systems are said to resemble living systems which 1013
organise through cultural codes, are knowledge based and rely on holistic rather 
than analytical thinking.  These systems eschew reliance on traditional 1014
management accounting controls to manage performance.  Indeed, the more 1015
complex the formal controls become, the harder it can be for an organisation to 
maintain control.  Therefore a firm such as WHS can operate successfully in the 1016
absence of formal structures and processes with few measures. M&S could 
similarly afford to dispense with procedure manuals and measurement data 
because "by replacing them with a set of principles and an understanding of the 
Company’s philosophy, management began to manage instead of becoming 
interpreters of the written word.”  All three built systems which prioritised loyalty 1017
(and two focused on family and kinship). All three focused on understanding 
performance holistically by observing it in store rather than rely on management 
accounting information.
The case studies therefore challenge the way we think about PMM systems. 
Euske et al. had shown the importance of cultural factors in managing 
performance of international firms in the early 1990's. They noted how important 
 See Chapter 1.1012
 Gharajedaghi, Systems Thinking.1013
 Gharajedaghi, Systems Thinking; Johnson, Lean.1014
 Johnson, Former.1015
 Fear, Thyssen, 785.1016
 Speech about Operation Simplification. “The War on Paper Bureaucracy” Lecture by 1017
Sir Derek Rayner to the Institute of Administrative Management at Painters Hall, London, 
on 22 May 1975. (A04/117 K Various Papers and Speeches)
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culture was in guiding the actions of employees particularly in times of 
uncertainty.  Since then, socio-cultural factors have not received the attention 1018
they warranted in PMM literature.  More recently, that has started to change 1019
with a several papers explicitly acknowledging that PMM systems are social 
systems.  And, understanding the implications of this is said to be one of the 1020
biggest challenges for PMM research going forward.  The case studies support 1021
this view but also emphasise that firms can cultivate the culture to achieve their 
performance objectives and use culture to manage performance on an on-going 
basis - culture is therefore an endogenous rather than exogenous factor and 
needs to be built into frameworks accordingly.1022
Further work needs to be undertaken. Examining what happened to the case study 
firms after 1970 might shed light on whether they lost their holistic approach to 
performance management. David Sieff, grand-son of Israel Sieff, lamented in 2004 
that M&S's subsequent decline was at least partly because of the loss of shared 
culture - they had stopped probing, recruited a Chairman externally and forgotten 
the principles on which the firm was founded.1023
The developing area of systems thinking also represents an interesting avenue to 
take research on PMM systems. Gharajedaghi argues that systems thinking 
represents a new way to consider how we manage firms in complex, chaotic 
environments.  Johnson attributes it to Japanese practices.  Both encourage 1024 1025
 Euske et al. Performance Management.1018
 There have been some studies (Henri, Organisational Culture; Bititci et al., 1019
Dynamics.) but they can be partial and culture is still recognised as an areas needing 
further research.
 Bititci et al. Challenges; Gray et al. Measurement Madness; Melnyk et al. Fit for the 1020
future.
 Bititci et al. Challenges.1021
 See recent culture literature - Weber and Dacin, Cultural Construction; Giorgi et al, 1022
Many faces.
 "Sieff's despair at lack of 'probing' at M&S" Retail Week, 18 June 2004 (https://1023
www.retail-week.com/sieffs-despair-at-lack-of-probing-at-ms/1714678.article)
 Gharajedaghi, Systems Thinking.1024
 Johnson, Lean.1025
 280
its wider use. However, the cases of M&S, Boots and WHS suggest that some 
British firms adopted at least some of the principles some time ago.  Business 1026
historians therefore have an opportunity to explore systems thinking in a historical 
context. Importantly, if a systems approach to performance management did 
operate in the past, why was it subsequently lost. The pressure that both Boots 
and WHS were under from external consultants in the 1960's to adopt divisional 
structures, convert TGM's/ Area Managers into inspectors and create a more 
control oriented system may offer some clues.  For PMM researchers, more 1027
actively engaging in systems thinking may identify new challenges. In particular, is 
Johnson's challenge that firms do not need measures to manage performance 
practical?  The case studies do not explicitly support this but they do show that 1028
measures are not as important as current PMM research suggests and that socio-
cultural factors were perhaps the most important tool available to manage 
performance in the past.
 Recent corporate histories identify the importance of cultural factors in the 1026
management of businesses - Fear, Thyssen; Jones, Unilever.
 See sections on "Structures" in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.1027
 Johnson and Broms, Profit beyond Measure.1028
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